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CIS/RUSSIA ARMED FORCES

'13 Little Known Facts' On GRU

93UM0115A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 10 Oct 92 p 3

[Article by A. Korzun and V. Filin: "Stirlits Worked at the 'Aquarium': 13 Little Known Facts from the Life of the Main Intelligence Directorate"]

[Text] 1. The GRU, or Russian Armed Forces General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate, is purely military intelligence, the sphere of interest of which is—a) foreign armed forces; b) equipment and weaponry; c) the level of preparation of possible theaters of combat operations; and, d) the economy that operates on the enemy's armed forces.

One of the covers or the "roof" utilized in the work of a GRU intelligence agent on foreign territory, is a diplomatic post. There are also so-called illegals, that is, intelligence officers who work under aliases and who live according to a painstakingly developed legend. For example, Maksim Maksimovich Isayev, he is Stirlits.

2. According to certain information, a total of five journalists have been able to visit GRU Headquarters Building near Khodynskiy Pole during the GRU's entire history: last year former GRU Chief Vladlen Mikhaylov received a British journalist and a journalist from APN ["Novosti" Press Agency] who accompanied him, later the authors of this article were there, and new GRU Chief Yevgeniy Timokhin met with a KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent during the spring of 1992.

3. There are a little more than a dozen and a half traitors and "non-returnees" (those people whom they could not "arrest" and shoot in the homeland) that we know about. Of them, the most famous are Penkovskiy and Polyakov. Smetanin and Filatov are less well known. (All of them were shot at some time). Of the latter number of "non-returnees", the names of Colonels Krapiva and Dvyrnik who "left" last year have been leaked to the press. A literary gift is customarily awakened in some of those who have left and not returned. For example, Viktor Suvorov's book "Akvarium" [Aquarium] was published in Great Britain in 1987. It was published in our country for the first time in 1991, but, in the words of the street vendors, is not enjoying any great demand. Suvorov's real name is Vladimir Bogdanovich Rezun, in the past a GRU major who went over to the side of British intelligence in Switzerland. In General Mikhaylov's words, right now Rezun is living on the grounds of a British intelligence unit approximately 70 kilometers from London. The title "Akvarium" was bestowed by him on the GRU Headquarters Building itself that was initially built as a military hospital. Many GRU officers prefer a simpler name—"Steklyashka" [piece of glass].

4. The GRU's foundation are intelligence sections and intelligence directorates in the armies and military districts and also special-purpose units and subunits that

are subordinate to them. GRU "Spetsnaz"—these are not OMON [special-purpose militia unit] or OMSDON [separate special-purpose motorized rifle divisions] but people who have been trained to operate as small groups in the enemy deep rear area under any conceivable or inconceivable conditions. There is also a special subunit in the GRU where until last year Communist and Socialist "friends" from Latin America, Asia, and Africa studied the art of conducting partisan wars and carrying out terrorist acts. According to certain information, the current president of an African country and another 5-6 ministers from the developing countries underwent training here.

5. GRU leaders, as a rule, were from the army environment, more rarely from the KGB, including non-professionals in intelligence. None of them were ever members of the Ministry of Defense collegium. Colonel-General, now Pensioner Petr Ivashutin was in power in the GRU the longest of all of them—from 1963 through 1986. Just like in the army, there was always a political department in the GRU. The political section chief along with the first deputy GRU chief and the personnel directorate chief composed the so-called "troyka" which determined who deserved to work abroad and who did not. According to testimony from GRU agents, the decisive word was left to the "main political leader"—right up until the elimination of the political section last year and the retirement of its last chief General Prokhorov. Many people in the GRU also passed through the school of work in the CPSU Central Committee. The KGB carried out counterintelligence monitoring which offended the GRU officers.

6. Like everywhere else in the country, it was customary in the GRU to express "loyalty to the Leninist course" through expensive, including those beyond the means, gifts to the leadership. Nearly all ministers of defense and chiefs of the General Staff received expensive "souvenirs" from the GRU—collector's rifles, inlaid knives, and so forth, naturally, at the expense of the department's hard currency treasury.

7. Since service in the GRU was nearly the highest good fortune in an officer's army career, protectionism in the various branches of service was perceived as appropriate. Penkovskiy, currently the most famous GRU traitor—had access to the family of the then GRU Chief Serov and frequently carried out his personal errands. Serov was later removed from the post and demoted to major-general, soon after which he died. Former GRU Political Department Chief Dolin "watched over" the Traitor Smetanin. General Polyakov, who was shot in 1986, was on "good terms" with the former personnel directorate chief and underwent 15 years of training in the Central Committee by Party Worker Izotov. According to certain information, expensive gifts that Polyakov gave to Izotov figure in the Polyakov affair. For example, for the rank of general, Polyakov presented a silver service to Izotov that had been previously acquired by the CIA and given to Polyakov. Brezhnev's

wife's distant relative, as they say, successfully served in the GRU. He obtained rank and positions surprisingly rapidly.

8. Until recently, you could end up on a special temporary duty assignment "regardless of personality", despite the strict demands made of "extractors", that is, those officers who work abroad. They sent former GRU Personnel Directorate Chief Admiral L. on a mission when he was 60 years old. Evil tongues say that he went to administer retribution against traitors that he himself had sent to the rezidenturas [intelligence mission in foreign country]. Once again, despite the high demands made of "GRU workers abroad", 95-97 percent of the serious intelligence information is obtained from open sources and using radiotechnical systems, including on satellites.

9. GRU cadres are primarily trained within the walls of the military-diplomatic academy that is located near the "Oktyabrskoye pole" Metro station. The course of study can take 3-5 years, depending on the specialization. Until recently, it was nearly impossible to rent or purchase an apartment on "Polezhayevskaya" and "Oktyabrskoye pole", all the more so to foreigners, due to the density of NII and military units who worked at the GRU. They train illegals differently: based on other programs and in private apartments which compose sort of separate classes of the nonexistent General Staff Higher School building.

10. Since targets beyond the borders of the USSR-CIS are the focus of the GRU's attention, the foundation of foundations is knowledge of the language of the country of assignment that has been honed to perfection. They told us an anecdote that was circulating in the GRU. They had ordered a scientist to illegally penetrate into a foreign country, to become naturalized there, and to transfer scientific-technical information of an intelligence nature after that. The scientist was not opposed to that but he said that he didn't know the language.

"Don't worry about it," they said, "Act like a mute".

"And what if I suddenly talk in my sleep?", the scientist asked.

"It won't happen," they assured him, "We'll cut your tongue out..."

Besides languages, an intelligence agent is required to know how to recruit agents. During his studies, he can be trained while doing this against his own fellow citizens. So, a chatterbox was previously a find for a spy.

11. Horrible stories about monsters from the GRU who are capable of carrying out coups either in Baku, Vilnius, and then again somewhere in Uryupinsk have been greatly exaggerated. Rumors about "chekizm" [security mania] in the GRU have been just as greatly exaggerated. The building looks dilapidated from within and is not comparable to the corridors at Lubyanka, and the furniture in the GRU chief's office (when Vladlen

Mikhaylov received us) was under 13 year-old smooth green woolen cloth and a small strip of paper with the name of the owner of the "other end"—"Shebarshin" (then USSR KGB First Main Directorate Chief) was pasted on only one direct telephone.

"Does it ring?", we asked with interest.

"So far, not even once," responded Mikhaylov.

12. According to very confidential information obtained by one of us already last year, the GRU knows where it needs to look for the Yantar [Amber] Room. The precise location of its preservation was reported to the "appropriate levels", including to the President of Russia, in autumn 1991. A second letter on that same subject was sent to Boris Yeltsin this spring. Neither of the letters has been answered thus far.

13. And the latest news from the "Akvarium". A professional, 55 year-old Lieutenant-General Fedor Ladygin has replaced former Colonel-General of PVO [Air Defense] Yevgeniy Timokhin, a man who came to the intelligence community by chance.

Last Subunits Leave Poland

*93UM0117B Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
29 Oct 92 Morning edition p 1*

[Article by Leonid Kornilov, IZVESTIYA correspondent: "The Poles Have Bid Farewell to the Units of the Former Soviet Army"]

[Text] The last combat subunit of troops of the former USSR left Poland on 28 October. A brigade of torpedo boats departed Swinoujscie (Baltic Sea coast on the border with Germany). All tanks, armored transport vehicles, aircraft, ships, and artillery pieces were withdrawn earlier.

About 6,000 of our servicemen remain on Polish territory. They will support the transit of troops from the FRG and the removal of property in Poland, and this is about 100,000 tonnes. They are not armed, and the last soldier will leave Poland no later than the end of next year.

Soviet troops were located in Poland for nearly half a century, and the intergovernmental treaty on their stay on Polish territory was signed in 1956. However, as the newspaper ZYCIE WARSZAWY writes, the Polish side never knew exactly how many Soviet soldiers and weapons were located in the country. Our army had 58 garrisons and 13 airfields on an area of more than 80,000 hectares in 13 provinces.

In accordance with the treaty signed during President L. Walesa's May visit to Moscow, the last combat unit of the Russian Army was supposed to leave Poland before 15 November. Thus, the obligations have been carried out ahead of schedule.

Official Details Armed Forces Manning

93UN0396A Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY
in Russian No 46-47, Nov 92 p 7

[Response by R. Bykov, press service official at the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense, to reader's letter: "The Army"]

[Text] Pavel Grachev, minister of defense of the Russian Federation, declared recently that the situation with respect to manning the Armed Forces today has become extremely complicated. Would it be possible to ask you to comment on this statement "using figures?"

[Signed] V. Lebedev, Kursk.

At the present time a total of only 65 percent of our Armed Forces consist of conscripts (Ground Forces—58 percent, Air Defense Forces—60 percent, Air Force—61 percent, and Rocket Troops—85 percent). Owing to this, a situation has developed in the army in which many units and large units simply lack the ability to conduct their daily activity even at the minimally required level. This is very likely the reason for the numerous accidents that are occurring in the army.

In 1992 the number of draftees amounted to 20 percent of the needs of the navy and the army for young replacements. In addition there is a steady increase in the number of draft evaders: While in 1989, 0.4 percent of the draftees did not show up at draft centers, in the first half of 1992 this figure rose by more than a factor of 17. In the spring of 1992, 17,800 persons illegally avoided service in the Armed Forces (of these, about 5,000 were in Moscow and Moscow Oblast). Characteristically the majority of "evaders" live in the large cities, while remote Russian areas, as previously, supply practically 100 percent of the draftees.

It is also impossible not to note the continual drop in the educational level of those called up for military service. Thus, in 1989 the breakdown of those called into military service was: with higher education—0.4 percent, with secondary education—91.1 percent, and with incomplete secondary education—8.5 percent. In 1991 the figures were 0.3 percent, 83 percent, and 16.7 percent, respectively.

DEN Chronicles 'Alarming' Military Events

934C0411C Moscow DEN in Russian
No 47, 22-28 Nov 92 p 1

[Unattributed report: "Alarming Chronicle"]

[Text] Contrary to the widely publicized statement about halting the withdrawal of troops from the Baltic states, the 107th Motorized Infantry Division has been secretly transferred from Vilnius to the Moscow area. The first echelons of the motorized infantry division have arrived and are being unloaded in Solnechnogorsk.

Support of the National Salvation Front by many military units brought a strange document to light entitled "Commentary of the Press Bureau of the Ministry of Defense of Russia," which not only prohibits officers from taking part in the work of the Front's structure but also prohibits the military press from even mentioning this organization.

In the event of the declaration of a state of emergency in the country, it is proposed to bring airborne troop units based in the Moscow area into the capital. In addition, it is planned to reinforce the VDV [airborne] units with troops withdrawn from republics of the CIS.

Recently the 109th Airborne Regiment, which was transferred from Lithuania, arrived in Naro-Fominsk.

On 23 October the Collegium of the Ministry of Defense came to a decision concerning the retaking of the officer's oath, although it is generally known that officers of all armies take the oath only once. It is this loyalty to the oath that is the essence of an officer's honor. This undertaking is against the law.

Opponents of retaking the oath who spoke at the conference of the Collegium—the commanders of the Air Force and the Navy, and other commanders—were unable to prevent the provocative decision. Moreover, they were told that such a position is fraught with possible discharge from the Armed Forces.

It seems that the leadership of Russia has added the lessons of the worst dictators to its armory. Lieutenant Colonel S. Terekhov, chairman of the Officers Union, is being discharged from military service and the victimization of a large number of other members of the organization has begun. Lieutenant-General Bogdanov, deputy minister of defense, is personally calling up assistants to troop commanders and instructing them on this score.

Staff Officers Threaten Force Against Coup

934C0411A Moscow DEN in Russian
No 47, 22-28 Nov 92 p 1

["Declaration by a Group of Generals and Officers of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and the Staff of the Moscow Military District": "A Putsch Will Not Work!"]

[Text] In connection with the promulgation on 31 October of this year in ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, published by the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation, of information indicating that there is evidence concerning the preparation of a coup d'etat by people in B.

Yeltsin's immediate circle (the article "People Around President Undermine Political Situation"), and also taking into account the well-known statement by the president himself, we are empowered to declare the following:

1. An attempt by any official or group of persons representing executive authority to use force to disperse the legally elected Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation and the Congress of People's Deputies of the Russian Federation will be regarded as a gross violation of the Constitution and the laws of the Russian Federation.

In this event, the Russian Armed Forces will come out against the organizers of the putsch and will suppress it by force.

2. The political struggle must proceed exclusively within the bounds set by the Constitution of the Russian Federation and legislation in force. The law must be the same both for the ordinary citizen and for the president of Russia.

When necessary, a constitutional change of the government and higher officials of the state, including those who fall under the action of Article 121-10 of the Constitution, is a generally accepted political practice and an absolutely normal occurrence in any democratic country.

3. The Armed Forces of the Russian Federation are loyal to the Constitution and to the oath to the Fatherland.

[Signed] Group of generals and officers of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and the staff of the Moscow Military District.

CIS: POLICY

CIS Veterans' Affairs Committee Meets

Decision on Medical Care

93UM0141A Moscow PATRIOT in Russian
No 42, Oct 92 (Signed to press 20 Oct 92) p 5

[Decision on the Main Directions of the Comprehensive, Inter-State Medical and Social Program for Protecting the Health of and Rehabilitating Soldiers/Internationalists and Their Families for the Period 1992-1995 under the rubric "Soldiers/Internationalists Affairs Committee"]

[Text] In view of the need more fully to meet the needs of the soldiers/internationalists for rehabilitation, prostheses and treatment at sanatoria and resorts, and for specialized, skilled medical aid, the governments participating in this decision have decided:

1. Generally to approve the main directions of the comprehensive inter-state social and medical program

for protecting the health of and rehabilitating soldiers/internationalists and their families for the period 1992-1995 (included herein).

2. To instruct the Soldiers/Internationalists Affairs Committee under the Council of Commonwealth Heads of State, together with the soldiers/internationalists affairs committees of the Commonwealth states, to finish work on the measures contained in the comprehensive inter-state medical and social program for protecting the health and rehabilitating the soldiers/internationalists and their families for the period 1992-1995.

3. To take into consideration the fact that the measures specified in this decision are financed with funds of the Veterans/Internationalists Affairs Committee in 1992 and with budgeted funds from these states in subsequent years, based on the number of soldiers/internationalists residing therein.

4. To instruct the Soldiers/Veterans Affairs Committee of Commonwealth Heads of State, the ministries of finance, the ministries of social protection and social security, the ministries of health and the ministries of defense of the Commonwealth states to work out the following proposals and submit them to the Council of Heads of Government for consideration in November of this year:

—for financing measures specified in the main directions of the comprehensive inter-state program for protecting the health of and rehabilitating soldiers/internationalists and their families for the period 1993-1995;

—for providing soldiers/internationalists with automatic increases in benefits in the areas of medical and social security, occupational training and job-placement, regardless of where they reside.

Drawn up in the city of Bishkek on 9 October 1992 in one original copy in the Russian language. The original is to be kept in the Archives of the Government of the Republic of Belarus, which will send certified copies to the states which are signatories to this decision.

The document was signed by representatives of the governments of Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, the Russian Federation, the republics of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, and Ukraine.

The representative of the government of Turkmenistan did not sign.

Decision on Aid to Strife-Torn Regions

93UM0141B Moscow PATRIOT in Russian
No 42, Oct 92 (Signed to press 20 Oct 92) p 5

[Decision on Inter-State Program for Assisting the Populations of Regions Which Have Suffered During Armed Conflicts and for the Immigrants and Refugees, under the rubric "The Soldiers/Internationalists Affairs Committee"]

[Text] Based on the need to coordinate the efforts of members of the Commonwealth of Independent States to improve the situation in areas of tensions and create the conditions to sustain a normal life for the populations of regions which have suffered during armed conflicts, as well as citizens forced to abandon their places of permanent residence due to such conflicts, the governments of the signatories to this decision have decided:

1. To support the proposal of the Soldiers/Internationalists Affairs Committee under the Council of Heads of Commonwealth States for developing and preparing for signing a draft Agreement on an Inter-State Program of Assistance for the Populations of Regions Which have Suffered During Armed Conflicts and for the Immigrants and Refugees.

2. To establish a working group to preparing a draft Agreement on an Inter-State Program of Assistance, consisting of deputy heads of government in charge of emergencies and with the involvement of corresponding ministries and departments, as well as the Main Command of the CIS Joint Armed Forces and the Soldiers/Internationalists Affairs Committee under the Council of Heads of Government of the Commonwealth States.

3. To instruct the working group (the Russian Federation's convocation) to prepare a draft agreement and submit it for consideration at the regular session of the Council of Heads of Commonwealth States by 1 November 1992.

Drawn up in the city of Bishkek on 9 October 1992 in a single original copy in the Russian language. The original copy is to be kept in the Archives of the Government of the Republic of Belarus, which will send a certified copy to the states which are signatories to the agreement.

The document contains the signatures of representatives of the governments of Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, the Russian Federations and the republics of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.

Representatives of the governments of Turkmenistan and Ukraine did not sign.

Committee Chairman Comments

93UM0141C Moscow PATRIOT in Russian
No 42, Oct 92 (Signed to press 20 Oct 92) p 5

[Interview with Ruslan Sultanovich Aushev, chairman of the Soldiers/Internationalists Affairs Committee, by PATRIOT correspondent N. Gavrilov: "And the Borders Are Giving Way"]

[Text] The heads of CIS governments which took part in the meeting in Bishkek approved a number of joint documents. They include two which were prepared and drawn up at the initiative of the Soldiers/Internationalists Affairs Committee. The first was the Decision on the Main Directions of the Comprehensive Inter-State Medical and Social Program for Protecting the Health of and

Rehabilitating Soldiers/Internationalists and Their Families for the Period 1992-1995. The second was the Decision on the Inter-State Program of Assistance for the Populations of Regions Which Have Suffered During Armed Conflicts and for the Immigrants and Refugees. (The documents are being published.)

Ruslan Sultanovich Aushev, chairman of the Soldiers/Internationalists Affairs Committee, attended the sessions at which these decisions were adopted. We asked him to comment on these documents and to tell how they were adopted.

[R.A.] The general impression was that the leaders of all the independent states of the Commonwealth were very understanding of the issues raised in the documents. Take the medical and social security program, for example. There is not a single republic of the former Union which does not have soldiers/internationalists in need of medical and social aid. Every independent state can do and is doing something for its citizens within the limits of its capabilities, of course. But let us be frank. They all have varying capabilities... while human beings are still human beings, wherever they may be. Russian or Ukrainian, Kazakh or Tajik—they are all equals in trouble: wounds, contusions, shock. We can help them most successfully only by uniting.

[Gavrilov] Ruslan Sultanovich, the Decision on the Inter-State Medical and Social Program does not have the signature of the representative of the government of Turkmenistan. Does this mean that not all of the governments were in agreement?

[R.A.] I cannot imagine why Turkmenistan's representative did not sign. Incidentally, no objections were raised when the matter was discussed in the session. The Ukraine's representative just requested a few amendments in the program itself. This is perfectly understandable. Every state considers its own specific interests. All the others remained silent, which indicated that they were in agreement. It is not clear why the signature was not forthcoming. The program was adopted, though. I am very glad that it was, and I am grateful to the heads of government for their concern for problems troubling the soldiers/internationalists.

[Gavrilov] And is the program itself realistic? A host of various programs have been approved in our country, and most of them are still just on paper.

[R.A.] It is perfectly realistic. We did not simply get together and think it up. It underwent a thorough polishing, so to speak. Alterations and amendments were made in it during the discussion in the Coordinating Council with the republics' representatives. And everything was geared to bringing it as close as possible to real life and feasible. There was no impossible fantasizing. Everything was based on sober calculation, on an optimal combination of our needs and our capabilities. Let us take a look at the main directions, and you will see that it is all realistic.

Next year it is planned to set up a data bank on medical and social services for soldiers/internationalists. The bank is already being created, and we have its first perceptible output. A number of ministries of the Commonwealth countries are participating in it.

It is planned to establish an International Center for Problems of Rehabilitating Soldiers/Internationalists and the Parents of Soldiers Who Have Been Killed. This undertaking is also already at the stage of practical implementation. The center is already taking its first steps—in the city of St. Petersburg. Work is already being done in this area.

It is planned to introduce medical insurance for our group to make it possible to obtain medical aid in any Commonwealth state. The problem will soon be resolved.

The provision of medical and social assistance and the social and occupational rehabilitation of soldiers/internationalists at the Rus, Baykal, Lazurnyy and Saki centers, regardless of their place of residence, occupies a prominent place in the program.

[Gavrilov] But the borders could be a hindrance.

[R.A.] Precisely. In the past that was true. Now, however, when we have a decision of the governments of all the states, this matter will be resolved rapidly and effectively.

We also understand that there must be people to work with the soldiers/internationalists. The program therefore specifies that an International School for the Training and Advance Training of Specialists in Rehabilitation and Social and Psychological Services is to be set up in Moscow. I believe that a system of such schools will be set up also in a number of other Commonwealth states.

We have to develop and improve centers for providing prostheses for the disabled. Centers like the Rus rehabilitation center and the prosthesis center in Yerevan, for example.

We are assuming that we shall be able to launch the construction of health and rehabilitation centers in the different economic and geographic regions of the Commonwealth states.

[Gavrilov] What about the money? How much will all of this cost?

[R.A.] A great deal. It will now be easier to acquire the money, however. The decision states that all measures scheduled for this year are to be financed by the committee. Then, beginning next year, all of the countries which have signed the decision will assume this obligation.

[Gavrilov] And those who have not signed it will not receive money? But there are soldiers/internationalists in those countries as well. What about them? Who is

going to help them? Their own governments? This is not always possible. Not every republic has its own rehabilitation or prosthesis centers.

[R.A.] The committee will not overlook not just the soldiers/internationalists residing in the CIS countries, but also those in states which do not belong to the Commonwealth.

[Gavrilov] One of the points in the decision instructs the committee, together with a number of the states' ministries, to work out and submit proposals for financing the measures contained in the program in November. This is an enormous job, and the deadline is approaching. Will you meet it?

[R.A.] We should. We need to. We are already working on it. I shall report the proposals to the Council of Heads of Commonwealth States in November.

The program also contains certain other proposals. They too are perfectly achievable. For one thing, it is planned for the Commonwealth states to build up a currency reserve for acquiring medicine and new prosthetic technologies, and for other needs. All of this is within our capabilities.

[Gavrilov] Ruslan Sultanovich, what can you tell us about the second decision, the one on the provision of assistance to populations which have suffered during armed conflicts, the immigrants and refugees?

[R.A.] It is only a beginning. We still have to prepare a draft agreement on an inter-state assistance program. It has been determined that our committee will also take an active part in this work.

[Gavrilov] How does one explain the fact that it was the committee which initiated the establishment of this program? This would appear to be somewhat removed from your direct duties.

[R.A.] Not entirely. How could it be "removed," when blood is being shed, when people are being forced to abandon their homes and flee to find refuge anywhere they can? This is not just their trouble, but our common trouble, our common misfortune. Obviously, the soldiers/internationalists are presently experiencing the full extent of this pain more than any other group of the population. They can see more clearly than many others what every military conflict does to the people. This is no doubt why the committee has taken the feelings of the soldiers/internationalists into account and proposed that we work out a Decision on an Inter-State Program of Assistance for the Populations of Regions Which Have Suffered During Armed Conflicts, the Immigrants and Refugees.

[Gavrilov] Thank you for the interview, Ruslan Sultanovich.

Round Table on Russian Security, Political, Economic Interests

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[Round table discussion with Sergey Stankevich, Sergey Blagovolin, Anatoliy Rakitov, Margarita Maksimova, Aleksey Gulko, Yuriy Nazarkin, Konstantin Borovoy, Vladimir Feodosyev, Iona Andronov and Ananiy Politsyn: "Russia's Interests: Security, Policy, Economy; Round Table in the Editor's Office of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA"]

[Text] Today, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA initiates a new section—"Russia's Interests: Security, Policy, Economy"—which we believe should assume an important and noticeable place in the newspaper.

National interests and national security have always been a topic in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA. But today we are sensing an ever-greater need for raising it to a qualitatively new level. The new realities born of extremely serious political, geopolitical and economic changes, the transitional status of the present Russian state, and its possibilities for the future require deep consideration. And this must be done as quickly as possible. Because prolonging establishment of the state and prolonging the state of uncertainty is no longer simply a threat to security but a threat to Russia's very existence.

Thus far, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, and many other publications as well, with the exception of just the specialized scientific journals, have looked at these problems at the level of separate publications. In the meantime it is totally obvious that massed and purposeful intellectual efforts and synthesis of different points of view, positions and conceptions are necessary in many directions of the problems of national interests and security.

This is the difficult work that KRASNAYA ZVEZDA wishes to assume. We invite politicians and military chiefs, economists and diplomats, defense executives and representatives of business circles, political scientists and sociologists, experts and analysts, historians and ecologists—all who are ready to talk seriously on this topic—to participate in this new section.

Precisely why is KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, a military newspaper, inviting all to participate in a discussion that goes far beyond the framework of just the military sphere alone? First of all because no attempts to conceptually solve problems in the military sphere can be possible without solving the general, global problems. And this is precisely the situation we encounter today in all things. Second, in this time when the discussion centers on Russia's survival and on the nation's integrity, somebody needs to take care of the constructive, creative work, to offer an alternative, if you will, to the journalism of distorted facts and sensation.

In this connection there is one important point that should be clarified immediately. Russia's interests and

the problems of its security are issues that are currently the object of a hard political struggle. But our purpose for starting a new section is not at all to offer someone the possibility to publicly exchange accusations, or to publicize anyone's narrow party and group views. We are starting it primarily to unite intellectual efforts, to find answers to questions which are equally important to all Russians regardless of their political positions, convictions and interests.

And so, we begin this new section with a major publication (see below) on a round-table meeting in the editor's office, during which, we believe, an extremely wide range of problems were identified and a number of conceptual issues were raised for further discussion and development.

The participants of the round-table discussion were:

Andronov, Iona Ionovich—deputy chairman of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet Committee for International Affairs and Foreign Economic Ties;

Blagovolin, Sergey Yevgenyevich—president of the Institute of National Security and Strategic Research. Doctor of economic sciences, professor;

Borovoy, Konstantin Natanovich—co-chairman of the Party of Economic Freedom;

Gulko, Aleksey Yakovlevich—deputy chief of the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Russian Federation Armed Forces. Lieutenant general;

Maksimova, Margarita Matveyevna—chief scientific associate of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the Russian Academy of Sciences. Doctor of economic sciences, professor;

Nazarkin, Yuriy Konstantinovich—special ambassador, chief, Disarmament Administration of the Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Affairs;

Politsyn, Ananiy Vasilyevich—first deputy chief of the Center for Military Strategic Research, General Staff of the Russian Federation Armed Forces. Lieutenant general;

Rakitov, Anatoliy Ilich—director of the Information and Analysis Center of the Administration of the President of the Russian Federation. Doctor of philosophical sciences, professor;

Stankevich, Sergey Borisovich—advisor to the president of the Russian Federation on political issues;

Feodosyev, Vladimir Lvovich—chief specialist of the Russian Federation Ministry of Industry.

The round table was led by Captain 1st Rank **Chupakhin, Vladimir Leonidovich**, editor-in-chief of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA.

What Is Russia?

[Chupakhin] Let me begin our discussion with a typical letter from a reader. Reader N. Fedorov from St. Petersburg writes: "Many of our misfortunes stem from uncertainty. We still do not understand what happened to us as a result of the collapse of the USSR. What is Russia today? That which is within the framework of the Russian Federation, or something greater? What is Russia's place in the world now? Where is it being led, and where does it want to go? Must we now orient ourselves only on the West, or on the other hand, should we look more to the East? After the defeat in the cold war, should we now draw inward, and begin dealing with our own problems, or....? It is often asserted in the press that we do not have a conception of national interests, of national security, and this is why our foreign policy is so illogical, and why it is so difficult to develop military and military-technical policy. Isn't it then about time to define things?"

Such is the letter. And it's not the only one. All of these issues trouble the people.

[Blagovolin] The problems you have posed are extremely important. And I would like to say right away that the idea that Russia should now go into isolation, and concentrate on solving its own internal problems, is I think unacceptable. It was believed prior to 1985 that Russia, which was then the Union, should make its presence known everywhere, even Angola, El Salvador and Nicaragua. This was an absurd and dangerous idea. But the idea of complete withdrawal, that we should abandon spheres of influence that we had won over a period of decades, and in some cases centuries, is just as absurd and dangerous as the idea of total presence.

Now about what is sometimes referred to as the debate between the "Atlantists" and "Eurasians." Where should we orient ourselves—toward the West or toward the East? First let's define our terms: What do we mean by West? Just Europe, or the Atlantic coast of the USA? If we are discussing not a geographical but a geopolitical concept, then for known reasons the West may also include Japan and South Korea. Nor do I believe that we should forget our own history. The Russian state was established and underwent development by an advance from West to East, by an advance of a specific Slavic, Orthodox and, let me emphasize, namely a European civilization through policy and force (which by the way was not always bad). Were it to be accomplished, a merger with the East in the geopolitical aspect would signify, from my point of view, disaster for Russian culture and the Russian nation. Though perhaps just in democratic parameters. Not to mention the fact that this is a path toward backwardness, toward demographic problems. Nor should we forget the threats that are making themselves more and more known both to the West and to Russia from the South, including from the Asian directions, that chaos in all of the southern part of the geopolitical landscape can certainly arise in the future, and that it is precisely there that forces interested

in Russia's weaknesses, in tearing its territory apart and plundering its wealth can operate.

But when it comes to discussing the danger of integration with the West resulting from possible loss of independence, well.... Tell me, isn't France integrated into the West? Of course. But does this really signify rejection of its own national interests, of an independent policy, including in the sphere of defense?

And what about Japan? It is now even being said that the American and Japanese economies are simply merging. But Japan remains a totally independent and distinctive force.

In other words what we are talking about is correct selection of our course. I personally favor maximum convergence with the West. Though I clearly recognize that this does not in any way signify that Russia has no Asiatic interests. But the fact is that integration with the West is not a thoughtless leap without consideration of our own unique features and interests. On the contrary. It is a possibility for tapping into the West's strength to achieve our interests. In many ways we and the West are threatened by the same dangers. And we must capitalize as much as possible on the fact that highly developed Western countries are interested in a stable Russia.

[Rakitov] I share the point of view that Russia is neither an Asian nor a European country. The most correct answer to the old dilemma, posed back in the last century by Slavophiles and Westerners—who are we, the West or the East—would be, I think: We are Russia, we are a special civilization. What we have here is not a dilemma, but a trilemma, and perhaps a universal multiple conception. Need we divide civilization into two types at all, all the more so because the outer facets tend to wear away?

In what ways is Russia unique? First—there's the means of formation and development of the Russian state. Russia continually underwent expansion. No matter what catastrophes it endured along its historical path, it has often been precisely after these catastrophes, if you look at historical geography, that it expanded even more. This is unique to our mentality, our culture. But as it expanded and transformed, Russia did not absorb other peoples. They united organically with the Russian nation, and as a result a special nation underwent formation. Recall what Dostoyevski said: Scratch Russian and you'll find a Tatar.

It is in this quality, as a special nation with a very complex history, that we present a certain integrity. And an even more important characteristic of our historical life is the huge size of our territory. Even now that the Baltics and the CIS countries have fallen away, we are an enormous country, the world's largest. Did this territorial factor play a historical role in the development of our civilization and culture? The philosopher Berdyayev wrote in this connection, you might recall, that we are a

people of improbable breadth, that we are a passive, "feminine" people, and appealed to us to become a "masculine" people.

I think that it is important to understand all of this: The problems arising today come from the depths of our civilization and culture. We must understand that limiting or destroying Russia territorially means going contrary to its history, and consequently, contrary to today and tomorrow. We must understand that we must integrate not with the West, and not with the East, but with the world. We ourselves are obligated to remake our culture, and no one is going to remake it for us. We must take lessons from all, but we must also continue to be ourselves, we must know how to adapt to different conditions. We need our own structure of thinking. We need a profound state and social policy, and state patriotic education.

There have been totally unique civilizations in history—neither Western nor Eastern. They chose their own path, but some unfortunately disappeared without a trace, like Ancient Egypt for example.

Every nation in a sense exhausts its strengths, its historical charge at some particular stage. And either it is able to overcome the trials, or not.

We can recall the history of France or England in the time of their great revolutions and great upheavals. Were today's sociologists and economists to be transported back into those circumstances, into those crises, they would probably say: It's the end, there's no way out.

What saved the French nation? Mainly the grandest of all efforts of consciousness. They carried out the Enlightenment, and they managed to transform the people's spiritual structure. And the same in England. It would be sufficient to peruse the pamphlets and publications of the time of the Great English Revolution. What a storm of publicism there was, how much was said about the collapse, the crisis! And realization of the need for radical changes was often precisely the decisive factor.

Hence the conclusion that in order to survive as a nation, we must engage in purposeful, stubborn work to change our social consciousness, our mentality, our psychology.

I of course doubt that the issues of Russia's national psychology will be raised at a meeting of the Security Council. And that's a pity, because what is happening to us is not only a problem of economic devastation—it is also a problem of the deepest crisis of spirituality.

[Borovoy] I think that what I am about to say is totally undisputable. We are a huge, strong state that is presently in a stage of self-organization. What we need to do today first of all is to learn to respect ourselves and build a strong state—Russia. Let me emphasize—not the Soviet Union, but Russia.

We need to understand that what has come about is a reality: There is Russia, and there are other sovereign

states. Or are we to once again go about seizing the territory of, let us say, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and the Baltics?

If this is so, if we intend to pursue such a policy, then we must at least calculate, estimate our courses. Are we capable of reaching such objectives, are we capable of supporting military might necessary for this? If we calculate soberly, we will come to understand that we can't.

A great power.... It is great, I think, not in territory, and not in weapons, including nuclear. It is great in its people, and also, in its tranquillity and stability.

And the army must finally recognize itself to be namely the army of Russia, and not of the USSR. The military must cast off the complex that the army exists for the purpose of seizing territory. When it does so, people will look at the army in a completely different way.

[Politsyn] Konstantin Natanovich, I think that you would not be able to come up with a single example from Russia's history in which some military chief wanted to seize something. Alexander Nevskiy, Suvorov, Kutuzov? They all implemented state policy, and they were all implements of the state. The modern military are also limited to a certain framework, and they are an implement in the hands of the state. We are subordinated to the president, to the Cabinet of Ministers. We defend the state, its power, its peaceful development. And we have absolutely no need for anyone to seize anyone else.

Perhaps more than any others, the military are precisely interested in the presence of maximum clarity and predictability in state policy regarding security issues, a policy which would unite into a single whole the economic, political, social, ecological and military aspects. We need clear answers to questions such as these: What are the threats to Russia's security today, what are their degree and nature, and what forms should opposition take?

Relaxation of the military, political and strategic situation in the world led to a decrease in the threat of wars on a large scale. But this is only the positive side of the coin. There is another, negative side.

I think that the USA and other NATO countries will stick to a policy from a position of strength in the course of further disarmament negotiations. The main goal of the USA and its allies remains reducing the influence of the CIS and Russia upon the course of world development. Any possible deviation of Russia from its intended economic, political and military reforms will evoke a sharp reaction from the West. To ensure this policy, the USA, England and France are maintaining a mighty grouping of strategic offensive forces ready for combat use. Consequently the potential military sources of danger remain. But there are a number of others as well—territorial claims, religious and nationalistic extremism, and others. In this connection we need to thoroughly study the following questions, and then

define them legislatively: When and at what level should political, diplomatic and economic resources be used, and when should military resources be used.

We do not as yet have a clear answer to these questions under today's conditions. But conflicts are arising here and there. The military are unwittingly finding themselves to be the scapegoats. In the meantime it is primarily the politicians who allow bloodshed in peacetime that should be held accountable.

Internal instability in Russia and the CIS is a fact of greater danger today than even the foreign threat. We need a program to avert conflicts, a program of political and economic stabilization, one which should be written with everyone's participation.

As far as the army itself is concerned, it isn't suffering any complexes of any kind. Not only does it recognize itself to be Russia's army, but it is also being developed practically as such. A conception of the development of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation has been developed, and the Russian Ministry of Defense was established and is now functioning. Other measures are being implemented as well. As a result of these transformations, modern armed forces of small size in keeping with the level of the real military danger and with the new political and economic situation, forces capable of fulfilling their missions in all situations, will be created by approximately the year 2000.

[Stankevich] I feel certain that we must think about a Russia which is strong, a Russia which respects itself and which knows how to defend its self-respect when need be. Yes, the main thing today is for Russia to stabilize itself in its present boundaries. Empire-building must be rejected as a choice. But there must be sovereignty as well, which I define as confidence in an economic and cultural breakthrough within the boundaries of Russia itself, with reliance upon its own strengths and without counting on any significant assistance from anyone at all.

In this connection I would like to say a few words about integration with the West. Yes, Sergey Yevgenyevich Blagovolin is right when he asserts that there are politicians in the West who want Russia to be a strong partner, an element of a stable geopolitical configuration.

We need to work with such forces and conduct negotiations with them, we need to fight to see that precisely this line becomes dominant. But at the moment it is too early to say that this has already happened, that this line has stabilized.

What is happening in reality? In place of the bipolar, relatively stable balance that had been, a number of geopolitical centers are forming. Consider the North American center. The USA, Mexico and Canada have signed a trade agreement which could do little for the economies of these countries but which possesses clearly pronounced geopolitical content. And what about the ASEAN countries? Now there's an extremely strong geopolitical center! American experts recognize that here

as well the economic content is very limited. Consider the geopolitical center of the Asia-Pacific region. The kind of competition going on between China and Japan to become the region-forming power. Consider how hard Turkey is working to form its own geopolitical center. Including out of the ruins of the USSR. In this situation the slogan of simple integration with anyone might even be dangerous in my opinion. Because we have not yet gotten up on our own feet, we have not yet defined our own vital interests completely. And this is precisely what we need to lay at the basis of any determination as to whom we integrate with, why, and to what degree.

And it would perhaps be worth thinking about forming our own geopolitical center. And establishing interrelationships with other geopolitical centers. This is a new configuration that could form and persist over a hundred years into the future. And it is very important here not to err in our strategic choice.

Sovereign Power and Security

[Chupakhin] Our discussion is moving into the realm of the specific. The question that begs itself is this: What is within the zone of vital interests of Russia anyway, or to put it more precisely, of the state which is bounded by the borders of the present Russian Federation? What are the priorities here, and what are the long-range and immediate objectives? Without a doubt the Russian Federation is not about to attack anyone, nor does it wish to conquer anyone, as Konstantin Natanovich Borovoy fears. Nonetheless, can it really be said that Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan and the other republics have already been cut away forever in all things?

There are numerous other spheres in which there is a basis for discussing the interests of Russia.

[Maksimova] I would like to begin right away with a question that is extremely important from a methodological aspect. We are talking about national interests, and we are continually associating them solely with the state's existence as a sovereign power [derzhavnost], with its integrity. And when it comes to the security problem, we essentially reduce it solely to defense of the state. But security can also be understood more broadly, after all. Ultimately, the main thing is not the individual in behalf of the state, but the state in behalf of the individual, in behalf of his secure and worthy existence and development. After all, if the individual is not socially secure, if he is spiritually enslaved and limited in his rights, then both the society and the state are unstable.

For some reason we cast off this simple truth, at the same time that the initial positions of our understanding of security are all the more important because the choice of priorities in Russian domestic and foreign policy depends on this. After all, if statehood and existence as a sovereign power are primary, then the interests of the personality, the individual, the work of providing for his daily needs, the guarantees of his security, and finally his survival all fall by the wayside.

[Borovoy] The common man does not of course live only in the interests of the state. He is more concerned with what is happening in his home, his block, his city. The interests of the citizen are what is most important.

[Stankevich] I would like to object. When it comes to existence as a sovereign power, the implication is not just the territorial, state or legal integrity of Russia. I personally define this much more broadly.

It is being said here that the main thing is to ensure the security of the citizen—military, economic, legal. But who or what is to ensure all of this? Place the same person in the conditions of one state, in the environment which it creates, and this person will be secure in all respects. But place that same individual in another state environment, into the fabric of a state that is not so well off, and then what becomes of his security?

You are taking the personality, the family and the home as your starting point. But you can never divorce yourself from the concept of a state. Or from the concept of a sovereign power. A state is an instrument, a collection of institutions. A sovereign power is a state plus the values which it defends.

One way or another, all of our problems rest upon the fact that we need to resolve our statehood as quickly as possible. In this aspect I would like to put the long-range objectives aside and try to formulate the immediate, unpostponable objectives. Specifically, we can define them literally by a single word—stabilization. Multilateral stabilization.

We need to start with our borders. A sovereign power is unimaginable without borders. We need to establish a regime which on one hand would maintain a sufficiently free flow of goods, people, information and capital—that is, one which would not be an obstacle to normal functions of a market. And on the other hand, one which would protect us from uncontrolled infiltration of those goods, those people, that information and that capital which could present a threat to us. It is not easy to separate one from the other, but it is necessary. In particular, I am referring to the flows of weapons and narcotics, to protection against criminal groupings and destructive interferences aimed at our territory.

We need to establish normal borders without closing ourselves off, without transforming Russia into a fortress. This is the first priority.

The next priority is internal stabilization within the bounds of these borders. We need to find a normal formula of Russian federalism. We are currently talking about situations in which the shooting has already started, but we also need to keep in mind situations in which the shooting has not yet started but which contain a potential danger of major conflicts.

Consider for example the regular session of the Supreme Soviet of Tatarstan that has just convened. The constitution is question number one. It goes without saying

that this is the constitution of an independent state. Everything—from citizenship to foreign political ties—was done on the basis of the model of an independent state. This is a precedent that is for us of a global scale, one which can quite possibly evoke a chain reaction, and destroy even the unsteady unity that was established by the Treaty of Federation. A precise, thoughtful reaction to this situation is perhaps no less necessary and important to Russia than measured behavior in areas of crisis.

To find the formula of Russian federalism means on one hand, as I see it, to decentralize the state, to delegate powers to self-managing regions, to raise their status, to share the responsibility for reform with them, and at the same time to find a possibility to strengthen the sovereign power in such a way that further disintegration would be impossible. There is work here for the security service and the army. Economic ties have great significance here as well. Another highly important point that deserves to be mentioned in this regard is attainment of agreement among the elite—regional and federal. It is on the basis of such agreement, by the way, that the political stability of pre-Bolshevik Russia was maintained.

And finally, there is one other highly important step along the path of stabilization—stabilization along the borders, which we need to strengthen. This is what is referred to as the close frontier. And here the number one problem for us is the status of 25 million of our compatriots.

[Gulko] I would also begin by determining, so to speak, the starting points. Now, after disintegration of the Union, can we permit the disintegration of the Russian Federation as well? Or can we not? Can we give away more territory? Or not? As was correctly noted, the question of Russia's integrity is not at all an abstract one today. It is the key question of our national security, and a highly important one at that.

To go on, there is the problem of national security, and there is the problem of national interests. As long as we want to learn from the West, then let's consider how the West approaches this problem. Consider how far the Persian Gulf is from the USA. Even so, it is officially recognized as a zone of its national interests.

Russia also doubtlessly has its own zones of vital interests. There are for example the zone of the Baltic straits, the zone of the Black Sea straits, and many other regions which are associated with Russia's access to vitally important lines of communication, trade routes, and to the resources of World Ocean. There are regions with which the Russian economy has traditionally maintained strong bonds, and finally, there are strategic interests in the military sphere, neglect of which could undermine the state's defense capabilities.

[Borovoy] Do you feel that the Baltics are also within the zone of vital interests?

[Gulko] Absolutely. They are our neighbor, and their territory blocks access to the Gulf of Finland.

[Borovoy] But what do we do about the fact that these are independent states?

[Gulko] The fact is that the states of the Persian Gulf are also independent states.

[Stankevich] That is, independence of states does not at all mean that other states cannot place them within the sphere of their vital interests.

[Andronov] It must be said that it is also no secret that our radar tracking complexes providing early warning of a nuclear attack are located in the Baltics. And if we lose them, all of the northeastern part of Russia will be open to missile attack. Russia will have to invest billions of rubles to restore this highly important system that provides for security.

[Gulko] When you add to this the southern part of Ukraine and the Caucasus, you find that we have lost a great deal both in the north and in the south.

In the meantime there are instructive examples of sovereign powers that are able to solve this problem in the name of security. Recall the American bases on Okinawa and at Guantanamo. When the discussion turns to expensive facilities of strategic importance, we probably need to firmly state our interests and work to adopt decisions taking them into account.

We can of course approach determination of national interests with different yardsticks. But I would like to once again emphasize that with which I began: Russia's integrity is a fundamental, key problem.

[Nazarkin] I agree that the integrity and independence of Russia are of fundamental interest to the state. Among such permanent interests, I would also include defending and ensuring the security of citizens of the Russian Federation beyond its borders, and providing the foreign political and foreign economic conditions for the country's normal economic development. Besides such permanent interests, there are also specific objectives stemming from the transitional period we are presently experiencing—attaining stability at our borders, stopping ethnic conflicts on Russia's perimeter, and defending the interests of the Russian-speaking population in the "close frontier." All of this affects the foreign policy aspects of Russia's security.

But still, the main threat today in my opinion is not from outside but from within Russia. I am referring primarily to the threat of economic collapse.

Should the Economy Be Patriotic?

[Borovoy] But what do you define as collapse?

[Nazarkin] The moment when the decline in production attains a limit at which the process becomes irreversible.

[Borovoy] Production, for example, of combines that no one needs? I personally feel that a collapse would be impossible. A part of the freed assets begin to be sold off.

If production of what the society doesn't need declines, this isn't a collapse but a normal process within the framework of restructuring?

[Nazarkin] Unfortunately, in our country the decline in production concerns not only things that we no longer need in the previous quantities but also that without which modern life is impossible. Oil for example. Also, when I refer to internal sources of danger, I also imply growth of social tension.

[Blagovolin] Just try to regulate restructuring under the conditions of collapse.

[Borovoy] I would like to first clarify what it is we don't need to produce. And as for regulating, I know what needs to be done: Don't regulate anything at all. Everything will regulate itself.

[Stankevich] A highly interesting issue! The play of market forces, Adam Smith's invisible hand. Is that what will do all of the regulating? This opinion is often stated. But let me risk the assertion that this opinion is wrong in application to Russia. Under our conditions, the regulating hand must be visible. To remove the state completely from the economy, to rely today only on the elements of the marketplace means to create a zone of economic misfortune in the country. The fact is that many large production operations in our country are unique employers. We have mid-sized cities such as Cherepovets, Magnitogorsk and Novokuznetsk, where two or three plants provide employment to almost the entire oblast. And their shut-down would mean misfortune.

Why, you ask, will they shut down? They will inevitably shut down if everything is left to the will of the elements. They are already partially shut down. Many are now working 3 days a week, and they have put people on indefinite leave. They will shut down because there will be a time gap between the moment they stop producing those "unneeded combines" and the moment when restructuring occurs.

In our Russian conditions, the state can and must be an instrument of regulation not only at the macroeconomic but also at the microeconomic level. We need to utilize the state precisely as an instrument, without reducing it to a fetish, of course.

[Maksimova] There is of course no place in the world where a market exists without serious, deep interference by the state. But as I understand it, we are talking about something else. About the fact that a hard political struggle is under way, and there are forces which would in principle wish to interfere with the market and deviate to the path that had been traveled previously. What we are observing today in the upper echelons of power is a confrontation not between the proponents of Adam Smith and John Keynes, but between those who favor Russia's fastest possible transition to a highly organized market and those who desperately oppose this, striving

to keep the Russian economy within the framework of the authoritarian administrative system by all means.

[Feodosyev] As long as the discussion has turned to economics, I would like to raise the following problem. We have already spent a long time talking about the need for moving from a militarized economy to a socially oriented one. We are undergoing disarmament, and we are shutting down military production, which will free resources for new economic development. But once we assume this path, all of domestic and foreign policy must be subordinated to this.

But what is happening in fact? We are limiting expenditures as hard as we can, while at the same time taking steps which impose more and more new burdens upon the country. For example we need to establish a new infrastructure for the Russian army. And what will it cost us to accomplish the accelerated withdrawal of troops from the Baltics, and to maintain strategic stability under the conditions of implementing our fundamental treaty? I am not even talking about the attempts to transform the president's proposals on a global defense system into a program of cooperation with the USA to establish the GZOU [not further identified].

And there is one other aspect associated directly with economic security. We are saying nice things about the need for cooperating with the West. And this is something we should of course develop, we need to open the economy to Western investments. But we need to find the optimum here, we must not forget the interests of our own producers. We still must place our reliance primarily on, figuratively speaking, that patriotic tug that can pull us out of our crisis.

[Borovoy] Do you know what patriotism is called in economics? Idiocy! The postwar experience of development in different states shows that whenever any one of them made the decision to close off its market, it unavoidably suffered a sharp worsening of its indicators. The states that won were those that did not adopt any protectionist decisions. The USA's greatest misfortune is protectionism. It is what is killing it in its competition with Japan.

[Stankevich] No, patriotism in economics is not at all idiocy. If of course we are discussing enlightened patriotism. The U.S. economy is doubtlessly patriotic, and the Japanese economy is even more patriotic. And if they weren't patriotic, there would be no rivalry between them.

No one is saying that the economy must be closed. But the entire question is the degree to which it should be opened, and within what limits, so as not to do harm to ourselves, to our national market. Under today's conditions, our Russian market is unable to function in an absolutely open mode.

[Rakitov] As I see it, we should keep in mind that civilizations exist that are predominantly economic, such as the Anglo-Saxon economies. It was in them, by

the way, that Marxism came into being. But the Russian market and the Russian economy are not English or American—they are Russian. And nothing about this can be changed. This is a system with a heredity. Like it or not, we have our own unique economy. How to make it effective is another matter.

We could use someone's assistance, and we could attract capital, experience and science—all of this would be to our benefit. But nothing would come of it unless the entire nation (and not just the party, policy or the state) is oriented on the fact that a nation can solve its own problems by itself.

It would make sense in this connection to consider the problem of patriotism more broadly. Unfortunately, we have gotten used to seeing our democratically oriented officials wince when the discussion turns to patriotism.

[Gulko] Recently one of the publications conducted an interview with a respected minister who declared that he had supposedly received a democratic and not a patriotic mandate. Can such a differentiation be made?

[Chupakhin] Perhaps only we in Russia have managed to devalue both of these concepts through narrow political struggle. For some reason we in our country usually refer to patriots and democrats negatively, and frequently these words are even written in quotation marks. In the meantime, if both patriotism and democracy were to be considered as something other than political labels, what sort of contradictions could there be here? A real patriot wants to see Russia as a strong, flourishing and, of course, a democratic state. Real democracy cannot but be patriotic.

[Rakitov] We use the term "national-patriot" more often. But who has ever proven at any time or in any place that patriotism is only a national phenomenon? We know of Roman patriotism, and we know of American patriotism, which are neither national nor all the more so nationalistic phenomena. I have absolutely no desire to despise any nation, or to place the Russians above anyone else, but forgive me if I do not wish to place them below anyone either.

Patriotism is not an ethnic but a state, territorial and social phenomenon. And what is even more important, it is most profoundly a civilized cultural phenomenon. It is extremely important to the flourishing of a nation, to its resolve to preserve itself as a nation, to instilling the faith of a nation in its own strengths.

I think that one of the constructive tasks today should be to have the press (and we are in the editor's office of a newspaper) and all other media of enlightenment seriously attack the problem of patriotism precisely from this position.

How to Protect Interests

[Andronov] We can talk a great deal about things theoretically. But I am a politician, a practical worker. And I

must agree here with Borovoy that self-regulating mechanisms operate not only in the economy but also in policy. If a person possessing patriotic convictions is in power, he knows how to act in each concrete case. And all discussions and sensible proposals would be useless when the helm is under the control of favorites.

I just returned from Riga, where I worked as part of a state delegation to negotiations. What I can say is this: The army and the officer corps have essentially been abandoned to the tyranny of fate. Officers are in a desperate position. There are almost no enlisted men left in Latvia. The officers serve guard duty. The Latvians are waiting for this strength to exhaust itself. The debate concerns when the troops are to be withdrawn: They say in 1993, we say in 1994. They are urging us on, while at the same time holding us back. They know that either way, we will get out.

This is the situation I saw in many places. I feel that it is no accident. It is part of a particular political course. There are people who have assumed a course toward disintegration of the power, the disintegration of the army. Such is my opinion—you may not agree with me. When I heard our military comrade speak here, I was amazed: You are always putting the blame on the politicians. But until the army and its leadership come to understand that there is no one left for them to count on, that they must act on their own, we will continue to fall apart.

[Politsyn] There's no need to encourage the army to interfere in politics. That would also be politics, and with known goals at that. I am certain that the military will not opt for such a thing.

[Chupakhin] Politization of the army is by the way another problem associated with social and national security. We might recall for example how at the beginning of the year there was anxious discussion about the fact that the army could become an independent political force. But the fact is that the army did not and does not want to become such a force. What is politicizing it is circumstances and politicians, who sometimes treat the military sphere, which requires very careful and delicate handling, so extremely lightly.

The emotions expressed by Iona Ionovich Andronov and the roughness of his conclusions are quite understandable. The drama of the army, the drama of the officer corps, especially in the "hot spots," are constantly the topics of articles in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA. But we have persuaded ourselves many times that simply complaining about and criticizing this, and even seeking the culprits, is not very beneficial. It is understood, for example, that the decisions presently being made to withdraw troops from the Baltics are forced in many ways, they are the product of former policy. The process had begun several years ago. History and the voice of the public will decide who the culprit is. We, however, would do better to determine what needs to be done. We organized this round table primarily because we are

continually having to deal from one day to the next with the great specific, loud, bleeding problems of the army, and to analyze them, and we are having to always struggle with the unresolved nature of the general issues. What should Russia's policy be in principle in order for us to be finally taken seriously? How can we protect our people and our interests?

[Andronov] All right. Are you familiar with the situation in Tajikistan right now? With the regiment in Lomonosovo? All of the local soldiers have gone. About 50 officers and warrant officers remain. They're sitting at the controls of their tanks and guns, isn't that so? Russians, women, children and old people who have not yet been killed off have converged there in huge numbers. Another attack occurred just recently. Three tanks and an armored personnel carrier were seized, and they are surrounded by a sea of bandits, bands of the most diverse political and tribal leanings—you can't make heads or tails of it. They're even coming out of Afghanistan. And so our Russian officers and their children have come together there from the entire district. In the meantime we are sitting here and talking like nothing's happening. And what about the Americans, a great civilization, a great democracy, what would the American president and the secretary of defense do in such a situation? We know quite well what they would do. A surgical operation to rescue and remove them. We are sitting here, discussing and talking about the interests of Russia. So give me an answer to this specific situation! What are we to do today? Tomorrow may be too late.

[Stankevich] I feel that if we want to be serious about it, and to analyze the situation in which this particular regiment in Tajikistan has found itself for something other than rhetorical exercise, then we should do this not at a round-table discussion but in the editorial column.

This can and must be done. Of course, a sovereign power that respects itself must intervene without delay if the lives of its citizens are endangered. Moreover it is important to find an optimum and effective means of such intervention. I for example am not sure that a surgical military operation is exactly what the situation you describe requires. Because not everyone has converged under the protection of the forces—many of our compatriots are outside the military posts as well. We also need to think about what will happen to them.

But I have no doubts that we need immediate and decisive steps to protect both the former and the latter. The same goes in other regions as well: in Abkhazia, in the Dniestr region.

[Chupakhin] The question, as I understand it, essentially centers on the methods of protecting our interests. What can we allow ourselves to do, and when and under what circumstances, to protect our people? Could the use of force be in the arsenal as well?

[Stankevich] I feel that all available arsenals can and must be used. Force is not of course the first option. Perhaps it might be the 400th method of policy. Even so,

it should still be present in the arsenals, together with other different methods of nonviolent or semiviolent pressure.

But we need to discuss not only the possible reaction to specific situations. We need to look at the problem more broadly. I already mentioned stabilization along Russia's borders as one of the main and most immediate priorities.

To put it frankly, one of the problems we have here is the existence of a certain double standard in the approach to the question of citizens' rights. We know for example that 600,000 of our compatriots in Estonia and 900,000 in Latvia are deprived of elementary rights. Elections were recently held in Estonia. A minimum of a third of the Estonian population was deprived of the possibility for participating in them. If something of this sort had occurred in Russia, there would have been a storm in the Western press. There would have been protests to the United Nations and to international human rights organizations. But today they are silent. I think that we shouldn't be timid in talking about this "double standard" with both our Western partners and our own Russian intelligentsia, many representatives of which are ready to give everything to those Latvians or Estonians whenever they cite the insults they suffered from the former Soviet Union.

[Andronov] And the Russian government is doing nothing at all.

[Stankevich] The Russian government, thank God, has recently moved a little in this direction. But the efforts being undertaken are clearly insufficient. The reaction to that Estonian election situation could have been much more serious and stronger on the part of both the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other departments. They should have given some thought to whether negotiations could be continued and the present level of economic relations could be maintained in this situation, as if nothing ever happened.

Close Frontier, Far Frontier

[Maksimova] The close frontier and our interrelationships with it are a major headache. Unless we solve the political, economic and military problems we have with our neighbors, we will continually be facing new centers of tension and conflict. And not only outside of Russia, but also within. Our internal stability is intimately associated today with foreign stability. Unfortunately much is still being done in this area spontaneously, and most importantly, without due coordination and interconnection between different departments: Politicians are doing their thing, business people are doing theirs, and the military are working on their own problems. And it is primarily the social scientists who are addressing human rights.

In the meantime all of this can and should be done integrally. Attempts have now been made for example in negotiations with Estonia to consider all of the problems

having to do with human rights, borders and troop withdrawal together. This is the first time, I think. Do we have anything of this sort going on with Ukraine, with which we should perhaps settle our interrelationships first of all? Is anything of this sort happening with the other former republics? For the moment, such an interrelated, integral approach that accounts for both our interests and those of the partner does not exist.

Yes, we are dependent upon our neighbors. But they are dependent upon us as well. And how! They depend on us for deliveries of many forms of energy resources and raw materials. They depend on our technology, which is something that some leaders of these states still fail to understand, by the way. They depend on the ruble, which, by the way, we are controlling so poorly that we have not one but several centers of emission in this zone, causing an upward spiral of inflation that is already considerable.

Or consider debts. Practically all of the former republics are indebted to Russia, and by a great deal. Mutual deliveries are still frequently being made under terms terribly unfavorable to Russia. Here is a specific example. According to the agreements, we supply Russian oil and gas at world prices. But an absolutely amazing currency exchange rate of rubles to the dollar is established in this case—1 to somewhere between 22 and 26. And of course we suffer colossal losses as a result. Moreover just the debts of CIS countries to Russia for oil deliveries have exceeded 100 billion rubles, and for the moment these debts are not being compensated in any way. At the same time we buy goods in former republics at a significantly higher exchange rate—1 to 300 in relation to some goods. Because of such "benevolence," Russia suffers losses in the billions.

We have enormous possibilities for influencing our partners. If we are able to competently utilize the economic factors, we will be able to protect the rights of the Russian-speaking population and solve the problems we have with those same countries concerning troop withdrawal, preservation of strategic facilities and access to the seas. Everything could be done significantly more effectively.

[Blagovolin] I would like to note that this is not the first time in history that we are experiencing the collapse of an empire. Many empires have collapsed, but in different ways. You might recall for example the British Empire with its extremely long lines of communication. It did not have rigid ties between its individual parts, nor did it have the population mix we have. But even so, whenever the English left, they always did so with a clear understanding of the terms under which they were making their withdrawal. We on the other hand, who have far greater grounds for meticulously qualifying all of the terms, allowed the division to occur on an "grab what you can and run" basis. Many mistakes have been made, but it is not too late to turn into a more civilized channel. And I agree that we are not utilizing many of our possibilities.

For example, consider the timetable for withdrawal of forces from the Baltics. Let me cite the West's position once again: They are telling us out loud, don't go before 1994. Don't go!

I would like you to turn your attention here to the possibility of a dangerous imbalance: The point of view currently exists that we should let the far frontier go in peace, and focus on the close frontier. I agree: We have numerous painful problems in the close frontier, and no matter what is said here about the independence of new states, not one of us can deny our responsibility for Russians there. If for example bloody events begin in the Baltics or in Central Asia, any government incapable of acting decisively and effectively here in Russia will be swept away. But it is all the more important to understand that our relations with the Baltics, Ukraine and Central Asia will depend in many ways on how effectively we build our relations with the West.

Unfortunately even the West is politically weak today—many governments are on the brink of withdrawal there. But given all of the influences upon the political course, the West—from the USA to Japan—is extremely fearful of catastrophic development of relations in Russia. Our interests in averting such a development of events agree. Our natural partners are presently there in the West. Unfortunately we do not have a natural partner today in Kiev. But in Bonn and Paris we do.

[Stankevich] The West (to me by the way this concept is quite different—the Atlantic Community) is truly concerned with our misfortunes. But why? They are naturally troubled by the fate of nuclear power plants and nuclear weapons. They are troubled by nuclear technology and the drain of scientists associated with this technology. They are troubled by the threat of ecologically dangerous production operations. They are anxious essentially for themselves, and not at all out of altruism.

Other theories exist as well. For example Kissinger's theory, and Brzezinsky's theory, which reduce directly to the notion that Russia's disintegration is desirable to the West. I am saying this not to raise fears but to simply make it clear that we are our only natural allies and natural partners. It is finally time for us to rely upon our own strengths. For Russia to become a sovereign power is the main priority. Were Russia not to stand up, were it not to stand up as a sovereign power, any talk of integration would be meaningless. Only something that is whole and determined can undergo integration.

Now let me return to the close frontier. Twenty-five million of our compatriots....

[Borovoy] Could you please make it clear—25 million Russian citizens or...?

[Stankevich] Twenty-five million ethnic Russians. As for what state they will become citizens of, that's a matter of their own self-determination. They naturally could become citizens of the Baltic republics or other states. They may also prefer Russian citizenship. But regardless

of this, we are historically and morally responsible for their destiny. And we are politically responsible for them as well! And when you say that these are sovereign states, we must keep in mind that states do not come and go in the span of a day. The fact that an independent state is proclaimed and it is recognized on the international plane is only the beginning of its establishment, and not at all its culmination. The moment you proclaim yourself to be an independent state, and you're recognized, you must determine your boundaries, which must then be marked off and documented in international treaties. You must settle things with the legacy inherited from the preceding situation, which is embodied in the economy and economic obligations, and which is represented by the people and their destiny.

[Borovoy] These are independent states, and there is nothing to settle with them.

[Stankevich] Nothing of the sort. The process of establishment of these independent states cannot be considered to be complete until we settle on the legacy. Russia is absolutely the heir to this legacy by right of many circumstances, including by right of historical circumstances in relation to the people of which we are speaking. And no sovereignty, no independence can serve as an obstacle here. Because if you systematically violate the rights of the individual, and discriminate in relation to a significant part of the legacy, you place your own sovereignty under doubt. This is an international rule. Human rights are extraterritorial.

[Borovoy] If only they would agree with you....

[Andronov] But all of our diplomacy regarding problems of the close frontier has simply failed in recent months. As I understand, First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Shelov-Kovedyayev was responsible for our policy in the close frontier. Despite all of the support he had from certain political circles, he had to leave his post in shame.

[Chupakhin] We are hardly prepared to offer evaluations of specific individuals here. But it would be quite logical to raise the issue of the role of the competency of politicians, diplomats, the military, and civil servants in general in light of the problems of Russia's security and interests.

[Borovoy] In the area of politics, we are totally thoughtless and unprofessional. We have a president and a prime minister, who go about their own business. Then suddenly a Security Council appears—once again a politburo of some sort. The state keeps trying to revert back to the old system. In the meantime everything should be clear—if certain politicians are unable to handle the job, they should be replaced. We need a real choice.

[Stankevich] If you dare to assume responsibility for 160 million persons, you have to be competent. This sounds even trite. Except that the question is who is defining competency, and how. In our country, the way it is defined is this: If you agree with my political position,

then you are competent. But if we are talking about some other kind of competency, then that's another matter.

[Rakitov] It may be that the greatest misfortune of our days lies not in economic devastation, or in conflicts in the laws, or in mistakes in particular decisions. It lies in the fact that over the past 70 plus years we have cultivated professional incompetency. And so as a result many people who are wise overall and who have taken on the task of reforming Russia find themselves incompetent in relation to a number of highly important matters. They read the textbooks, and they know the languages. But they are simply incompetent when it comes to knowing the history, traditions and unique features of Russia. They decided that social, political and other problems could be solved on the basis of definite economic models. They did not understand the unique features of Russian civilization. And these unique features are essentially based on the fact that Russian civilization has always been a state-oriented civilization. In view of its difficult history, in view of the need for unifying enormous expanses of territory, Russia developed its own mechanism of self-development, perhaps somewhat heavy, and incomprehensible to some. We also had a state church and a state party, and we ourselves are the fruit of the development of statehood. Young reformers have not yet accounted for this to a sufficient degree. To add to this, they have turned out to be incompetent in business affairs and in bureaucratic procedures.

Market conditions require a special kind of competency. But today we see numerous people who have leaped into business without knowing what business is. And in politics, we have countless energetic, ambitious youngsters who have entered this field because, as it seems to them, everything else is difficult and troublesome.

We say a lot of bad things about bureaucrats, but what we fail to understand is that we shouldn't speak badly of them—there's no use in that. Instead, we should create a competent stratum of people capable of managing the country professionally.

The problem of civil servants is also the problem of the country's security. Incompetent civil servants are more dangerous than a conflict with Chechnya [transliteration]. Because this conflict is a consequence of incompetent decisions made by incompetent officials.

We have the illusion that a transition to a market economy will by itself change everything. But the market exists over almost the entire planet. And only around 15 states are well-to-do. The market "combines" fabulously with poverty and disrespect. A transition to a market economy will not produce anything on its own. Wealth comes not from a market economy, be it capitalist, or socialist, or any other "ist," but from an economy that relies upon the most sophisticated technology, the highest culture, and professionalism in all things.

[Feodosyev] In this context I would like to touch upon the question of defense industry, as the scientific and

technical basis of the country's defense capabilities. It is currently experiencing very difficult times.

Without a doubt a decrease in military expenditures—a significant one at that—is necessary. But there can be no doubt that we need to preserve that potential of defense industry which would ensure that the armed forces would be outfitted in accordance with military doctrine, and that they would possess the capability for reacting to possible scientific and technical breakthroughs in the military sphere abroad, and to military-political changes in the world.

We must understand that under today's extremely difficult economic conditions, it is impossible for us to maintain our military-industrial potential by distributing the small amount of resources available to us to all requestors indiscriminantly. We need serious, thoughtful decisions at the interdepartment level. In short, we require a balanced, long-range Russian military-technical policy. There should be no delay in developing it.

[Chupakhin] We are nearing the end of our discussion, with numerous issues still to be discussed. This is too wide-ranging a topic, and it would be naive to hope to illuminate all of its aspects in detail in a single conversation. A proposal has been made to finish off our round-table discussion in the way done on television, where each person says what he feels necessary at the end of the program, literally in just a few words: He can summarize, he can offer additional information, or he can raise an issue for future discussion.

[Nazarkin] I cannot agree with Sergey Yevgenyevich Blagovolin's assertion that we supposedly have no natural allies in Ukraine. Yes, there is an excessively bitter psychological element to our relations these days. But I feel certain that time will pass, passions will subside, and fundamental interests will resurface, including in Kiev, because we are linked not only economically but also psychologically. The same can also be said for Belarus and Kazakhstan.

I agree with what was said here about the need for singling out the close frontier as a priority direction in the activities of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and other departments. In this case I have no intention at all to diminish the significance of traditional ties with the far frontier. But this is all settled in our country.

[Politsyn] We need to focus attention in the immediate future on the effort to conclude regional agreements—and chiefly wherever conflicts are raging or are possible.

[Gulko] We have only touched upon the topic of Russia's possible allies. I feel certain that in the same way that the USA's main strategic ally is Great Britain, Russia should have as its partner Ukraine, my own Belarus, Kazakhstan and other countries of the CIS. We need to pursue a firm line toward this, and at the same time we need to try to approach these countries especially carefully.

[Feodosyev] A mechanism which would bring together the efforts of the state, entrepreneurs, the intelligentsia and other forces, and which would direct them at solving primarily the national problems, is something we need as much as we need air. There must be a clear understanding of the priorities in international relations, including of course the entire complex of military-political issues, military development and military-technical policy in their interrelationship and in the context of the economic reforms currently being implemented. Such a mechanism is not as yet discernible.

[Andronov] Little was said here of the topic of a foreign threat, especially about territorial claims upon Russia. Let's look at the facts. For the moment we are not demanding anything of anyone. But then there's Estonia, for example, which is demanding vast areas of Leningrad and Pskov oblasts. For some reason Latvia is also demanding another region of Pskov Oblast. We need to react to these things as well.

[Rakitov] We have leaped into the market without changing the state. And if we wish to preserve its integrity, we must deal very seriously with its restructuring, so that it would reflect the new objectives.

[Blagovolin] I agree with what was said by Vladimir Lvovich Feodosyev about the need for a mechanism of implementation. And it should primarily take the form of a mechanism of strong legal power that guides itself by national interests and realizes them on a legal basis.

I would like to object once again to Sergey Borisovich Stankevich. Nuclear power plants and technology are not the only things that are troubling the West. And today, Kissinger is far from the most influential person in the USA. On the other hand the point of view, perhaps of not all, but of very many influential politicians who are in power or who are coming to power, is that it would be simply unimaginable to maintain geopolitical equilibrium without Russia. Hence what our objectives should be is this: In thinking about our own interests, we need to play this "Russian card" in our interests to the fullest possible extent.

[Maksimova] First. In order to develop a clear, well-adjusted Russian policy, we need to clearly understand the balance of the strong and weak sides of both Russia itself and its nearest partners and allies, and chiefly the balance of interests and contradictions in our close frontier.

Second. The example of that same European Community and the Maastricht Treaty shows that even countries with differences in potential, level of economic development and political structure can agree to establish currency, economic and political unions. And they are able to do this in many ways owing to the fact that in abandoning ambitions, claims and mutual distrust, they looked primarily at the benefits and losses each participant might experience from the future action.

It is Russia that should set the example of a readiness for reasonable compromise. And it is possible only on a broad foundation, where the interests of the economic, political and military security of the agreeing parties are brought together into a single unit.

[Borovoy] My conclusion is this: The most important things are the interests of the citizens and a new strong Russian state.

[Stankevich] The problems we discussed are extremely acute. But I still cannot see any basis for referring to them with terms I've heard here, such as "collapse" and "catastrophe." Self-organization is proceeding, it is proceeding with difficulty, and more slowly than we would like. But the main thing is for the movement to proceed in the needed direction. Artificially accelerating the process would be dangerous, because this could evoke a reverse result.

And therefore I once again emphasize the importance of an organizational basis taking the form of a strong and effective state. This must be the alpha and omega for us. Then the citizens will also feel confident, and will look toward the next century with confidence.

[Chupakhin] Well, all that there is left for me to do is to thank the guests for participating in the round table. And to say that this is only the beginning of a great and serious discussion in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, the beginning of a new—and today perhaps the most important—thematic direction of the newspaper: "Russia's Interests: Security, Policy, Economy."

Filatov Editorial on Loss of Officers' Personal Weapons

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[Editorial by General Viktor Filatov: "Surrender Our Pistols? Already?"]

[Text] There is a father Arbatov and a son Arbatov. The father is the director of the USA and Canada Institute. American occupation began through this institute, like through the traitorously open gates of a fortress. The father is a "big scientist." The son Arbatov is also a "scientist." The father has been an American battering-ram all his life. He battered primarily our Army and Navy. Not a day went by that he and his institute did not argue that the reason we have no toilet paper is that we are building aircraft carriers, and the reason we have no tampons is that we are building intercontinental missiles which—oh my God!—reach the United States. The conclusion was always the most categorical: if you want to have toilet paper, cut up the aircraft carriers, submarines, and missiles into scrap metal.

They got their way. We have been left without an army and navy. But what about the toilet paper? Here another "scientist" appears—the father's son. Disarmament and conversion are very expensive, more expensive than the

arms race, the father's son expounds. But there is no alternative to disarmament and conversion, he continues, if we want to have toilet paper and tampons. This kind of scientific family is to our detriment...

They speak the truth: all military people prepare for the past war. At one time an unprecedented war was unleashed against us: the Brzezinskis and Kissingers attacked the Matrosov and Zhukovs, and the brain centers of America and Europe attacked the Tupolev and Korolev design bureaus. But what intelligence did we bring into battle? The Arbatovs do not count; they always were lackeys. Here are the bosses. They were all, it is customary to believe, in the Politburo. There no longer is a Politburo. The members remain, without an apparatus.

When we were being pinned to the Volga, we quickly got rid of our "civil war military leaders." At that time there was Stalin. But now, pinned to the wall of a European home by perestroika, we found ourselves with Gorbachev. Not long ago someone correctly wrote that the "hour of zhloba [a lowering of standards] has come." It is in the past, but people with a range of vision of a regiment commander had control of a more than 5-million strong machine. And they manipulated it. The State Committee on the State of Emergency had nothing to do with it. The Emergency Committee was a show for the simpletons. Here is just one of a large number of examples. Colonel-General Kalinin. He is the one who brought troops into Moscow in August 1991. Every Muscovite knows him by sight—he is the one who, appearing on television, announced both the curfew and the procedure for obtaining permits to travel throughout the city at night. At that time Kalinin was the commander of the Moscow Military District.

The Emergency Committee moved. Kalinin was appointed chief of the Armored Academy—the most prestigious and important academy—although Kalinin had never been a tanker. When they learned at the academy who had been appointed as their chief, real disturbances took place there.

After 1985, the decay in the higher echelons of power grew stronger not by the day but by the hour. But today it is simply raging. People in all units and subunits are now being forced to read the following military oath of allegiance: "I, entering military service, pledge allegiance to the Motherland and swear to scrupulously carry out the Constitution and laws of my state and the states of the commonwealth on whose territory I perform my military duty. I pledge to carry out implicitly the duties assigned me, military regulations, and the orders of commanders and officers in charge. If I violate this oath, I am ready to bear the responsibility established by law."

And this is the military oath of allegiance? This ungrammatical and tongue-tied wording is a military oath of allegiance?

They are bewildered as to why the CPSU, the Army, and so forth collapsed from one blow of Yeltsin's fist on the

table. But you see, it was even more primitive when some sailor said: "The guard detail is tired..." and everyone scattered. But now it is even worse: no one is pounding his fist on the table, no one is saying anything about the tired guard detail, but there also is no power. There is only fear. I always knew that when the Arbatov-legion was disarming us by palming off toilet paper on us instead of aircraft carriers, the motor behind all of this was the Americans' fear of our might, fear of receiving a retaliatory crushing strike. But here in the units and subunits of the Russian Army, something unbelievable is happening: all officers have been ordered to surrender their personal weapons, their pistols, to the armory. Whose fear is this? Our fear? Fear of our occupiers?

I know many Americans who are no smarter than a hockey goalie. But I am sure that even they could not come up with something like taking the pistols away from our officers. Tell me: Isn't confiscating the personal weapons from officers really a way of saying you do not trust the entire army? That is how you act only with a hostile, captured army. Incidentally, the order "Surrender your weapons!" is always followed by the order "Face to the wall!"

We began disarmament with aircraft carriers and ended with surrendering pistols to the armory. Here is what I would like to tell officers. To hell with it, the pistol. It is not worth kicking up a fuss over this, as has already happened in one of the regiments. The main thing is that you, the platoon leader or company commander, keep your platoon or company at full combat readiness. Most likely, the ransacking of our holsters is a signal. It is a signal for all of us, like in the song: "The last parade is coming." From all appearances, today we are already ready to give the order in the clearest Russian: "Face to the wall!" Will this really happen?

Prokhanov 'Hopeful' After Meeting Grachev

934C0411B Moscow DEN in Russian
No 47, 22-28 Nov 92 p 1

[Article by A. Prokhanov: "Conversation in the Ministry of Defense of Russia"]

[Text] Some materials were published in DEN No. 45 (73) that wounded the honor of Minister of Defense of Russia P.S. Grachev. The Minister asked me for a meeting, which took place on 12 November in the office where in former times I was received by D.T. Yazov. Minister Grachev expressed regret regarding articles in which he is reproached for joint ownership of the highly profitable joint-stock enterprise Avia Kap-Info. The Minister acquainted me with a document according to which he withdrew from joint ownership of Avia Kap-Info immediately after the code appeared prohibiting representatives of authority to participate in commercial activity. The second reproach—about special connections with A. Temerko, chairman of the Russian Military-Industrial Association, which allegedly were profitable to the Minister—was rejected by P.S. Grachev with

the claim that he acquired the subordinate relations with A. Temerko "through inheritance" from the previous leadership. The Minister of Defense's explanation seemed convincing to me, and I expressed regret regarding the possible moral damage that the cited DEN articles could have caused the name of P.S. Grachev.

I was interested in a statement made recently by Grachev in which he gave assurances that the army will defend the President. This statement was made against the background of a sharp dispute between Yeltsin and the Supreme Soviet of Russia, the President and the National Salvation Front, and against the background of Yeltsin's threat to disperse the congress and neutralize the opposition. It was assessed by patriots as direct political support by Grachev of the president in his struggle with parliament and the congress. The minister of defense assured me that the public was presented a truncated version of the sentence. In its full text, the sentence stated that the army will protect the president, its supreme commander in chief, the Supreme Soviet, and the people. P.S. Grachev assured me that the Russian Army, on the structuring of which he is working, will never violate the Constitution and will never act against the people. He said further that rumors of an alleged meeting that was held by the Security Council at which he, Grachev, supported the idea of declaring a state of emergency in Russia have nothing in common with reality because such a meeting was never held.

The minister's statement that he is a regular reader of DEN makes it possible to hope for constructive relations between our newspaper and the Ministry of Defense, relations that always existed between the Russian intelligentsia and the army until the ill-fated events of August 1991.

The minister of defense reminded me of the Afghan campaign, in which both of us were participants. The overall feeling from the conversation filled me with cautious optimism regarding overcoming the tragic split between the patriotic intelligentsia, which now finds itself in opposition to the current authority, and the leadership of the army, which is one of the functions of this authority.

CIS: GROUND TROOPS

New Aerosol Smoke Systems for Subunits

93UM0121A Moscow VOYENNY VESTNIK
in Russian No 5-6, May-Jun 92 pp 81-84

[Article by Lt Col A. Grishkevich and Lt Col (Res) A. Kiselev: "New Smoke Systems for Subunits"]

[Text] *Dear Editor! In one of the last issues of your journal last year, I read an interesting article about the use of camouflaging aerosols in fighting for a security area. But here is what bothers me. The article cites certain types of smoke pots and grenades that I have never heard about before. I was also surprised to learn that*

flamethrower operators can use their own armament to apply smoke. I very much hope you will continue discussions on this topic.

Guards Senior Lieutenant M. Kukharenko

The battle for the village of Karezi-Mir was becoming difficult. The extended line of motorized riflemen went to the ground under continuous fire. The dense brush and mountains approaching directly towards the buildings prevented an attack from the flanks or rear. This was to the Dushmans' liking: at any moment they could make a concealed retreat.

In order to block them reliably, the commander of the task force decided to land a tactical airborne assault force at a site covering the only path. However, the situation was made more complicated because the site was also very visible from the village. The chemical warfare officer came up with a solution, proposing to make the assault landing under the cover of an aerosol screen.


An Mi-6 escorted by two combat helicopters appeared over the planned area at 1000 hours. Ignited smoke pods flew out its open doors to the plateau. Convection and the operating rotors of the helicopter completed the job. A solid wall of smoke was created, behind which two platoons of motorized riflemen successfully took up positions. The opposition's detachment was soon destroyed by attacks from two directions.

This is just one example of the use of aerosol camouflage equipment by our subunits during the war in the Republic of Afghanistan. In reality, smoke was used there very often and quite successfully. An instruction pamphlet given to each serviceman recommended using smoke to cover personnel abandoning equipment knocked out of action, evacuating damaged combat vehicles and the wounded, clearing mines from roads, forced crossings of narrow rivers, and passing columns.

However, the experience in Afghanistan also showed another thing. The basic performance and operating parameters (poor concealment properties, economical inefficiency, and low reliability) of many organic smoke systems created back in the 1940's and 1950's did not satisfy the requirements of modern combat. What is more, similar shortcomings were also revealed at scheduled tactical exercises and drills, especially at those which practiced organizing protection against high-precision weapons. (Incidentally, the journal's readers have already expressed such opinions*—Editor.) That is why a whole group of new general-purpose aerosol camouflage systems was supplied to the troops in the past decade.

The RDG-P smoke hand grenade (Figure 1 on the left) is the first in this series. Its casing is made of low-pressure polyethylene, which immediately solved two problems. First, it became cheaper to produce the grenades. Before, the cardboard for them was acquired in Finland for currency and then was treated with a water-repellent

Figure 1



impregnation using a complicated production process. Second, the plastic, together with the airtight aluminum foil membrane, protects the aerosol-forming compound considerably better against moisture. Strictly speaking, it guarantees its failure-free operation even after 10 years of storage.

The RDG-P is activated by a rip primer device. You must remove the rubber cover, tear the foil, pull sharply on the cord ring, and throw the grenade 20-25 meters. It is not difficult to do this, since it weighs 500 grams. Smoke will appear in five seconds and will be generated intensely for two minutes. Under average weather conditions, the portion of the aerosol screen that cannot be seen through is 1.5 times longer than that of previous types of smoke hand grenades and is at least 35 meters.

The ShD-MM small modernized smoke pot is standardized with the earlier grenade by its igniter and with the DM-11 by its casing. It weighs up to 3 km. The outlet hole is also hermetically sealed by aluminum foil. It is carried by a handle made of nylon cord. The pot burns for seven seconds and smokes for nearly five minutes. Compared to its predecessor, it provides reliable concealment from visual observation on a greater line (70-100 meters).

The ShD-B unitized smoke pot is ranked as medium size. Its basis consists of elements of the DSh-01 (7.4 kg), of which there are three in the unit. They are mounted in one unit with the aid of two holders and four coupling rods. The elements are activated, each separately, mechanically or by an electric detonator after removal of the shipping caps. In the first case, one must pull out the safety pin ring and remove the protection from the firing pin, and then hit it with a heavy object. Smoke will

appear in 10 seconds. In the second case, you should connect the leads of a priming device to the control line and supply an electrical current of at least 0.5 Amperes. The pot will begin working in three seconds.

When burning all the DSh-01 elements, a powerful, albeit brief, aerosol screen is formed to a depth of 300 meters. When used in succession, the smoke generation will continue for 15 minutes, but naturally with less (one-half to one-third) density of the aerosol screen.

All of these smoke systems are equipped with a new pyrotechnic aerosol-forming compound. It includes zinc oxide, chlorinated hydrocarbons, and additional components. Due to the fact that it considerably expands the possibility of counteracting optoelectronic equipment in the visual and near infrared region of the spectrum, it is called an aerosol-forming compound of increased effectiveness.

How is an aerosol formed? The following products are generated in the process of burning the contents of the grenade or pot:



After sublimation, the zinc chloride condenses to solid particles, which actively absorb water vapors from the air. Due to this, the particles reveal themselves in the form of an opaque white to dark gray sheet. At the same time, carbon monoxide, soot, and other substances hazardous to man are fed into the atmosphere. Therefore, it is recommended that personnel not be near the sources of smoke generation without respirators.

It is advisable to distribute the smoke systems authorized a motorized rifle battalion as follows: 1-2 for a

motorized rifleman, 16-24 for each armored personnel vehicle (armored transport vehicle), and 50-60 RDG's or ZDP incendiary-smoke charges for a company. For smoke pots, the distribution is such: 3-5 per squad and 24-36 in company stocks. The rest of those and others are transported by the supply platoon. Depending on the combat disposition and the presence of natural cover on the battlefield, a motorized rifle company is able to cover its maneuver several times with the allocated resources.

The goals and tasks to be carried out using aerosols, including those of improved quality, remain the same. Nevertheless, we would like to call attention to certain particular features of their use in different situations.


As we know, the withdrawal of defending subunits from a security area becomes more complicated on open terrain, where armored equipment is most vulnerable to fire from antitank weapons. That means it is almost always necessary to counter the enemy's guidance systems. Senior Lieutenant S. Sirotkin handled this problem pretty well at an exercise during the course of which the tank-reinforced motorized rifle platoon under his command was assigned combat security.

Mentally modeling the upcoming battle, he estimated what the duration of smoke generation should be. It turned out that it had to be no less than what was required to load personnel in an armored personnel vehicle and move to the company strongpoint. Then he estimated the wind. Although its direction was not noted for stability, alternately changing from a flanking to a frontal direction at the "enemy," the officer envisioned laying linear camouflage screens exclusively with smoke pots and grenades.

In our opinion, given the availability of other similar equipment—ZDP, System 902, thermal smoke generating equipment—this proposal was the best from the standpoint not only of simplicity of execution but also economic considerations. Using RDG-P grenades (and with fewer expended) will cost less than incendiary-smoke charges.

When the attackers approached to 500 meters (see diagram), the flank squads and the tank began to withdraw first. Motorized riflemen designated in advance each lit a smoke grenade and placed them beyond the parapet at intervals of 30 meters. The commander of the 2d Squad, Senior Sergeant V. Yermolovich, acted differently. He ordered two pots to be placed beyond the trench so that the aerosol cloud would not interfere with the delivery of aimed fire by his subordinates but also would provide protection for the platoon.

In its movement, the column was covered by smoke from the ShD-MM thrown from the last vehicle. The following should be kept in mind here. Screens on intermediate lines will adversely affect the fire effectiveness of friendly ATGM's and guns set up for direct fire. Hence, when organizing coordination, the battalion commander must indicate the direction of withdrawal. Another thing. If the wind is blowing from the enemy, it is more



efficient to blind his weapon positions, in particular, with artillery rounds and mines.

Commitment of subunits to battle can be accomplished behind an aerosol screen. Helicopter gunships, which on the march are difficult to detect in a timely manner, pose the greatest danger for the subunits. For this reason, and also due to the need to prepare smoke generation in advance, it is advisable to cover the battalion's deployment into company and sometimes platoon columns using the senior commander's forces and assets. Sometimes, smoke generator vehicles or helicopters with minelayers and a supply of UDSH smoke pots are used.

The counterattack line, as a rule, is camouflaged from a trench by a subunit located in direct contact with the enemy. The start of the smoke generation is selected so as to anticipate the designated time for going over to the attack and so its duration covers the entire deployment into extended line. If the wind direction is toward the enemy, it makes sense to light several smoke pots immediately in each pocket. Then the attackers will advance unseen for some time behind the smoke barrage without excessive losses.

Hand smoke grenades are most acceptable in the city, since brief aerosol screens here have certain advantages. After ensuring concealment of swift dashes by assault groups, they quickly disperse and do not become an additional interference for aimed fire. And, of course, one must not at all forget the method of "smoking out" the fascists from basements and underground trenches that emerged during the Great Patriotic War.

It is not envisioned that small motorized rifle and tank subunits will use ShD-B medium smoke pots. Due to their output and other operating parameters, it is

planned to use them to camouflage launch positions, including dummy positions, of missile and anti-aircraft missile batteries, radar posts, unit dispositions on open terrain, crossings, and important rear-area facilities. In addition, smoke companies and battalions of the Chemical Troops equipped with remote-control smoke generation systems are equipped with them.

Anyone who fought in Afghanistan knows how often flamethrower operators died there only because they were not always able to sneak up to Dushman fire positions unnoticed. Therefore, the RPO-D standardized infantry rocket launcher with smoke munition was created specially for them (see Figure 2). Its distinctive marking is a yellow strip on the rear end cover.

Since flamethrower operators are usually attached as reinforcement to motorized rifle battalions and companies, it is their commanders who must be able to correctly select the targets to be blinded. Above all, they should be enemy weapon positions and observation posts during a counterattack, breakthrough of a defense and seizure of fortified areas, crossing of water obstacles, or when changing positions.

Just how do the flamethrower operators operate in such cases? Let us assume that an assault group with a flamethrower squad is to take a permanent defensive fortification made of reinforced concrete. They begin by "blocking" it with aerosol. If the wind is from the flanks, they aim off 20-40 meters to the windward side when firing the smoke munitions. If the wind is a frontal wind toward the enemy, they chose a point 30-40 meters closer to the defensive fortification. They fire several rounds (at least three) in a spread pattern. Then the flamethrower operators move forward in pairs to convenient positions and as soon as a firing port is visible, they fire on it from the RPO-A.


We hope that our article will help combined-arms officers become more fully familiar with new smoke systems and use them with tactical competence in all types of combat.

Footnotes

*VOYENNNYY VESTNIK, 1990, No 4.

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Figure 2. RPO-D Infantry Rocket Launcher with Smoke Munition



Improvements to 5937 Wheeled Transport Vehicle
93UM0124A Moscow TEKHNIKA I VOORUZHENIYE
in Russian No 7-8, 92 pp 14-15

[Article by Major K. Rozov: "The 5937 Wheeled Vehicle Is Being Improved"]

[Text] During the process of series production of these chassis, a number of changes have been introduced into their design that are directed at increasing the vehicles' operating criteria. An AK-1500V compressor with an automatic air pressure maintenance system in the engine's pneumatic starting system tanks (70 kg/cm² is being installed on the chassis. This ensures more reliable engine start and precludes the need for a fixed compressor unit to charge the tanks.

A shortcoming of the system is the fact that the rubber membrane of its IL-611 air regulator malfunctions. To replace the rubber membrane, disassemble the regulator and install the spare diaphragm from the chassis' O spare parts, tools, and accessory kit [ZIP-O]. You have to install a brass or steel stopper, with an M6 male thread, an internal diameter of 2 millimeters and 7-8 millimeters in length, in its exhaust T-joint (this has been coordinated with the manufacturing plant) to increase the reliability of the regulator's operation. To do that, unscrew the T-joint and tap an M6 thread to a depth of 7.5-8.5 mm in its internal hole (5.5 mm in diameter). Then, screw the screw stopper flush to the connection and zakernivat [not found] it.

A "Sikamat" type pressure regulator and water trap has been used in the chassis' pneumatic system. This ensures better quality purification of oil and water vapors from the air that enters the reservoir from the compressor and also permits condensation to be removed from the pneumatic system automatically.

The force on the steering wheel when towing a chassis with a nonworking engine has been significantly reduced thanks to the use of a backup hydraulic pump in the steering wheel hydraulic actuator system. The pump has been installed near the left rear side transmission and is put into operation using a V-belt transmission from the vehicle's transmission. When the chassis' power plant fails, connect the pump's pulley to the side transmission using a V-belt.

There is a reinforced stripper in the G spare parts, tools, and accessory kit [ZIP-G] to facilitate dismantling the wheel reduction gear carriage. To use it, disconnect the brake fluid line from the operating cylinder and from the union nipple that has been screwed into the wheel reduction gear's axle and you must unscrew the union nipple from the axle. While installing the new carriage, apply USS GOST 3333-80 graphite lubrication to its splines and to the wheel reduction gear splines. Furthermore, when mounting the 135E-2602060 reduction gear's lip seal, and also other dual-rim lip seals, fill the space between their rims $\frac{3}{4}$ full of Litol-24 lubricant. Lip seals made from a more durable rubber mixture are used

to preclude oil leakage from under the reduction gear's cover and to increase their rigidity.

There is an OVU-65G heating-ventilation system (OVU) installed on the chassis with a semi-automatic control that greatly simplifies its start-up and shutdown. You need to remember that if the system is functioning in the "heat" mode, you must not move its switch from the full to partial operating mode. Otherwise, the OVU-65G's subassemblies and instruments may malfunction. Now you can use compressed air instead of nitrogen to recharge the chassis hydraulic system's hydraulic accumulators.

Some changes have been made to the chassis's operating instructions to ensure the vehicle's reliable operation, and also to reduce the labor intensity of its maintenance. So, during daily maintenance, drain the condensation from the filters located on the pneumatic system starter panel in the engine compartment. Otherwise, pneumatic system starter assemblies and instruments may malfunction. You must monitor the functioning of the compressor's ventilation system because a compressor jam may occur when its efficiency is reduced which will entail a torsion bar breakdown.

Monitor the temperature of the liquid coolant during the process of operating the chassis (especially during the cold period of the year). It must be within 80-100° C. The formation of deposits from the products of incomplete fuel combustion (so-called resin smudge) is possible at lower temperatures and these deposits may spontaneously burst into flame when they accumulate in the ejector duct. During winter, you must warm the radiator's grids using the covers from the O spare parts, tools, and accessory kit. Continue to heat the liquid using the pre-start-up heater to rapidly heat the engine after starting it. Before turning off the engine, reduce the temperature of the liquid coolant to +70° C. To do that, let the engine idle.

Use GOST 25770-83 MTZ-10p oil for the engine lubrication system when the ambient temperature is below -25° C. Use TM5-12RK TU 38.10.1844-80 oil in the chassis's transmission assemblies when the ambient air temperature is from -50 to +50° C. Change it after 45,000 kilometers of operation, but no less than once every five years. In areas where the air is not cooled below -20° C, you can use GOST 6360-83 MT-16p transmission oil; no lower than -25° C—GOST 23652-79 TAP-15V oil; and, no lower than -30° C, GOST 23652-79 TSp-15k, while adding 10-15% AKOR-1 additive to them. Use GOST 23653-79 TSp-10 transmission oil with AKOR-1 additive (10-15%) in areas with a cold climate with an ambient air temperature of from -40 to +30° C.

Add 10-15% GOST 305-82 type "Z" or "A" diesel fuel to the mixture if the ambient air temperature is lower than indicated for the backup types of oil. Do not drain the mixture from the assemblies during the shift to the

summer period of operation but monitor its level on a daily basis and add fresh oil with the AKOR-1 additive when necessary.

Change GTZh-22M brake fluid in the servo of the brakes and coupling once per year (during the shift to the winter period of operation). Add up to 18% GOST 18300-72 rectified ethyl alcohol when the ambient air temperature is lower than -40° C. You can use "Neva" TU 6-011163-78 or "Tom" TU 6-01-1276-82 brake fluids as substitutes (they can be mixed in any proportions).

Lubricate the mirror surfaces of the main (operating) brake cylinders and their hydraulic drive engagement cylinders, and also the packing seals with castor oil during assembly to prevent corrosion. When conducting TO-2, check the leak-proofness of the main brake cylinder lip seals. To do that, remove the covers of the forward and rear wheel brake drum inspection ports from one of the sides. Start the engine and create 0.6-0.8 MP [Milli Pascals] (6-8 kilograms per cm²) of pressure in the hydraulic system. While moving the chassis, place the wheels of that side so that their inspection ports are at the level of the center portion of the brake shoes. Insert two 0.5 mm thick feeler gauges between the brake shoes and brake drums and, while pressing the brake pedal to the floor, adjust it with the parking brake catch. Check the clamp of the brake shoes' test feeler gauges: if they hold reliably in that position for no less than five minutes, the lip seals are serviceable. If you can remove one or both feeler gauges in 2-3 minutes, replace the lip seals in the appropriate brake cylinder.

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CIS: AIR, AIR DEFENSE FORCES

Conditions at Air Defense Base Near Moscow

93UM0135A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
14 Oct 92 p 4

[Article by Aleksandr Korchagin: "An Orphaned Installation: Officers Do Enlisted Work"]

[Text] Legend has it that Beriya picked up a pair of compasses and drew a circle around Moscow on a map. He took a pencil and made dots at uniform distances, then ordered that the dots become locations of the capital's air defense battalions! The work was carried out by prisoners. In the event a dot would coincide with the location of a village, the latter was to be removed. Swamps were dried and forests cut down.

An adversary was to be denied the possibility of access from any angle. Thus, if the legend is to be believed, that is how Moscow's PVO [air defense] rings came into being. The repose of Muscovites was to be assured by missile battalions, with seven kilometers of separation between each.

Today, their manpower is sufficient only for security duty and manning the latest equipment. That is something that became clear to us after we had a look at the facilities in the fall of 1992. Just what do the people do there—they who are located so far from civilization to guard the Moscow sky?

The road leading into one of the launch sites was protected by a barbed wire fence. A sign at the entrance read: "ENTRY FORBIDDEN." Nonetheless, we decided to take our chances and defy the sign to continue moving openly, encountering no particular difficulties, until we drove upon a concrete road which teamed up with the ageless and forbidding forest to form a kind of tunnel. We discovered that there was a very large number of roads, which crisscrossed to form a kind of grid. Located on each line were missile launchers, but with no missiles and ancillary equipment. Moving further into the forest, we came upon bunkers. The doors were open, so why not look in! Lying there were disorderly piles of electrical cables, some kinds of disassembled instruments, and odd pieces of enlisted men's uniform. We went further into the woods and saw more. I "discovered" an old model of diesel engine with its corroded generator, and electric motors.

How much labor and equipment were no longer of use to anyone!

We took some shots and after they were developed showed them to the commander of the military unit stationed at the "orphaned installation."

"You could have been shot," said the unit commander. "This area is in active use and is subject to strict security. In addition, the launch sites are secret. And you should be in possession of a document from your newspaper carrying the approval of our military authorities. That is the only way you can obtain the right to visit this place," he added.

"Can you yourself ring PRAVDA for confirmation?"

"I would be delighted to do so," said the officer, "but the communications department of the closest town cut off my telephone service due to the unit's inability to pay the bill."

The commander lifted the telephone receiver and handed it to us. The line was indeed dead. The same was true for the postal service in the town, but the commander somehow was able to have parcels, newspapers, and letters delivered, at least twice a week.

Motor transportation suffered difficulty there, in that the rise in energy prices caused the bus service to become unprofitable, with the number of trips into town curtailed. Nonetheless, the children must be delivered to school, which is located 15 kilometers from the unit.

It is considered there that a real tragedy lies elsewhere. There is no influx of conscripts. There are no enlisted personnel to perform security duties. The latter are carried out by commissioned officers at the control

panels of the combat element. They are granted one day free of duties every two weeks.

"As far as the area you photographed is concerned, it no longer is of any use," remarked the commander. "The old missiles were dismantled and placed into special storage. Lying in the area you saw is only scrap; we have no personnel available to clean that up. An order we received from our military superiors directed us to hire whatever people we need in nearby villages. We have no more than 1,200 rubles to pay them."

"So what will come of this situation? Is Moscow in any danger?"

"No. Our people are devoted to their work. Do not think that we have done nothing with the new weapons just because the old ones were taken away. What happened was that the facility you saw has been replaced by others of the same kind, the difference being that the latter are on wheels. The danger lies elsewhere. If the aerial borders of Russia are going to be reduced due to a parade of sovereignties, Moscow will be faced with the threat of gaps in the sky. The reason is that this will produce a breach in the unified system of monitoring airborne craft. This would open the way for incoming missiles."

"So there is a danger, after all? And the base is unmanned, on top of everything."

"We are keeping watch over it, but we lack the personnel to maintain continuous security."

We had a feeling of uneasiness as we pulled away, a sensation of some kind of guilt with respect to the commander, the commissioned officer personnel, their wives and children who played in the residential area consisting of two five-story buildings. It is difficult to explain the cause of such a strange feeling. It may have been due to those people's lack of opportunities for such basic things as going to the cinema or visiting a large store. Or maybe it was due to the dismal nature of the information we had gathered for our report, not the kind of information which the people wearing the uniform deserve. However, it is not the journalists who are guilty of the fact that the powers that be caused the great country to flip over to leave to the mercy of fate those who assure that there are no gaps in the sky.

CIS: NAVAL FORCES

Rear Adm Aleksin Rebutts Allegations on Naval Accident Rate

93UM0134A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 21 Oct 92 p 6

[Article by Rear Adm Valeriy Aleksin: "A Disinformation Campaign Is Being Waged Against the Navy: So Believes the Navy's Chief Navigator"]

[Text] Irresponsibility multiplied by impunity unties the hands and the tongue. I became persuaded of this one

more time upon reading A. Khrapovich's article "No Answers to Embarrassing Questions," carried in the 1 October 1992 issue of NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA. This piece continues the chain of the gross distortions of the facts and insulting attacks against naval officers that were observed in an article by the same author in NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA on 20 August of the same year.

What is of concern here is not at all the vulnerable egos of the targets of the mud-slinging, but the campaign itself initiated by Khrapovich and his associates against the navy. I am referring to some officials of the Committee for Serviceman and Family Affairs under the government of the Russian Federation. The goals this committee pursues are doubtlessly necessary and noble. But the unfortunate thing is that people who are, mildly speaking, unscrupulous have joined this organization as "experts."

It could be supposed that Khrapovich and his comrades are uninformed people whose hearts ache for the navy. But no, they are among those who possess the information or could obtain it if they so desired.

But let's return to Khrapovich's article. In his letter "No Answers to Embarrassing Questions," the author asserts that I supposedly "replied remarkably quickly" to his article published on 20 August 1992 (this reference is to my article "Naval Command Busy With Fight Against Accidents" published in NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA on 10 September 1992). I will have to disappoint Khrapovich. My article was not in response to him, because I wrote it back in July—that is, before his so-called "embarrassing questions" were ever published.

By the way, there are no embarrassing questions in Khrapovich's articles. Anyone who knows the situation in the navy by other than rumor could pose them almost without end. The extremely complex economic, social and technical problems that are tormenting the country are also reflected in the state of affairs in the navy.

Now about the "facts" about the accident rate in the navy for the last 6 months, which Khrapovich and Kolton cite in their numerous statements. Since I have complete information on this question, let me state that there never was an explosion of a solid-propellant missile aboard a "Tayfun" class nuclear submarine. An accident did occur on such a submarine on 17 September 1991—that is, over a year ago. During a practice firing a missile damaged the lid of the launcher, but it did not explode, and the crew did not suffer.

Nor was there a fire this year aboard the nuclear powered cruiser "Frunze." Fires did occur in compartments of the helicopter-carrier cruiser "Kiyev" on 15 June 1991 and the helicopter-carrier cruiser "Minsk" on 24 August 1992, as was also reported in the press. There were no casualties during the time of these incidents, thank God. Yes, one seaman did die, quite unfortunately, while fighting a fire aboard the large ASW ship "Admiral

Zakharov" but this also was a well publicized fact, and not a discovery by Khrapovich and Kolton.

Among nuclear powered ships of the U.S. Navy, the nuclear powered submarine "Thresher" sank in 1963 with 129 men aboard, and the nuclear powered submarine "Scorpion" sank in 1968, also with its crew of 99. On our part, a "November" class nuclear powered submarine sank in 1970 as a result of a fire, killing 50, a "Yankee" class missile submarine sank in 1986 with four men (both in the Atlantic), and the nuclear powered submarine "Komsomolets" sank in 1989 with 42 men. By the way, the commission that investigated the causes of the "Komsomolets" disaster was not from the navy but from the USSR government. And in contrast to what Khrapovich writes, shortcomings in personnel training and equipment maintenance were indicated among the causes of the ship's demise. This was also said in a corresponding order of the minister of defense.

Fourteen persons, and not 28 as A. Khrapovich asserts, died aboard the "Charlie" class Soviet nuclear powered submarine that sank in 1983 in a trimming region off of Kamchatka. The submarine was raised and repaired, but it sank once again in 1985 by a mooring at a ship repair plant at the fault of ardent superiors, and not of the crew, which suffered no casualties. Now this submarine is being used as a trainer for submarine crews. The U.S. Navy lost the missile submarine "Nathaneal Greene" in 1986 in the same way: Following a serious accident at sea, it was not repaired, and was instead decommissioned.

Things have been written about these facts several times here and abroad.

There is no substance to A. Khrapovich's statement that "hundreds of people perished" in the last 10 years due to accidents and disasters of submarines in the Russian Navy. As of 20 August 1992, 83 persons have died in our country as a result of submarine accidents and disasters in over 10 years (1982-1992), with 42 of them dying on the "Komsomolets."

Every state department (and not only in Russia)—the Ministry of Defense, the Merchant Marine, Air Force, Navy and so on—possesses a corresponding classification of accidents based on the intent and conditions of activity of subordinated forces. In the Russian Navy these are a ship disaster, an accident, an accident aboard a ship, and an accident involving a ship's armament and equipment. All have their own causes and consequences. Therefore treating as all one thing the explosion of the expansion tank of an electric compressor aboard a nuclear powered submarine of the Northern Fleet, a major fire aboard the large ASW ship "Admiral Zakharov" and the fire that occurred at coastal artillery depots is incompetent and unproductive from the standpoint of fighting the causes of accidents.

My interview with ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA (21 May 1992) that A. Khrapovich attacks was in no way associated with a meeting of the committee of which he is a

member. Delegations from the U.S. Navy and the Russian Navy discussed prevention of incidents at sea in Moscow on 22-25 May. At my initiative the question of preventing collisions of submerged submarines—these being the most dangerous accidents at sea—was raised and our proposals were presented. It was in order to gain public support for our position that the interview was published prior to the beginning of the negotiations.

Later in Moscow, on 22-26 June 1992, trilateral negotiations were conducted on naval problems at the expert level between representatives of Russia, the USA and Great Britain. All participants without exception found both our proposals on preventing submarine incidents and proposals on coordination to prevent ship accidents to be extremely constructive and promising. This is also a difficult problem for the Americans and the English, and they are happy for any productive advice. There are things that we can share, and learn from each other.

Let me note that in the first half of 1992 the accident rate increased by a factor of 5-7 on Russian railroads and in aviation and industry in comparison with 1991. In the meantime the accident rate of ships of the Russian Navy is still at the 1990-1991 level. When the number of incidents involving ships in the last 6 years (1987-1992) is expressed on an annual average, the accident rate in the navy drops in relation to many categories by three, four and six times (see NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, 10 September 1992 for details). Not a single navy of any other state has such results, which is why representatives from other states are prepared to learn from us.

Unfortunately, the matter of preventing technical accidents (explosions, fires, flooding) is being addressed least effectively in the navy: The number of incidents has decreased by only a factor of 1.5. Moreover almost all serious incidents—ship accidents and disasters—occurred precisely for technical reasons in the last 3 years.

Technical support to the condition of the fleet is a most complex problem. It cannot be solved by the efforts of just the navy alone. But this is the most important direction of accident prevention (following the demise of the nuclear powered submarine "Komsomolets" in 1989).

Now a few words about the new system for preventing accidents aboard naval ships. It was developed in fall 1986 at the instructions of Fleet Admiral V. Chernavin, then the naval commander-in-chief, following the loss of our "Yankee" class nuclear powered submarine in the Atlantic, and not when A. Khrapovich began concerning himself with this problem in mid-1989. The effectiveness of this system has been confirmed by experience and by the results of the last 6 years (1987-1992), which Khrapovich and his friends have no relationship to.

Let me also dwell on Khrapovich's personal attacks on me. I didn't get my admiral's chair straight out of diapers. I began my career aboard a cruiser as a seaman.

In 16 years of experience aboard submarines I've seen my share of fires and sinkings. Therefore I know what I'm writing about, and I've experienced all of these things first-hand. The order that I received I earned in the navy, while all I earned in Moscow was a single veteran's medal. Meaning that I didn't get my position of leadership by "a knack for saying the right things." More often than not, I was uncomfortable with some of my immediate superiors, regarding which you will find entries in my personal file.

P.S. With this we end the discussion on accidents in the navy. It is hard to suppose that the naval leadership has failed to take notice of the four (!) articles in NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA presenting opposing points of view. All that remains is to hope that the conclusions they reach from them will have as their principal result an increase in safety.

CIS: REAR SERVICES, SUPPORT ISSUES

Small-Scale Military Satellites

93UM0124B Moscow *TEKHNICA I VOORUZHENIYE* in Russian No 7-8, 1992 pp 34-37

[Article by Candidate of Technical Sciences Lieutenant Colonel A. Kuznetsov and Lieutenant Colonel A. Yakushin: "Small-Scale Military Satellites"]

[Text] The U.S. military-space forces that have supported the operations of troops at the strategic, operational and tactical level have actively participated in local wars and conflicts of recent years. In U.S. Secretary of Defense D. Cheney's opinion, the space forces are substantially expanding the capabilities of the troops to accurately determine their coordinates, ensure reliable communications, and to detect targets in a timely manner. This provides additional advantages to subunits in the use of modern types of weapons and military equipment that have been deployed in unequipped theaters and without development of their infrastructure. We can cite the following example. The flight missions of Tomahawk cruise missiles that were actively utilized during the war with Iraq (nearly 300 launches were conducted) were calculated at U.S. Navy shore bases based on space reconnaissance data. The efficient determination of coordinates for weapons launch sites and precision-guided weapons delivery platforms was carried out based on information from space navigation systems. Space communications systems were widely used for troop command and control.

Foreign experts have come to the conclusion that the dependence of that country's armed forces military might on military space has significantly increased based on analysis of modern American weapons systems and U.S. armed forces tactics. At the same time, they note the serious shortcomings of traditional military space systems and suites that substantially limit the sphere of their application. Specifically, high-capacity spacecraft

are highly vulnerable due to their substantial dimensions (for example, the Lacrosse radar reconnaissance satellite has solar batteries with a sweep of more than 50 meters, a radar antenna—more than 20 meters, and it weighs more than 18 tonnes). This situation has resulted in the accelerated development of antisatellite systems. In those same United States, the MALS aircraft-missile antisatellite system has successfully undergone testing, they are designing satellite destruction weapons based on mobile ground-based missile complexes, and they are developing the capability to install antisatellite weapons on surface ships and submarines.

Missile launch vehicles, based at unprotected stationary launch complexes and that have a long active trajectory sector, are used to launch traditional large spacecraft. In the event of a military conflict, a space launch site's facilities may be destroyed by non-nuclear weapons and the missile launch vehicles themselves are an ideal target for the space echelon of an antiballistic missile system under any variation of its deployment. Difficulties with maintaining a large ready inventory of spacecraft on the ground (due to their technical complexity and high cost) and the long periods required to prepare spacecraft and missile launch vehicles for launch (tens of days) make it practically impossible to effectively build up orbital formations of space systems in wartime.

American experts think that the antisatellite battle can be conducted not only during a world war but also during local conflicts. At Congressional hearings in 1991, U.S. Department of Defense Space Command Head General D. Kutyna stated that the United States will not permit an enemy to gather useful information using satellites or reconnaissance aircraft flights over their own troops during an armed conflict.

Traditional military space reconnaissance and communications systems have been oriented on providing information of primarily strategic and operational-tactical command and control elements, and planning for the employment of these systems is carried out at the strategic level. According to expert assessments, space information is not disseminated to tactical element commanders in a timely manner or in sufficient volume because of the need to ensure the secrecy of the space information being disseminated which is transmitted through the elements of a complicated hierarchical structure. Furthermore, U.S. Army division-sized and smaller units have not been totally supplied with satellite communications systems. Tactical communications make up approximately 60% of the Department of Defense's unsatisfied requirements in the communications sphere.

These problems were resolved to a certain degree during the war with Iraq—equipment was provided to the troops for receipt of satellite reconnaissance information directly from the National Intelligence Processing Center located in Washington. Division-sized and smaller units that were involved in the conduct of combat operations were equipped with a significant number of satellite communications systems. This

required retargeting more than ¼ of the spacecraft from U.S. Space Command's orbital formation to the combat operations area. According to foreign experts, planning the employment of reconnaissance and communications spacecraft at the strategic level and their priority operation to carry out strategic tasks could result in denying access to space communications and reconnaissance data to the majority of tactical element commanders in conflicts of greater scale and intensity. And finally, long periods of time (5-7 years) are required to develop spacecraft and they function in orbit for an adequately long period of time (3-10 years). As a result, obsolete equipment is being operated.

U.S. experts see the most radical path to overcome the shortcomings cited in the development of cheap, small-scale spacecraft designed for a short period of active functioning along with the development of traditional

spacecraft. They must have simplified on-board equipment and weigh up to 1,000 kilograms. Due to their small size and thanks to the use of low-signature systems ("Stealth" technology), the probability of their destruction by antisatellite weapons will be reduced in contrast to traditional spacecraft. Furthermore, the cost of a single small-scale spacecraft will be less than the cost of firing a round from an antisatellite weapons system. Due to simplicity of design, these devices may be developed in 1-2 years. Mobile launchers that are capable of conducting space launches during all periods of the military-political situation are being developed to place them into orbit. Low cost, simplicity of the small-scale spacecraft, and a high launch rate capability will permit these spacecraft to be used for operational follow up reconnaissance and to augment space system orbital formations to increase their combat capabilities and to replace spacecraft that have been destroyed by antisatellite weapons systems.

Tactical-Technical Specifications of Foreign Military Communications Spacecraft

Spacecraft Designation, Country	Initiation of Operation	Orbit	Operating Frequency Range, in MHz	Number of Telephone Channels	Relay Transmitter Output, in Watts	Weight, in Kilograms	Period of Active Operation, in Years	Cost of Manufacture and Launch of the Spacecraft, in Millions of Dollars
Traditional Spacecraft								
DSCS-3, United States	1986	Geostationary	7,250-8,400, 225-400	1,500-3,000	10 and 40	748	6-10	250-300
"Lisat", United States	1984	Geostationary	240-400	12	40	1,388	5 (lease for 5 years)	80-90 (period of lease)
"Milstar", United States	1992	Geostationary	20,000-44,000, 225-400	50-100	20	up to 3,500	10	250-300
"Skynet-4", Great Britain	1988	Geostationary	7,000-8,000, 250-300	6	40	1,270	7	120-150
NATO-4, NATO Allied Armed Forces	1991	Geostationary	7,000-8,000, 250-300	6	40	1,270	7	220-250
Small-Scale Spacecraft								
"Maxsat", United States	1990	low, circular, polar	225-400	1	10-30	68	3	3
"Microsat", United States	1991	low, circular, polar	225-400	1	10	23	1	1
"Tacsat", United States	1992	low, elliptical, polar	20,000-44,000	40	30-60	435	5-7	5.5
"Wosat", Great Britain	1990	low, circular, polar		1	0.3-0.5	1	up to 1	0.02

The possibility for decentralized employment of small-scale spacecraft by tactical element commanders is an important specific feature of small-scale spacecraft. Any consumer who has the appropriate equipment can turn on and tune in to a satellite's on-board systems in such a way that he can obtain the information he needs.

In the United States, the Department of Defense Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) began work on the manufacture of small-scale spacecraft for effective support of armed forces operations in the mid 1980's. In 1985-1992, they plan to spend \$1 billion to carry out the "LightSat" and ASTP programs, which are conducting the development of production technologies for key elements of small-scale spacecraft. Air Force (from the Reserve and STEP programs) and Navy (from the SPIN program) experts are working out these issues simultaneously. At the same time, the organization that is carrying out the SDI Program is conducting the design of small strike and information spacecraft for the antiballistic missile echeloned system (Brilliant Pebbles and Brilliant Ice). At the present time, it is being reported that an engine weighing three kilograms that has 600 N [newtons] of thrust, a star orientation sensor weighing 250 grams, and also an on-board computer weighing 270 grams that has a speed of up to 40 million operations per second and four megabytes of random access memory have been designed and have undergone testing. Total cost of the small-scale spacecraft development program for operational support of U.S. armed forces operations should total \$10-30 billion.

They plan to use low-orbit small-scale spacecraft to carry out the following missions: provide tactical communications in theaters of military operations through direct relay of information between stationary and mobile subscribers in line-of-sight range of the spacecraft, monitoring the redeployment of their own troops, providing operational and strategic communications by storing messages in the small-scale spacecraft and their subsequent dump over the assigned area ("electronic mail") or the exchange of information between small-scale spacecraft along intersatellite communications lines; collection of reconnaissance information and target designation data from automated sensor systems (including underwater situation broadcast and automated meteorological site systems); and, remote control of weapons.

American experts have developed the principles for building the communications systems based on the low-orbiting small-scale spacecraft on the GLOMP experimental satellites series that weigh 68.5 kg (GLOMP-1 was launched in 1985 by the Space Shuttle reusable transport spacecraft, GLOMP-2 was launched in 1990 during the first launch of the "Pegasus" missile launch vehicle). The direct relay and "electronic mail" modes, encrypted communications with nuclear missile submarines in the Northern Latitudes, the collection of information from hydroacoustic buoys and other sensors, and determination of the coordinates of radio emission sources were tested on these spacecraft. In 1990, two "Maxsat" small-scale spacecraft were placed into orbit

using the "Scout" missile launch vehicle. These satellites support the exchange of digital information between submarines located near the North Pole and their shore bases in the direct relay and "electronic mail" modes at a rate of 1.2 or 2.4 Kbits per second. During the war with Iraq, they were also used in the Persian Gulf for tactical communications of Marine Corps subunits and for the transmission of information from this area to the U.S. military leadership.

"Microsat" small-scale spacecraft have been developed to provide tactical communications to U.S. Army division-sized and smaller units and subunits. They have been equipped with intersatellite communications systems that also permit them to be used to obtain information from combat engineer-reconnaissance teams and automated reconnaissance systems that are located in the enemy's deep rear areas. These devices and also the "Maxsat" do not have special protection from electronic warfare systems. They are designed for employment in peacetime and in local conflicts. U.S. experts are designing the "Tacsat" small-scale spacecraft to support combat operations under electronic countermeasures conditions. They plan to install on "Tacsat" an abbreviated version of the future "Milstar" on-board satellite communications system that functions in the millimeter wave length range with frequency hopping operating frequencies in a bandwidth of up to 2 GHz. According to American experts, joint operation of "Milstar" and "Tacsat" will permit them to develop a flexible satellite communications system that has high stability in all periods of the military-political situation.

According to foreign press reports, the Western European countries and Israel are also actively developing small-scale communications spacecraft. Specifically, Great Britain has designed and launched into orbit the "Wosat" small-scale spacecraft. British experts think that these systems will be capable of replacing the expensive "Skynet-2" spacecraft and provide high survivability to the military satellite communications system in the future.

Optical, radar, and electronic reconnaissance small-scale spacecraft are designed to warn tactical element commanders about missile attack, to conduct reconnaissance of the theater of military operations, and to transmit target designations to weapons systems. At the present time, scientific-research and experimental-design work is being conducted on the development of these spacecraft. They plan to begin deployment of these spacecraft during the second half of the 1990's. The "Tacsurat" small-scale spacecraft which will support conduct of visual reconnaissance of maritime targets with a resolution of 5-10 meters and transmission of target designations to a ship in real time is being designed based on a U.S. Navy order. They propose utilizing this satellite jointly with the existing SSU naval electronic reconnaissance systems. U.S. Navy experts are conducting development of radar and optical-electronic reconnaissance

apportioned space systems. They are studying the possibility of developing a bistatic radar system for reconnaissance and transmission of target designations in real time to tactical weapons systems based on 4-16 small-scale spacecraft.

They are designing two types of missile launch vehicles to launch small-scale spacecraft—"Pegasus" and "Taurus". The "Pegasus" cruise missile is launched from a B-52 launch platform (they are proposing to use either the Lockheed L-1011 or Boeing-747 wide-body civilian aircraft in the future) at an altitude of 10-12 kilometers. It is capable of placing payloads weighing up to 275 kg into low polar orbits and up to 500 kg into low equatorial orbits. Up to four launches per day can be conducted from a single aircraft. Among the "Pegasus" system's features are simplicity of preparation for launch and the capability of rapid rebasing and broad maneuver of launch azimuths and, consequently, the pitches of the orbits. The latter is achieved when the launch platform carries out a flight with a large parallax and launches the missile launch vehicle at the optimal point. Specifically, it is sufficient to fly the launch platform to the region of the equator to launch a spacecraft into equatorial orbit. "Pegasus" is undergoing flight testing (the first launch was carried out in 1990) at the present time.

The "Taurus" missile launch vehicle (its second designation is SSLV) was designed for launch from mobile ground based launchers and will place payloads weighing up to 1,375 kg into low orbits and up to 375 kg into geostatic orbits. Its launch preparation time is no longer than 72 hours. Initiation of "Taurus" flight testing is planned in 1992. According to American experts, the "Taurus" and "Pegasus" missile launch vehicles have high survivability and are capable of carrying out the concealed operational launch of a small-scale spacecraft during all periods of the military-political situation.

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Officers' Demands for Housing Halts Withdrawal

93UM0116B Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 29 Oct 92 p 1

[Article by Captain 3rd Rank Anatoliy Lobskiy: "Commentary: A Storm Warning in the Baltic"]

[Text] The refusal of the 3rd Baltic Fleet Coastal Defense Division to leave Klaypeda until each officer and warrant officer has been handed an order for a well-appointed apartment in Kaliningrad Oblast has forced the Russian Ministry of Defense to halt the troop withdrawal from the Baltic states. This step has placed in doubt the reality of some of Russia's foreign policy agreements and the government's ability to control the situation and to guide it, without mentioning the creation of the dangerous precedent of massive disobedience in the Russian Army's most combat capable units.

News about the collapse of the agreement between the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense and the Lithuanian Ministry of Defense became the straw that broke the camel's back. The document, signed on 25 May 1992 by General of the Army Pavel Grachev, provided for the transfer of two torpedo boats, two small antisubmarine warfare ships, and some other military equipment to the Lithuanian side. In return, the Lithuanians were obliged to build, through the efforts of "Selma" Association, a 2,572-apartment housing project in Kaliningrad which was designated for the division being withdrawn from Lithuania. Turnover of the first apartment building for operation was scheduled for May 1993. A small ray of hope had begun to appear for more than 1,000 families of fleet officers without apartments in Kaliningrad.

The magnificent presentation of the joint project, to which Lithuanian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs V. Laurinavichyus came, occurred in the first few days of September. And the turnover of the ships was designated for 30 September. But the Andreyevskiy Flag was not lowered on one of them either on that day or later. Embarrassed fleet personnel uttered apologies through their teeth and the bewildered Lithuanian delegation returned to Vilnius and a rumor has begun to circulate among division officers that the agreement had been repealed and, consequently, there would not be any apartment buildings whatsoever built by Lithuania. And thunder rumbled in the form of Officers' Assemblies resolutions.

Why did the disruption of the agreement occur? Maybe meticulous economists argued that the fleet had lost some of its value? No, no one doubts the economic advisability of the project. Then, some sort of provisions of international law that regulate arms sales were certainly violated? Also no. The legal preparation of the agreement was, according to experts, impeccable. And yet this is precisely the crux of the matter.

As it often occurs in our Homeland, one set of rules was in force at the time the agreement was concluded but another set of rules had been thought up by the time it was carried out. It turns out that in July, a month and a half after the documents had been signed, a Russian governmental decree was issued that gives the exclusive right for the sale of military equipment abroad to "Spetsvneshtekhnika" State Foreign Economic Concern. Just one sentence that determined that this procedure was in effect for newly concluded agreements would have eliminated many commercial, diplomatic and political complications. But that sentence was not in it and Vice-Premier G. Khizha's order to cease implementation of the agreement arrived on the eve of the transfer of the ships.

By that time, hundreds of people had already labored on preparing the plot of land for the future structure, they had erected a mockup of the village on the site, they had stored construction materials and equipment, and they had hired construction teams. In a word, fine sanctions for the collapse of the agreement will total a pretty

penny. So the fleet not only did not receive anything but will also lose quite a bit if the deal is abrogated.

Unfortunately, the probability of the latter is very great. And it would seem that the Ministry of Defense as an interested person must actively promote the resolution of the difficulties that have arisen. However, the additional documents that have been prepared by the fleet command authorities and that have strayed through the corridors of power were sitting in the office of Deputy Minister of Defense General Vladimir Toporov. During the time that has passed since that moment, he has gone on temporary assignments more than once and has certainly solved a multitude of other important issues but without suspecting that the thin folder on his desk is a fuse that is directly linked to the arsenals in the Baltic states. But if they explode in the Baltic States, Moscow will not fare well.

There was still hope until recently that a solution would be found. The Ministry of Defense will discuss the problem with "Spetsvneshtekhnika" and the issue is being worked out in an interdepartmental commission on military-technical cooperation and they will ultimately make the one correct decision. But now all activity will certainly be frozen after the arrest of a large group of "Spetsvneshtekhnika" associates for bribery of especially large sums. Only one solution remains in the situation that has developed—the government that established that procedure must itself help to make common sense win out.

Homeless Officers Picket Perm Oblast Office

93UM0116A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 30 Oct 92 p 8

[Unattributed article: "...And They Are Threatening to Block the Bridges"]

[Text] Yesterday 200 officers of military units deployed in Perm began to picket the Oblast Soviet building along with members of the Committee of Homeless Reserve Officers that has been founded here.

On behalf of the 1,500 families of officers who do not have apartments, the picketers are demanding that the issue of the return of the debts for providing housing to servicemen be immediately resolved. The officers accuse the authorities of inappropriately utilizing the monetary resources that come into the oblast for that purpose. They demanded that the authorities purchase existing available housing that has already been built and transfer the housing to them. Military personnel backed up their demands with the threat to block the bridges across the Kama and also major transportation highways.

Finance Deputy Chief on Use of Checks

93UM0148A Moscow TRUD in Russian 13 Nov 92 p 2

[Interview with Vyacheslav Yuryevich Kritskiy, a deputy department chief of the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense Main Military Budget and Finance

Directorate, by Svetlana Volodina, occasion, date and place not specified, under rubric "TRUD Consultation": "The Military Even Receive Checks Abroad"]

[Text] *There are many servicemen among TRUD subscribers. Judging from the letters, many of them still do not have a clear understanding of how and where they and their families will be issued privatization checks. Today V. Kritskiy, a deputy department chief of the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense Main Military Budget and Finance Directorate, answers questions of interest to the readers.*

[Volodina] Vyacheslav Yuryevich, will privatization checks be issued to servicemen serving outside Russia? If so, then what is the procedure for issuing them?

[Kritskiy] According to the Statute on Privatization Checks approved by Russian Federation Presidential Edict No 914 of 14 August 1992 and the Russian Federation Goskomimushchestvo [State Committee for Administration of State Property] instruction "On the Procedure for Issuing Privatization Checks to Russian Federation Citizens," checks with a nominal value of R10,000 each must be issued to all regular servicemen, members of their families, and women in military service as well as first-term servicemen and military construction personnel called into the army from Russian territory.

Local executive authorities establish territorial commissions, which also include Armed Forces representatives. Commissions also are set up in groups of forces and on major posts outside of Russia by orders of group commanders and post commandants. Small posts and "sites" located far from a major military force element also may establish their own post commissions.

[Volodina] It is no secret that even servicemen themselves registered with military units and their family members often do not have any kind of registration at the place of residence. What is to be done in this case?

[Kritskiy] Servicemen without permanent registration on the territory of Russia, including those serving outside Russia as well as family members living with them, and first-term servicemen and military construction personnel called up from the territory of Russia receive checks through military unit finance agencies.

Those on foreign TDY and their families who do not have permanent registration on the territory of Russia are provided with checks through finance agencies of the directorates which sent them on TDY.

Russian Federation citizens who come on military duty in a call-up or voluntarily during 1993-1995 should submit a certificate to military commissariats or military unit personnel entities from the territorial commission at the place of residence on their receipt or nonreceipt of a check. An entry will be made in the military service card when checks are issued to first-term servicemen.

If for some reason servicemen cannot receive the check themselves, it can be issued to other citizens under a power of attorney certified at the place of the principal's registration or, with lengthy foreign TDY, in a Russian consular establishment in the host country.

Servicemen under investigation also have the right to send a power of attorney to any Russian Federation citizen for receiving the check (with attachment of a SIZO [Investigative Detention Center] certificate to the effect that he is under investigation at the moment the power of attorney was issued). But if there is no one to empower to receive the check, it is issued to a representative of the SIZO administration, who can dispose of it in accordance with the written request of the person under investigation.

[Volodina] And what are workers and employees of military units and establishments located abroad and not having permanent registration on the territory of Russia to do?

[Kritskiy] The civilian staff of military units stationed outside the Russian Federation who have no permanent

registration on the territory of Russia will have the right to receive checks on returning to Russia for permanent residence, but during the period of validity of the privatization check.

[Volodina] This means the situations about which you have told already have been taken into account in the law. But what are those people who are serving in the Black Sea Fleet, retirees who receive a pension from your department from Russian federal budget funds but who live outside of Russia, and also members of their families to do? And there also are students of military educational institutions—officers, warrant officers, extended-term servicemen—studying outside of Russia in republics of the former USSR...

[Kritskiy] Unfortunately the question of issuing them privatization checks has not been resolved for now, but the mechanism itself already is being developed and appropriate proposals signed by the Russian Federation minister of defense have been sent to the Russian State Committee for Administration of State Property. Instructions will go to the troops immediately as soon as a specific decision has been made.

INTERREGIONAL MILITARY ISSUES

Morozov Order To Prevent Svyatashov from Fulfilling Duties

93UM0117A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 29 Oct 92 p 2

[NEGA report: "The General Is Not Admitting the Admiral"]

[Text] Ukraine's Minister of Defense, Colonel-General Konstantin Morozov, has instructed the authorities of Sevastopol not to permit the Chief of Staff of the Black Sea Fleet, Vice-Admiral Petr Svyatashov, appointed to this post by Russia's Minister of Defense, to perform his duties. However, Vice-Admiral Svyatashov has already been serving in the position of Chief of Staff of the Black Sea Fleet for 10 days. Meeting with Black Sea Fleet seamen on 27 October, he stated that the Black Sea Fleet "was, is, and will be a Russian fleet." Local observers believe that Petr Svyatashov may be appointed Commander of the Black Sea Fleet by edict of the President of the Russian Federation.

Kasatonov's Transfer of Nakhimov School Questioned

93UM0046A Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Russian 22 Sep 92 pp 1, 2

[Article by Captain 3rd Rank Miroslav Mamchak: "Whose Order Did Admiral I. Kasatonov Carry Out? Afterword to the Events in Sevastopol"]

[Text] It has turned out that the Yalta Meeting of the presidents of Russia and Ukraine has finally extinguished the sparks of confrontation caused by various approaches to the problem of the fleet.

However, public opinion in Sevastopol has once again been destabilized. The events that ensued from the execution of the Ukrainian Minister of Defense's order to include the Black Sea Higher Naval School imeni P.S. Nakhimov in the Ukrainian Armed Forces that was issued in precise compliance with the agreements previously reached with Russia was the cause of the confrontation.

School Head Rear Admiral V. Denisenkov was removed from his post for disobeying an order and for organizing opposition at the school by a decision of Colonel-General K. Morozov. This fact was also used as the point of departure for the organized opposition. Hundreds of officers from various garrison units and ships were literally rounded up at the school, without an explanation of the reasons for what was happening. But the majority of them, having learned about the goals for their arrival at the school, left the parade ground. No more than 60 people were present at the rally, although it was announced that there were 1,500 participants.

The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense and Navy command authorities restrained themselves from hasty conclusions. Their representatives made attempts in a business-like, calm manner to look into the situation that had developed and to alleviate tension and the positions of the sides. There were also no official assessments of every possible statement and article in the fleet press.

Following the spirit and the letter of the Dagomys and Yalta agreements, the Ukrainian side found it possible to resolve the urgent problems of construction of their own Navy in the spirit of a constructive dialogue and understanding of controversial issues.

However, as after Dagomys and with a practical approach to the resolution of the tasks defined by the Yalta agreements, the fleet generator that creates artificial tension in fleet division-sized and smaller units was turned on. Where are its sources and what are its causes? Why are the agreement's articles that were defined by the Presidents not able to calmly transfer the commissions' work to the practical plane? Who stands behind all of this? Let the reader himself arrive at a conclusion about that.

The lines of a telegram, which we cite below with some abridgement while retaining the author's style, tell us why they have not managed to achieve a constructive dialogue in the situation that has developed around the ChVVMU [Black Sea Higher Naval School] imeni P.S. Nakhimov and the position of Fleet Commander Admiral Kasatonov and his entourage.

"The illegal attempt to remove Rear Admiral V.A. Denisenkov from his post has a criminal meaning and consequences. These actions of yours are similar to 'letting a bull loose in a china shop...'

"At the present time, humiliating actions for Russian Admirals are being permitted that affect the honor and dignity of any admiral:

"a) They have removed an admiral at the whim of an outsider, an uncultured and ignorant man, and a colonel of other armed forces;

"b) An admiral, who has not taken the Ukrainian oath, does not conduct himself in accordance with the regulations that everyone uses in mutual relations with a Ukrainian Ministry of Defense colonel-general. He did not assign him to this post and he does not have the right to remove him, just like with materiel, they are not privatizing people or servicemen;

"c) Rear Admiral V.A. Denisenkov was removed for no reason, he is not guilty of anything. He is a renowned admiral and division commander;

"d) An act has been committed that is unprecedented in the world practice of all Armed Forces when they remove a general from his post in front of his soldiers, a general who is respected by the public has been subjected to humiliation and dishonor.

"At the same time I report the rudeness of levels, chief—subordinate, senior—junior of the so-called Ukrainian Ministry of Defense educational system representative.

"If I may say so, you coarsely occupied Rear Admiral V.A. Denisenkov's office using physical force and sat in his chair... prevented the use of communications equipment... and physically 'growled'".

"...Your unqualified opinions cause the most profound outrage".

"From the kindest motives, I want to tell you that next time they will arrest you and, naturally, it will be very difficult for you because everything is just beginning."

"All of these actions do not impart prestige to you or to the Armed Forces which you are building and, lastly, don't think you can frighten me again..."

As we can see, everything is simple for Kasatonov. Ukrainian Ministry of Defense officers are ignorant people. Removing a Russian admiral from his post is not sufficient to chase a Ukrainian officer beyond the military unit's fence. To defend your state's position is to "physically growl". And naturally for a Russian admiral who will never be Ukrainian, they "cause the most profound outrage" and "condemnation" of the Ukrainian side on Ukraine's legitimate rights to military property that, incidentally, is on its soil.

Admiral I. Kasatonov's approach to the articles of the Yalta Agreement obviously determine his next telegram:

"At the present time.. large-scale attempts are being carried out to realize... the scheme. The Ukrainian intelligence services headed by Colonel Skipalskiy, a virulent enemy of everything Russian, and Colonel Omelchenko guide all actions.

"The primary task—seize the fleet by the end of the year while skirting any political decisions through persistent Ukrainianization."

The recent "joke" at fleet-wide officers' assemblies may totally serve as the result of the Black Sea Fleet commander's written works. "We will begin to divide the fleet on 2 January 1996 at 1600 hours after lunch", that is, after the admiral's New Year's hangover. We can cite quite a few more such telegrams and expressions. They characterize the Black Sea Fleet commander as arrogant, rude, headstrong, and tactless with regard to the Ukrainian people and state and its Armed Forces.

And he did not become like that in the struggle for the Russian Navy on the Black Sea and his greatest desire is to deploy it in Ukraine's ports. He came into the Navy that way with a firmly formed sense of his own superiority over others and with his mania of ancestral admiral's grandeur.

"The primary characteristic of the task force commander's style of activities (Vice Admiral I. Kasatonov—Author) is to incite fear in full measure—" stress

Captains 1st Rank V. Oppokov and B. Smyslov in the article "Poslesloviye k vizitu" [Afterword to a Visit] (KOMMUNIST VS [Armed Forces Communist], No 10, 1989). This strange manner of "strengthening authority" was manifested on the flag ship. Here are several examples of that:

A cheerful conversation in the wardroom drove the flag officer to distraction. "I don't understand," he groused. "The lieutenants are seeing an admiral for the first time but, instead of being afraid and leaving unnoticed, they are sitting with him and smiling." Or this case. The task force commander gives an order to a junior officer. The junior officer doesn't understand what the admiral wants and wants to clarify it. Well but the commander is perplexed and extremely agitated. He indignantly yells at the top of his lungs: "The lieutenant is stupid. The admiral gives him an order and he is not afraid of asking the admiral to clarify something. He is not afraid of the admiral!..."

Subordinates' fear, blind obedience and the task force commander's unwavering imperiousness along with that were crowded in day in and day out and forced their way into the ship's life.

The ship's doctor said about morale and the psychological situation among the crew, continue the article's authors, that it "became explosive".

Isn't an appropriate atmosphere being created in the Black Sea Fleet using similar methods?

Power methods of interrelationships with subordinates, that were nurtured in the period of muffled stagnation, have been totally transferred to the practice of today's political events and actually remind us of "letting a bull loose in a china shop," and in this case the Black Sea Fleet is the china shop. Where does this attitude toward the fleet originate?

Reality is such that not only political forces in the person of A. Rutskoy, V. Zhirinovskiy, RDK [Republican Movement of Crimea] and other advocates of unity and indivisibility stand behind I. Kasatonov.

Without those forces, I don't think he would be able to risk placing himself opposite the Ukrainian government and Ministry of Defense or he himself determine whether or not it is worthwhile to carry out the Dagomys Agreements.

Today, you can look throughout the entire city and see very little in the fleet, and the school never belonged to the fleet. Before playing out the spectacle on the defense of "Celebrated" Admiral V.A. Denisenkov or on the "heroic" advances to the school of which it is worth talking about, a 281400 August 1992 telegram (No 46) containing the following was sent to Moscow, addressed to Russian Navy Commander Admiral F. Gromov: "I am prepared for any decisive actions based on your command. Kasatonov."

Russian Minister of Defense General of the Army A. Grachev's resolution was disseminated by a telegram (No 237, 30 August 1992) from there: "Do not permit the Ukrainian emissaries into ChVVMU [Black Sea Higher Naval School]."

In my opinion, the true attitude of Russia's military leadership toward Ukrainian state independence and toward the fleet's problems lies beneath the meaning of these telegrams. The telegram and the resolution from Moscow that insult the dignity of the state of Ukraine were haughtily written with the view, as if they were "emissaries from other Armed Forces," that is, officers from the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense Military Education Directorate had arrived at the Pacific Ocean or VVMU [Higher Naval School] imeni M.V. Frunze in St. Petersburg and not at the school that is located on the territory of its own state.

Later, already after the "decisive actions," at a press conference Admiral I. Kasatonov assured the journalists that he obeys only two Presidents: Russia and Ukraine.

This is nothing other than an attempt to bet on the naivete of simpletons.

"I carried out the order," Igor Vladimirovich firmly stated recently in KRIMSKAYA PRAVDA. He is characteristically "nobly" silent about whose order it was and what it contained. While proceeding from the fleet's humdrum existence and Admiral I. Kasatonov's actions, I will dare to suggest that the order was to prevent Ukraine from forming its own Navy, despite all the assurances of eternal and fraternal friendship.

Chief of Military Education on Training Facilities

93UM0043B Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA
in Russian 12 Sep 92 p 1

[Article by Major Valriy Korol: "Admiral I. Kasatonov Is Trying to Prove His Correctness Under the Cover of the Naval Infantry"]

[Text] The situation that has developed surrounding the two naval schools in Sevastopol is widely known. But Ukrainian Ministry of Defense Military Education Directorate Head Major-General Yuriy Prokofyev released some previously unknown details to Ukrainian and foreign journalists at a press conference.

Initially they acquainted the journalists with a videotape graciously provided to the Ministry of Defense by Sevastopol Television. It was quite clear on the screen that the "mass" rally of the Black Sea Fleet Officers' Assembly was just a total of several dozen officers who are subordinate to Admiral I. Kasatonov. And the entire "act" reminded us of a poorly reported spectacle.

Major-General Yu. Prokofyev noted that the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense commission headed by Colonel V.

Pilipchuk had arrived in Sevastopol to realize the school reform program which is part of the military education reform program.

We need to say that Admiral I. Kasatonov already subordinated to himself the Sevastopol VVMU [Higher Naval Engineering School], the Black Sea Fleet VVMU [Higher Naval School] imeni P.S. Nakhimov, and the 55th Officer Courses in Izmail in July 1992 through his own order. Despite the illegality of that decision, Igor Vladimirovich has continued to stand his own ground.

Major-General Yu. Prokofyev has repeatedly attempted to learn from I. Kasatonov the reason why Ukrainian officers cannot cross the schools' borders. But Kasatonov with a persistence worthy of another use has avoided a direct response in conversation.

From the first days, Igor Vladimirovich attempted to block the work of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense commission headed by Colonel V. Pilipchuk.

During the course of the puppet rally, it became clear that armed naval infantrymen were ready at any moment, based on I. Kasatonov's order, to come to the school to "clarify" the future situation.

Tension increased with each passing minute. Kasatonov's telephone was not being answered. The naval infantrymen reluctantly returned to the base only after telephone calls from Kiev to Moscow. They had managed to smooth over the conflict.

The Commonwealth ministers of defense met a week ago in Moscow. Admiral Kasatonov sent a telegram addressed to them, demanding the resolution of the schools' fate. The ministers refused to review this issue—that is Ukraine's affair.

It seems that Admiral I. Kasatonov does not agree with the ministers...

Illicit Military Property Trade Increasing Problem in Baltics

93UN0341A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 20 Nov 92 p 2

[Article by I. Chernyak, special correspondent: "Are Stripes Alone No Longer Enough?"]

[Text] The trade in military property has acquired incredible proportions in the Baltic zone. There is the danger that the army will be stripped to the bone before it can be withdrawn.

After President Boris Yeltsin of the Russian Federation announced the suspension of the withdrawal of the Northwestern group of forces on 29 October, relations between Russia and the Baltic countries were highly strained. The numerous commentaries on this topic somehow avoided mention of the Government of Russia, which was at least a contributing factor, if not the principal cause, of the present conflict.

I will remind you that Yeltsin issued this order soon after the Third Coast Guard Division of the Baltic Fleet, which was stationed in Lithuania, refused en masse to move to its new duty location. The officers and warrant officers said they would stay in Klaipeda until each one had been guaranteed an apartment in Kaliningrad Oblast. This was obviously a dangerous precedent: Mass insubordination in an extremely battleworthy branch of the Russian Armed Forces would have raised questions about the feasibility of several of the foreign policy agreements Russia had concluded and about the government's ability to keep the situation under control.

It was no coincidence that the Ministry of Defense used every means at its disposal to avoid focusing attention on the problem in Klaipeda. "What a mess! And just when everything seemed to be going so well," one of the top officials of the military establishment commented, off the record.

We can sympathize with him. Back on 25 May, after a meeting with Audrius Butkevicius, Lithuania's regional security minister, Pavel Grachev signed an order by which the Russian Ministry of Defense, represented by the Klaipeda division, turned two torpedo boats, two small antisubmarine ships, a hydrographic boat, and various other types of property over to the Lithuanian military. In exchange, Lithuania promised to build 2,572 apartments for officers and warrant officers in Kaliningrad, where the division was supposed to go. A contract was signed with the Selma Association, and the first building was to be completed next May. Everything was going well, the traditional toasts were drunk in recognition of the mutually beneficial agreement, and by the end of the ceremony the generals and the Lithuanian deputy minister of foreign affairs had reached a complete understanding on the most acute political problems. When the Lithuanians came to get the promised ships on 30 September, however, they were turned away at the gate. In the interim, the Russian Government had passed a decree, in a display of vigilance, granting the right to sell military equipment abroad only to the Spetsvneshtekhnika foreign economic concern. Pursuant to this decision, Vice Premier Georgiy Khizha personally forbade the Klaipeda sailors to turn the ships over to the Lithuanians.

We can only guess what Spetsvneshtekhnika did to deserve this honor. I can only say that many staffers of the lucky concern, including Vice President Kuznetsov, were arrested for bribery of extraordinary proportions soon after the decree had been published. People in the Russian Federation Ministry of Security recall that Spetsvneshtekhnika did not have the reputation of an honest partner even before that time: Criminal proceedings had been instituted against some staffers of this concern, then under a different name, back in the middle of the 1980s. Many generals, admirals, and officers from the Ministry of Defense had to go to prison then.

In any case, we can understand why the Russian Government did this: It had resolved to fight an uncompromising struggle against corruption, including corruption in the army. Of course, the results were somewhat unexpected: The division rebelled, radical nationalists acquired much more influence in the Baltic zone, and the conflict between Russia and the Baltic countries became so acute that its effects could even be felt in the West.

In general, the efforts of the government and the Ministry of Defense to keep the military out of commerce are reminiscent of Don Quixote's joust with the windmills. In the first place, at a time when even government officials on all levels are striving for personal gain, any officer might wonder why he cannot do the same. In the second place, what else can the officers do when their future is so uncertain, when they and their families might be standing on a desolate plain somewhere in Siberia tomorrow, and when their salary of 7,000 rubles in Latvia, for example, is equivalent to only 3,000 after it has been exchanged for local currency? Shaposhnikov and Grachev could issue ten orders prohibiting commerce in the army and threatening every punishment imaginable, but the situation is unlikely to change in the near future. After all, the procuracy does not have the manpower to take action against each officer and warrant officer. Of course, I might be accused of exaggerating. People might say that there have been rumors of isolated cases, but these violations have not become that common. What can I say? Judge for yourselves. Even the extremely circumspect I. Shapran, chief financial auditor in the Main Administration for the Military Budget and the Financing of International Relations of the Russian Federation, recently had to admit: "Losses, shortages, and thefts of military property, equipment, and weapons have displayed a tendency toward growth in 1992. The failure of troop commanders to keep the situation under control has created many opportunities for abuses and for outright avarice at the expense of the army and the state."

This is the official point of view. Opinions have been expressed more sternly on the unofficial level. Members of the Coordinating Council of the Assemblies of Officers of the Baltic Zone, for example, believe that "the pilfering of military property in the Baltic countries has become excessive" and that "billions of rubles are disappearing into shadow structures." Here is another example: The results of a recent inspection of the Baltic Fleet horrified the investigators—theft was rife, the officers were using any excuse to make money, and the army was obviously demoralized. An air transport regiment of the Baltic Fleet was engaged in illegal commercial operations under the supervision of the regimental commander. The head of the firm serving as the middleman in these operations was the former chief of a special section, and his subordinates included the former chief navigation officer of the fleet's air force and chief of the air force command post. On the rear services artillery supply base of the Tallinn brigade, tax- and

duty-free fuel and lubricants were being delivered to commercial entities in Estonia under the supervision of the commanding officer. The commanding officer of the guards division of missile patrol boats of the Tallinn Garrison, the commander of the base support unit, and the chief of the fuel depot were involved in illegal sales of up to 10-15 tonnes of diesel fuel each month. Within a year the sailors of the once respected Baltic Fleet had managed to make millions of rubles on the sale of over 10,000 tonnes of fuel. They are selling items made of copper, ship propellers and anchors, brass shell cases by the ton, air tanks, and God knows what else. Illegal permits and forged documents are being circulated. Even according to official data, hundreds of officers of the fleet are engaged in commercial operations. The military procuracy is in dire straits: Each investigator has to work on 10-15 cases simultaneously. There is little hope of help from Moscow: For some reason, military investigators have shown a preference for audits of the Western group of forces, in Germany, and simply will not leave.

Predictably, after Boris Yeltsin announced the suspension of troop withdrawals, the Baltic governments imposed harsher restrictions on the military. As a result, in spite of all of the prohibitions, officers and warrant officers continued to sell all types of property. Realizing that this is a case in which the drowning man will have to save himself, the humiliated army has had to go into this "savage" business.

UKRAINE

Group Organizes To Aid Soldiers Without Housing

93UM0041D Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA
in Russian 9 Sep 92 p 1

[Unattributed article, under the rubric: "100 Lines On This Subject": "We Will Help You"]

[Text] On 27 August, an announcement was published in our newspaper that stated that "Sozidatel" Union is organizing a facility to collect information on renting housing for servicemen. There is no denying that this is a very important and needed cause, especially in the current conditions of the insane increase of prices and the general decline of the standard of living. However, in fact we are depending on the power of the state alone for the resolution of this most painful program, while believing too little in our own strength and capabilities. Meanwhile, "Sozidatel" members think that it is necessary each day to make even small steps in the struggle for social protection of servicemen. The opening of the facility is one of those small steps.

How effective is that step? I met with Valentina Pavlovna Sidorenko, who is responsible for this work in the Union. And this is the information she cited. In just 10 days of operation, 46 servicemen have requested assistance to lease housing. Six officers have already been settled into homes.

As you see, the numbers, although modest, are quite specific. Unfortunately, we are finding owners of apartments who are demanding payment only in hard currency among the proposals to rent housing. Those people who are demanding up to 4,000 for a two-room apartment and 2,500-3,000 for a one-room apartment are totally divorced from reality.

There are also offers to rent private homes. But in so doing, owners at times think that an officer's family that has experienced an unsettled lifestyle can live under conditions that are totally unsuitable for this. By way of illustration, Valentina Pavlovna inspected several of these private homes and became convinced in the total unsuitability of these homes for residence.

We would like to direct attention to the fact that the Union charges a purely symbolic fee of five coupons for its services, and frequently gives out a needed address without waiting for payment. Recall that latter-day "businessmen" who are offering apartments charge no less than 6,000 for the address alone.

But "Sozidatel's" initiative has one shortcoming—too few people know about it. Once they read the announcement in NARODNA ARMIYA, there was an avalanche of phone calls and questions. But quiet will once again reign after a short time. The Union leadership is still faced with solving this problem. And we are once again repeating the announcement.

Military Educational Institutions Reorganized

93UM0041C Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA
in Russian 10 Sep 92 p 1

[Unattributed article: "On Military Education in Ukraine"]

[Text] The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense military education concept began to be implemented in September 1992. Specifically, it envisions the reduction of military educational institutions deployed in the republic from 34 to 9. Nine military lycees will also be created to train future military specialists.

The first of them has already begun to operate in Lvov. Furthermore, we propose training another 25 percent of Ukrainian Armed Forces officer cadres at civilian VUZs [higher educational institutions]. All of the republic's military higher educational institutions will be state institutions. Ukrainian Ministry of Defense Military Education Directorate Chief Major-General Yuriy Prokofyev reported that at a press conference that occurred in Kiev for Ukrainian and foreign journalists.

A great deal of attention at the press conference was devoted to the issue that was raised on the transformation of the Black Sea Fleet Higher Naval and Sevastopol Military Engineering schools into the Ukrainian Navy's Naval Institute. "This issue is provocative," stated General Prokofyev. "It has been inspired by certain individuals. All units and subunits deployed in the republic are

under the jurisdiction of Ukraine. The schools located in Sevastopol are no exception. They never were and are not part of the Black Sea Fleet authorized organizational structure. And as for Black Sea Fleet Commander Admiral Igor Kasatonov, he exceeded both the laws of Ukraine and also the agreement with Russia on the navy through his actions with regard to Ukrainian Ministry of Defense certification board members who visited the Black Sea VVMU [High Naval School] and toward the individual who has been assigned as interim acting school head and therefore deserves to be removed from his post."

Officers Diaspora Group Chairman on Group's Demands

93UM0041B Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA
in Russian 17 Sep 92 p 1

[Interview with Ukrainian Diaspora Officers Union Chairman Colonel Aleksandr Igorevich Slyusarev by NARODNA ARMIYA Correspondent Major Gennadiy Klyuchikov, under the rubric: "On the Cutting Edge of Public Opinion": "We Will Become Zaporozhian Cossack Troop Units At the Market Place"]

[Text] The statement distributed by the Ukrainian Diaspora Officers Union (SOD) Ispolkom [Executive Committee] states that a composite regiment of officers-Ukrainian citizens, who are serving in the CIS countries' armies against their desires and will, is arriving in Kiev on September 21. The officers along with their relatives will go see their commander-in-chief—the President of Ukraine—and Supreme Soviet deputies with the following demands:

1. Form a Main Competitive Certification Board (GAKK) under the Ministry of Defense on issues of returning servicemen—Ukrainian citizens who desire to continue service in the Ukrainian Armed Forces—to Ukraine.

2. Enroll the officers of the composite regiment who will take the oath of allegiance to Ukraine on 21 September for service in the Ukrainian Armed Forces and assign them to the posts:

- of those 10,000 officers who have refused to take the oath of allegiance to Ukraine or place them on the secondary staff to monitor the reliability of the former; or,

- in place of the many thousands of officers who have served out the prescribed terms of service.

There is no doubt that the SOD leadership plans to begin a protest action on September 21 that is unprecedented in nature and in explosive force and that significantly exceeds the student hunger strike on Independence Square that we recall.

How far are the members of this organization prepared to go to achieve the fulfillment of their demands? In

order to learn the answer to that question, our correspondent met with SOD Chairman Colonel Aleksandr Igorevich Slyusarev.

[Klyuchikov] What is compelling you to resort to these extreme steps?

[Slyusarev] We have long understood that it is impossible to attain the just resolution of our civil rights—to live in the Homeland and to defend it—in an instant. At our two conferences, we developed a draft Presidential Edict on the creation of the Main Certification Board which on a competitive basis would accept an examination from each of us for the right to serve in the Ukrainian Armed Forces. As a result of that competition-certification board, Ukraine would gain in three directions:

- significantly raise the professional level of servicemen; and,

- the Armed Forces will be reduced for a short period of time and the released resources will be directed to raise our people's standard of living; and,

- our rights to the Homeland and our profession will be observed. There will not be any resentful people toward our Homeland.

We handed the draft of this edict to the President, Parliament and to the Minister of Defense. Minister of Defense Colonel-General K. Morozov promised us a positive resolution of these issues in a personal conversation with me on 25 June and with Ministry of Defense Personnel Directorate Chief Lieutenant-General A. Ignatenko in his speech at the 3rd SOU Conference on 5 April.

But the resolution of the issue is being drawn out. Moreover, statements are appearing that our problem can also wait. By way of illustration, SOU Chairman Colonel of the Militia G. Omelchenko stated that this problem is not so urgent since an extremely insignificant number of people want to return to the Homeland.

We will not tolerate any more red tape whatsoever. I myself just recently returned from a "hot" spot and I know what our fellow countrymen are experiencing there. So, we are coming for what has been promised on 21 September.

[Klyuchikov] Who are those servicemen who will arrive with their demands on Monday?

[Slyusarev] All UDOU members are ready to defend our demands and there are nearly 3,000 of them right now. But nearly 1,000 officers who are serving in nearly all the armies of the CIS states will actually gather on 21 September. The fact is that we have warned our members: We will not tolerate desertion! Only officers who are currently on leave or on temporary duty will come to Kiev. Paragraph six of the

SOD Appeal states: "Honorably carry out your serviceman's duties at that military unit and in that army in which you are currently serving."

However, if a SOD member cannot come to Kiev on September 21 for whatever reason, his relatives will come in his place.

[Klyuchikov] How far is the Ukrainian Diaspora Officers Union prepared to go in the struggle to fulfill its demands?

[Slyusarev] We are beginning a bold, decisive, radical legal action. There have already been enough requests, unanswered appeals, and mothers' tears. We are opening the 3rd SOD Conference at 11:00 hours on 21 September which this time will not be conducted in the quiet of a hall but in the squares and in the streets of the capital and will end not with the adoption of a theoretical resolution but only in the event of the attainment of positive results.

We are prepared for a decisive struggle until total victory. That is why the officers will arrive in their field uniforms. If required, we will set up a field camp in the center of Kiev. After the appeal to our fellow servicemen through the mass media, we will already be twice as many one day later.

If we do not manage to achieve the radical resolution of our problem this time for some reason or other, a composite division of officers in which there will be no less than 10,000 men will arrive in Kiev in the Spring of next year. We have large reserves—nearly 300,000 servicemen who are serving outside the borders of Ukraine and nearly 2.5 million of their relatives.

We were born in Ukraine. And we are returning home and knocking on the door. The Homeland-mother is ready to receive us but someone is keeping her from opening the door. So we need to help mother even if we end up having to break down the door.

[Klyuchikov] Reports have appeared in some of the mass media that you are not excluding the possibility of armed action.

[Slyusarev] Consummate scoundrels are spreading those rumors. I am convinced that this is originating with those forces who are not interested in our return and who fear the steps proposed by us. The creation of the GAKK is a revolution in army personnel policy and the real beginning of the restructuring of the Ukrainian Armed Forces into the Ukrainian National Army. That pleases far from everyone.

I think it is necessary to repeat: We advocate decisive, at times extreme steps but within the framework of the law. If someone approached me with the suggestion to go out into the street with arms, I would immediately arrest that provocateur. On 21 September, we will arrive at the Supreme Soviet Building not with arms but with flowers

in our hands which our relatives and city residents will hand us at the moment when we take the oath of allegiance to Ukraine.

Officer Union Endorses Odessa Military District Commander

93UM0041A Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA
in Russian 17 Sep 92 p 2

[Article by Lieutenant Colonel Valeriy Fedotov, Odessa Military District Press Center: "Falsehoods and the Truth: Or Who Stands to Gain by Casting Doubt Upon the Odessa Military District Commander?"]

[Text] Reports have recently begun to appear in some of the mass media which state that Odessa Military District Commander Lieutenant-General V. Radetskiy allegedly has a negative attitude toward the activities of the Ukrainian Officers' Union [SOU] and first of all its Crimean branch. To what do the actual facts attest?

Ukrainian Officers' Union Crimean Branch Chairman Colonel Nikolay Skipa said:

"I have headed the Crimean branch of the Ukrainian Officers' Union since the moment it was founded. But this is the first time that I hear about a conflict with Odessa Military District Commander Lieutenant-General Radetskiy. This is certainly a question of the former commander who did not want to take the oath of allegiance to the people of Ukraine. That one was actually against us.

"When we founded the SOU, information about that immediately reached Corps Commander Major-General Valeriy Kuznetsov and from him to the military district commander. It was reported that SOU's activities were directed toward the disintegration of the army and would raise problems of nationalism. Morozov made a special trip here, to the Crimea, in this regard but he did not meet with me. I think that the head of our school, Major-General N. Tsybulenko, helped me to avoid persecution. He was one of the first generals in the Crimea to put a cockade with a trident on his service cap.

"We also did not have a conflict with General Kuznetsov, the former corps commander. He responded with a categorical refusal, and in a quite coarse manner, to my repeated requests to meet with him.

"When we conducted an ispolkom [executive committee] session, we were literally run out of the Officers' Club based upon his order. And we, gray-haired colonels, captains first rank, and reserve colonels, left the building like guilty schoolboys.

"As for Lieutenant-General Radetskiy, he found the opportunity to meet with me during his first visit to the Crimea. More correctly, he even asked about a meeting and received an invitation in this form: Vitaliy Grigoryevich invited General Kuznetsov to come to his office while I was there and ordered that SOU be provided with

facilities at the Officers' Club, with all types of communications, put into all prearranged message codes, and to allocate transportation to any garrison. After our friction with Kuznetsov, this sounded simply marvelous.

"Later Radetskiy authorized me to contact him at any time of the day. I also periodically did that because there was pressure on officers who had taken the oath of allegiance to the people of Ukraine. There were also attempts to ship equipment from garrisons.

"The military district commander took steps immediately. For example, Lieutenant Voloshin, a Black Sea Fleet seaman, was subjected to persecution after taking the oath of allegiance and they did not pay him his salary. And the young officer's wife was pregnant. After Lieutenant-General Radetskiy's intervention, the officer's fate changed drastically. Now he is serving in our military district.

"When General Kuznetsov did not obey the Ukrainian Minister of Defense's order on his transfer to a new duty location, we obtained the opportunity to be present at the military district commander's meeting with the people's deputies of the Crimea and to express our point of view. Incidentally, Lieutenant-General Radetskiy did not come to see us by himself. Ukrainian Officers' Union Oblast Organization Chairman Lieutenant Colonel Belomestnov was with him. He helped to coordinate actions in the difficult situation that had developed at the time.

"It is difficult to exaggerate the military district commander's role at that time. It was at that time that we strengthened our ties with him. So the rumors about any sort of obstacles whatsoever from him have been deprived of even the slightest grounds. Who stands to gain by concocting cock-and-bull stories? I think that only the opponents of the creation of the Ukrainian Army stand to gain."

Among the rumors are the following. They say that the Officers' Assembly which recently occurred in Odessa Military District was conducted according to an order from Kiev and had the goal of initiating a conflict with the Ukrainian Officers' Union.

The executor of that scheme, they say, was determined while considering his attitude toward the SOU—Lieutenant-General Radetskiy. This is what Ukrainian Officers' Union Member Major-General Nikolay Tsybulenko, who was recently appointed head of the Odessa Military Institute, thinks on that score:

"Events in the Crimea occurred before my very eyes. Radetskiy's arrival in the military district changed many things for the better. As for his centrist views, I share that position. I personally love Ukraine and all issues that are resolved positively make me happy. We need to do everything in such a way that everything works for the state and for its Armed Forces. And this can be achieved only after having found areas of common interest. If there is confrontation, what will we gain? Furthermore,

that does not exclude fundamental disagreements. But, I repeat, there must be unity with regard to statehood...

"As for the Officers' Assembly, I have my own point of view on that issue. It is positive that attention has been attracted to that problem. I personally do not see a confrontation between the Officers' Assembly and the Ukrainian Officers' Union. But we need to work on that problem. We don't want the Union to disappear.

"But in general I think that the Officers' Assembly has become obsolete in the form in which it currently exists.

"As for the rumors, they are being spread by those people who prefer the former poverty of life and spirit."

In his speeches, the Odessa Military District Commander has repeatedly stressed that right now Ukraine is striving not for declared but for genuine independence. And we can attain it only after having reached a consensus in society and in the Armed Forces. He states that he is ready to cooperate with any social organization whose activities result in benefit for Ukraine and its Armed Forces. That approach justified itself during the well-known Crimean events.

This is what Ukrainian Democratic Party's Crimea Organization Chairman Vitaliy Fesenko thinks on that score:

"We actively support the idea which the military district commander supports to consolidate the democratic forces. This is especially important for us in Crimea. Here democratic forces are few in number and weak and it is difficult for them to act against the well-organized and well-paid chauvinistic forces who have secretly supported those in power.

"The situation is such that there is not a single Ukrainian school in the Crimea, we don't have our own newspaper or dramatic theater and a Red-Blue banner still flies over the Supreme Soviet building, although we have also protested against that.

"We have developed cordial, constructive relations with the representatives of the army and the SOU. This is obvious albeit by the work in the soviet of the "Crimea with Ukraine" Movement during the preparation for the congress of Crimean Ukrainians.

"We in fact see that the army is advocating the consolidation of all forces that have taken a course toward building an independent Ukrainian state. We are traveling the difficult path together. As for the rumors, the goal of the people who spread them is to prevent us from working calmly and to prevent consolidation and unity."

Committee of Officers Without Housing Formed

93UM0043A Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA
in Russian 18 Sep 92 p 2

[Article by NARODNA ARMIYA Correspondent Gen-nadiy Klyuchikov, under the rubric: "Building the Armed Forces: The Social Aspect": "Apartments Are Not Falling From the Sky"]

[Text] The Committee of Servicemen Without Housing was formed on 24 March 1992 at a meeting of representatives of Kiev Garrison's servicemen without housing. Colonel Vyacheslav Leontyevich Ignatushin was elected chairman of that organization. The committee consists of 12 representatives from Kiev Garrison VUZs [higher educational institutions], military departments, military units and institutions.

Two words about what prompted garrison servicemen to create the committee. The housing situation at the garrison has become catastrophic: from 1984 to 1992, the list for apartments (the most favorable thing in this regard) has increased by a factor of four and totaled 4,688 people.

Both construction of their own housing and the number of those who have received housing through so-called shared participation have been significantly reduced under conditions of the economic crisis, the process of inflation and other negative phenomena. They had to find additional sources to obtain apartments for garrison servicemen.

Glasnost is practically totally absent in the issue of the allocation of housing. How many apartments the garrison has received, in which location and to whom they have been distributed—all of that was secret and closely held. This information had to be made available to any serviceman.

The accounting of the allocation of housing was so muddled that it did not permit the exercise of real control over KECh [Quarters and Utilities Unit].

Serious violations of Ukrainian housing law by the corresponding military organizations existed which was caused by the inaccuracy of previous USSR Ministry of Defense orders on these issues. This required the issuance of our own legislative acts that ensure the just resolution of the housing problem.

That is why the Committee of Servicemen Without Housing has tasked itself with the following priority tasks:

- begin work to create a package of laws that ensure the just resolution of housing issues in the Ukrainian Armed Forces;
- create a single garrison list for apartments based on the principle of placement on the apartment list from the date of arrival at the military unit;
- conduct an inventory of all existing KECh housing;

—newly elect and set into operation a garrison housing commission; and,

—widely publicize in the press the numbers, facts, and problems associated with the housing issue.

And six months has passed since the committee began its work. That is an adequate period of time based on the current revolutionary times. What real successes has the committee achieved during that time?

Since the first days of the committee's creation, its members have been aggressively involved in the process of preparing the draft Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers Resolution "On Social and Legal Protection of Servicemen and Their Family Members". Committee of Servicemen Without Housing members have continuously worked in Colonel V. Dralo's working group which is responsible for developing the section on "Providing Housing to Servicemen".

These officers did much to ensure that the most valuable suggestions were made part of the draft Cabinet of Ministers resolution and which are called upon to restore legality and social justice in the allocation of housing. Incidentally, this painstaking and difficult work that is unnoticeable from a casual glance can and must render a significant impact on the resolution of the housing problem in the army. But, unfortunately, not all of us value this work, frequently demanding immediate results.

We can entirely credit the fact of the revival of the garrison housing commission among the committee's contributions. Our newspaper at one time described all of the GZhK's [Garrison Housing Committee] misadventures, those numerous impediments by the former military district command authorities who did not permit us to even closely approach the issues of housing allocation. The current GZhK, which is headed by Colonel Ivan Stepanovich Gavrilov, has quite convincingly proved itself during this short period of time. Today the GZhK is in practically complete command of the situation. Knowing very well the issues of assigning and allocating housing, it is ensuring social justice in this issue with a sufficiently high degree of effectiveness.

The Committee of Officers Without Housing and the GZhK have managed to achieve the fact that now the Zheleznodorozhnyy Rayon Administration and not the KECh issues the order for an apartment to a serviceman, thus thereby not only eliminating it would seem forever the violation of Ukrainian housing law that has been asserted, but has also increased the effectiveness and independence to monitor the allocation of housing among servicemen.

Many of us still well remember how hundreds of apartments were given to "needy" people with one stroke of the former KVO [Kiev Military District] commander's pen. As of today, this practice has ended. The Minister of

Defense is not permitting cases of independent allocation of housing. The garrison housing commission is exclusively involved with this matter.

Here we need to stress that, despite the discussions on the "apartment Mafia" in the army that have widely occurred, committee representatives have encountered complete support from responsible officials of the Ministry of Defense. Since the first meeting at the Officers Without Housing assembly, committee members have established businesslike contact with Capital Construction and Troop Quarters Chief Lieutenant-General Dmitry Aleksandrovich Rudkovskiy. Thanks to his total support and assistance, committee members have received continuous access to any information on the construction and allocation of housing. You will agree that to reach representatives of society in the holy of holies of the KECh is a significant success for openness [otkrytost] and glasnost.

However, in order to have adequately objective and complete information and to exclude the possibility of the distortion of information on housing by interested KECh workers, we had to have reliable numbers on the allocation of apartments to servicemen by the city administration. Vladimir Dmitriyevich Bondarenko, who was recently appointed to the post of chief of the Kiev City Apartment Administration, has agreed henceforth to provide this information.

Now when the committee and the GZhK know precisely how many and where apartments have been allocated for servicemen, monitoring the allocation of housing is becoming more specific in nature. Although I must also note that so far we haven't managed to attain the regular reporting of this information in the press. But this is one of the committee's primary tasks.

This Is What the Apartment List Looks Like as of July 1, 1992

Year placed on the list	Special	Immediate	Total number on the list
1988	18	21	548
1989	60	47	806
1990	26	59	840
1991	46	55	982
1992	22	33	668

To some degree, while filling this gap, I will cite the following data that have been provided by Capital Construction and Troop Quarters Chief Lieutenant-General D. Rudkovskiy.

In 1991, protocols of the shared transfer capital investments for housing construction in the amount of 77,800 square meters were signed with the Kiev Gorispolkom [City Executive Committee] which, while taking into account the funds allocated to the city, would have permitted the garrison to obtain nearly 1,000-1,100 standard apartments.

As a result of price increases for construction and price indexing, a recalculation has been performed and in accordance with Ukrainian Presidential Representative to Kiev Order No 737, dated July 30, 1992, they plan to allocate 35,700 square meters or nearly 650 standard apartments to the Ministry of Defense.

Additionally, due to the activities of the Ministry of Defense Commercial Center, 15,000 square meters, that is, 300 apartments, will be obtained for \$2.2 million, of them, half this year and 150 in the first six months of 1993.

One hundred eighteen apartments will be built this year through their own construction. We have received a total of nearly 918 standard apartments this year.

We need to explain that this is not a question of real apartments but of standard apartments. It is generally accepted that there is 55 square meters total space or 30 square meters of living space in one standard apartment. But since actual apartments are of various sizes, this number of apartments is a "floating" number.

Documents have been completed for the shared participation in 1993 housing construction. According to them, 105,000 square meters of housing, that is, 1,500-1,600 standard apartments, will be allocated to the garrison. This is two times as many as this year.

Three hundred twenty six apartments will be built through personal construction.

In 1993, an attempt will be made to propose to the city state administration to conclude a contract for shared participation not only based on the total number of square meters but also on the specific number of apartments of a certain area. Knowing how many and what kind of apartments we will receive, we will be able to move the list more uniformly.

Creation of a single housing list in the garrison was another of the committee's priority directions. Opponents of that idea were convinced that this would cause the entire matter to collapse, cause servicemen without housing to quarrel, and introduce chaos. But there is such a precedent—city officials allocate housing precisely according to this principle.

Despite the experts' predictions, committee members along with Ministry of Defense housing organ workers and relying on the support of the garrison's Officers Without Housing have managed to create a single list in a short period of time. There are computer printouts of the list at the KECh and GZhK and any garrison serviceman without housing can glance at them and can learn his place on this list and thereby monitor justice in the allocation of housing.

Of course, it's impossible to resolve such a complex task with a single effort. Many ambiguities remain which require further work and polishing of all rough edges.

But this is an entirely natural process and committee members are continuously conducting this work at their sessions.

And here time itself will impact not so much the results as the style of the committee's work and the atmosphere in which its sessions are conducted.

Incidentally, a sufficiently large number of servicemen who are not committee members come to these meetings. They participate as equals in the discussion of issues, make suggestions, and monitor the work. However, that large portion of the preliminary, painstaking work which committee members are engaged in on a daily basis to the detriment of their own free time frequently remains unseen for them. If each of us could just imagine how much effort and nerves these endless trips to the offices of chiefs, disputes, and conviction cost. Especially right now when each person is attempting to obtain additional gain from his partner through any nonsense.

I will repeat that many of us do not see all of this "kitchen". And here everyone wants apartments and more rapidly. Therefore, two trends have appeared. One of them is the tendency toward extremist forms of struggle. Demands of a single act by the government to allocate housing to servicemen are increasing. Preparations are also occurring to conduct a rally of officers without housing at the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet Building. All the more so that this precedent has already appeared in Belarus.

The other trend is the withdrawal from participation in the committee's work. Of the committee's 12 members, four people practically do not come to its sessions. It is obvious that they were sent to the committee to allocate apartments but in no way to participate in the difficult work to acquire the apartments. Therefore, the primary load of problems lies on a very narrow circle of people who are simply physically unable to carry out all of the tasks.

Therefore, committee sessions frequently are either not legally qualified to make decisions due to the lack of a quorum or fierce debates are conducted at them that are more political in nature to the detriment of the resolution of urgent practical problems.

As a result, we would like to remind you that we elected the Committee of Officers Without Housing not so that it could incite passions or so that it could be the organizing nucleus to conduct rallies and to elaborate ultimatums. We expected that it would, on the one hand, provide a new impulse in the elaboration of just housing law and, on the other hand, it would put an end to abuses in the allocation of housing and conscious muddling of the list. And, in so doing, everything would be done with glasnost and openness.

The committee is also moving in that direction. We need to support that trend in every way possible, while decisively avoiding the path of rotating those of its members

who, while avoiding the preliminary work, are attempting to push us toward confrontation using forceful pressure methods.

Missile Defense Ineffective in Light of Persian Gulf

93UM0046B Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA
in Russian 22 Sep 92 p 2

[Article by Candidate of Military Sciences and Senior Scientific Associate V. Biletov, under the rubric: "A Scientist's Opinion": "Ukraine's Missile Defense. What Will It Be?"]

[Text] The Persian Gulf War that recently ended has raised the problem of combating tactical and operational-tactical ballistic missiles with special urgency and suddenness. The modern PVO [air defense] systems of the United States, the leading military power, were only 20-30 percent effective even against the older generation SCUD ballistic missile. While considering MIRV'ed warheads and the jamming sources installed on them, which is what is occurring for new generations of ballistic missiles, military experts think that effectiveness could be reduced by a factor of 8-10 or more, while reducing the capabilities of missile defense systems to near zero. This problem is being placed before the Ukrainian Armed Forces with no less urgency, and with the initiation of the planned destruction of strategic ballistic missiles, its urgency is increasing manifold.

To avoid possible questions, let's immediately stipulate this beforehand. This will be a question of the problem of combating tactical ballistic missiles [TBR], operational-tactical ballistic missiles [OTBR], aeroballistic missiles [ABR] and other missiles of that class with heightened combat capabilities, other than strategic ballistic missiles. Let's arbitrarily call these missiles medium class ballistic missiles [BRSK]. For Ukraine, under conditions of the planned total destruction of strategic ballistic missiles and adequate guarantees of non-attack against it using weapons of this class, BRSK's compose the basis of offensive ballistic weapons from an enemy. Consequently, for Ukraine, combating BRSK's is essentially its anti-missile defense [PRO]. But even in the event of the deployment in Ukraine of a national PRO system directed at combating intercontinental ballistic missiles [ICBM] (which is quite problematical and very improbable), the system for combating BRSK's is becoming this PRO system's most important strategic component.

And now about the problem itself. The unexpected nature of the problem of combating BRSK's, which the press reported quite a bit about during the Persian Gulf War, could be only for dilettantes in military matters. In military scientific spheres both in our country and abroad, this problem arose a very long time ago. Large-scale scientific research work directed at seeking effective solutions to the problem of combating BRSK's were already being conducted beginning from the 1970's. So, the primary efforts of numerous modernizations of the

famous American Hawk and Patriot surface-to-air missiles [SAM] were primarily directed at expanding firing capabilities against ballistic missiles: increasing the SAM's flight speed and its combat might, reducing the SAM's reaction time, increasing the accuracy of the SAM's guidance system and others. Modernization of our army and frontal element SAM's has also been directed at improving elements and systems in the interests of combating ballistic missiles.

Despite the prolonged scientific searches and the successful solutions that have been found at times, we need to frankly state that the problem of combating BRSK's has essentially not been resolved as of today in any of the world's countries. The events in the Persian Gulf are graphic confirmation of that sad fact.

What is the cause of the low results of scientific searches? Why have we not managed to achieve noticeable advances in the solution of the problem of combating BRSK's to this day? There are several reasons. The primary reasons are associated with the specific features of the BRSK's technical characteristics as air targets and also with the specific features of the combat employment of these missiles. Let's look at this in somewhat more detail.

BRSK's characteristics as air targets are noticeably different from the characteristics of air targets of another class of aerodynamic targets: aircraft, helicopters, cruise missiles, remotely-piloted vehicles [RPV's], and others. The primary distinctions consist of the following: small radar cross sections ($0.01-0.06 \text{ m}^2$); high flight speeds (up to 4,000 meters per second); drastically changing flight altitudes (maximum values of up to 40-130 kilometers); powerful warheads (up to 500 kilotonnes); long flight ranges (500 km or more); short flight time and others. The BRSK's specific features that are listed above define them as the most complex and dangerous targets for PVO systems.

These specific features have a substantial impact on the combat capabilities of PRO systems (SAM's that are capable of engaging ballistic missiles) and also on the structure of PVO troop formations. So, the area being defended by SAM's during ballistic missile firings (PRO mode) is 80-100 times less than while firing against aerodynamic targets (PSO [antiaircraft defense] mode). Deployment of SAM's while firing against ballistic missiles must be not ahead of the targets being defended (antiaircraft defense mode) but, behind them, which is caused by the ballistic missile's flight trajectory during the terminal phase.

As a result of the impact of the two factors indicated above, the general zone of cover by PVO troop formations while firing against ballistic missiles is substantially changed; it is transformed from a zonal into a target defense (close to a point defense) and PVO as a whole is "clustered" [ochagovyy] in nature. Restructuring formations requires significant amounts of time associated with the redeployment of PRO SAM's, which naturally is

impossible during a massive enemy missile-aircraft strike. This most significant shortcoming is associated with the combination in one SAM of the functions of combating aerodynamic and ballistic targets (the antiaircraft and PRO defense modes, respectively). Thus, a successful, as it seemed previously, technical solution for the development of universal SAM's has become an impediment on their future development at the present time. For the PVO Troops, the solution to the situation that has developed can be proposed in the form of a search for compromise solutions; while structuring PVO formations, use universal SAM's in the PRO mode only while covering the most important targets that are being subjected to enemy ballistic missile strikes. But then again, this is a topic for a separate, long conversation.

Combat employment of BRSK's (the second specific feature which we spoke about above) is closely associated with the important role which is being assigned to these weapons and will be massive in nature, according to foreign experts. We can anticipate the first massive BRSK strike against first operational echelon's troops and facilities. Ukrainian Armed Forces formations and also targets with a military-economic potential, infrastructure, Black Sea Fleet facilities, strategic deployment and demobilization points, and state and highest military command and control facilities on Ukrainian territory could become targets of the attack.

The great might of enemy BRSK combat units, their low vulnerability to PVO systems, the capability for massive employment, and targeting important strategic facilities and troop formations for destruction can have a decisive impact both on the course and on the outcome of Ukrainian Armed Forces defensive operations that have been planned in the event of an enemy invasion. Calculations indicate that of all of the damage which could be inflicted on Ukrainian Armed Forces troops and facilities using all types of enemy SVN [strategic offensive weapons?], the percentage of the damage inflicted by BRSK's could total 40-50 percent. With the absence of the proper countermeasures by Ukrainian PVO men and equipment, enemy BRSK's are capable of inflicting losses on the first operational echelon's troops and facilities that are close to suppression (30 percent) during the first massive aircraft-missile strike alone and, approximately 50-60 percent during the course of the entire first strategic defensive operation, that is, close to the level of destruction. It is quite obvious that the level of losses could have a decisive impact on the outcome of the war as a whole.

From what has been said above, it follows that combating BRSK's has important operational-strategic significance for Ukraine's defense. It is advisable to impart the status of antiballistic missile defense to this struggle, the creation of which we must consider a priority state task.

How do we structure Ukraine's antiballistic missile defense that is directed toward combating BRSK's? It seems that it is advisable to carry out the creation of the

antiballistic missile defense in two stages: the first stage encompasses the period until 2005-2010 and the second period after 2005-2010.

The concept of the first stage can be expressed by the "expanded PVO" formula which means that antiballistic missile defense will be structured based on existing and modernized SAM's that are capable of combating BRSK's through expanded production of these SAM's in the period until 2005-2010. Of course, this requires improving SAM's in the interests of combating ballistic missiles. Marked improvements are required in the IUS information-control system: intelligence, command and control, and communications systems, and others. The main ones are associated with the reduction of data transmission time on ballistic missile launches and their flight coordinates to PRO weapons systems. It is extremely advisable under these conditions to introduce a direct "PRO" channel into the existing PVO ASU [automated command and control system] system and so forth. Today there is an entire series of technical proposals for improving the PRO IUS [information-control system]. It is best of all to conduct the structuring of troop formations in this period on a compromise basis. There are also proposals and recommendations to the PVO troops on this structure and some of them have already been tested.

The second stage assumes the creation of an autonomous system designed to combat only offensive ballistic weapons, that is, actually antiballistic missile defense as a separate system. Relatively inexpensive, high-technology, specialized PRO SAM's that are capable of effectively combating all types of BRSK's must compose the foundation of the PRO system in this period. Scientific development of these SAM's must already begin at the present time with a continuous increase of effort. As far as we know, after the Persian Gulf War, scientific development of these SAM's received aggressive development in many countries and primarily in the United States. The PRO information-control system is structured based on systems that are deployed on the ground, in the air and in space. During this period, it would be advisable to separate PRO men and equipment into a separate combat arm: antiballistic missile defense troops.

Can Ukraine create an antiballistic missile defense that is capable of repelling massive enemy BRSK attacks with a high degree of effectiveness? Analysis of the military-scientific potential and capabilities of Ukraine's military-industrial complex enterprises indicates that this problem can be resolved.

Of course, this requires enormous organizational efforts, energetic leaders and professionals, talented scientific collectives, continuous concern and attention from the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense and the government. Success in this work is doomed without the creation of an integrated system of military-scientific research, the formation of which has been excessively delayed.

Finally, this requires consolidation of all scientific forces. We need to place special emphasis on this factor because recently several articles have appeared in NARODNA ARMIYA that contain unsubstantiated attacks with regard to the first organizational steps of Ukraine's military science. Of course, today—pluralism, today—democracy. But we think that right now it is an inappropriate time for Ukraine's military scientists to settle scores and to organize intrigues. We would like to think that the authors of these articles would reorient their capabilities from destructive to constructive processes and would take the most active participation in the construction of Ukraine's House of Military Science.

Thus, tactical ballistic missiles, operational-tactical ballistic missiles, aeroballistic missiles, and other promising ballistic missiles of this type with increased combat capabilities, the scientific development of which is being actively conducted abroad today, appear to be the most dangerous class of enemy offensive airborne weapons systems under conditions of the large-scale reduction of strategic ballistic missiles. Under conditions of the enormous damage anticipated from the massive employment of these weapons and their low vulnerability to PVO weapons systems, the problem of developing a highly effective antiballistic missile defense is raised with special urgency and acuteness. Ukraine's reliable defense is impossible without a reliable antiballistic missile shield.

Critique of Draft Military Doctrine

93UM0150 Kiev NARODNA HAZETA
in Ukrainian No 41, Oct 92 p 2

[Commentary by Lieutenant-Colonel Oleksandr Dudal prepared by Oleksiy Redchenko: "The Military Doctrine of Ukraine?"]

[Text] *The draft military doctrine developed at the Center for Strategic Studies of the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine is critiqued by Lieutenant-Colonel Oleksandr Dudal.*

The draft doctrine is based on the non-nuclear status of Ukraine. It is probably hard to imagine anything more absurd, since it is clear that this status for our state is planned for the future—the near or the distant future is another matter. Getting rid of nuclear weapons at once is suicide anyway.

The West covers up its fear of the presence of nuclear weapons in Ukraine with the idea of their "non-proliferation." But all prominent Western figures, and specifically M. Thatcher, proclaimed more than once over the course of many years that nuclear weapons are weapons of restraint. And the very presence of those weapons in Ukraine is one of the main elements of the principle of defensive sufficiency, which was completely ignored by the authors of the draft.

Section 1 Paragraph 7 says, "Proceeding from the possible nature of contemporary warfare, Ukraine believes nuclear war to be impermissible insofar as it would have

catastrophic consequences for all of mankind." That is all that we find about nuclear weapons in the proposed doctrine. It is also not clear why the General Staff does not propose a suitable replacement for the nuclear warheads, if Ukraine has to get rid of them in the future.

The draft proclaims, "Ukraine, in realizing its military-political policy, does not make it its aim to achieve military superiority over other nations." This is a mistaken idea. Ukraine cannot link the question of the size of its armed forces with the obligation not to make it its aim to achieve military superiority over other nations. Ukraine, after all, has to create suitable defensive potential—which could exceed the military potential of particular neighboring countries, say Hungary or Czechoslovakia—depending on this or that military threat.

The proposed draft has not a word about the development of some very important branches of the armed forces, specifically space and air-mobile forces. Will they really not be required, especially at this stage, and will Ukraine really have no basis for their development?

The doctrine gives no answers as to why only two operational commands—the Western and the Southwestern—are being created. What then, is everything so unclouded on the eastern borders of our nation? Or do we once again have to worry first and foremost what our "big brother" thinks? While the defensive capability of Ukraine will wait?

And how will the mobilization plan be brought to life? We need to have a list of anticipatory measures relative to the level of military threat. The whole country will have to convert gradually from a peacetime footing to a military one in the event of such a threat. The draft doctrine does not talk about this at all.

It is not stated who determines the level of an external military threat, and on what grounds. And under what principles our nations will have to counter that possible threat.

The draft (Section 1, Paragraphs 4 and 5) incorrectly defines the source and assessment of a military threat. Its origin, after all, is not the "problem" itself (as indicated in the doctrine), but rather a country that intends to solve that "problem" via military action. And the assessment of a military threat should be based on an analysis of the military doctrines, foreign policies and military potential of neighboring countries and the countries that are sources of aggression.

The third section of the draft gives no answer to the question of what economic-military policy in Ukraine is, who will actually—that is, in material terms—be developing our army...

It is also entirely logical to pose the question of the fields of the people who developed the draft military doctrine of Ukraine; great uneasiness arises about the very fate of the development of our armed forces.

And most importantly—what military-political policy has been outlined by the authors of the doctrine? And to please whom?

Commission Examines Military Training Problems

93UM0072A Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA
in Russian 1 Oct 92 p 1

[Unattributed article, under the rubric: "Combat Training: Two Views on the Problem": "Some Are at Training Exercises, Others..."]

[Text] Recently, our correspondent visited a Carpathian Military District division with a Ukrainian Armed Forces Main Staff commission. Since a large number of personnel were at Lvov Training Center at that time in accordance with the combat training program, the opportunity appeared to learn what the rest were involved with. In order to compose an objective picture, our Non-Staff Author Lieutenant D. Tulyakov received the task to prepare an article on that same topic but... on the eve of the commission's arrival. What he saw and heard is in the group of related articles published below.

"More Accustomed to a Shovel Than to an Assault Rifle"

On that day, soldiers of the motorized rifle battalion that Major Anvar Mikhalev commands should have been perfecting two plans right away. The first, as it should be, originated from the training schedule. It promised a day of intense training: marching formations with rifles on the parade ground, negotiating obstacles at the sports facility, and exercises with communications equipment. Well, but the second provided for something quite different—cleanup work at depots, digging ditches for a water pipeline, and cleanup. And, finally, weeding the grass in the guard post area as a result of the high commission's arrival.

This plan, in contrast to the first, was understandably unwritten. But the realities of unit life required that. Therefore, it turned out to be more vital and the motorized riflemen carried it out with enviable zeal during my conversation with the battalion commander.

"You yourself see: There's nothing to be happy about right now," Mikhalev commented on the situation. "It's supposed to be a new army but the old problems that existed before still remain. It is sad that our primary mission, combat training, is suffering because of that. Go explain to the people why we are compelled to be involved with our primary mission from time to time."

An explanation is required here. I did not end up at that subunit by chance because I knew that after a certain break the soldiers had participated in exercises with live firing and had very good results. They operated with maximum exertion of strength which, I do not dare exaggerate, at times bordered on heroism.

"Yes," the battalion commander bitterly smiled in response to the thought I had expressed. "We can certainly call it heroism when a complex combat training task was carried out not due to planned and purposeful training but at the cost of the super-exertion of nerves and strength."

Although more field exercises were planned for the battalion in the summer period in contrast to the winter training period, they did not have the desired effect. They went out into the field but manpower did not always arrive prior to the exercises. According to Colonel Nikolay Budnik's order, the battalion was involved in repair work on the firing range. Having set aside their weapons and vehicles, the motorized riflemen picked up shovels, saws and putty knives.

"I ordered the officers to conduct an accounting of the training that had actually been conducted, without writing down each 'false report,'" said Major Mikhalev. "Although I understand very well that there is little benefit from that. But no one pays serious attention to the notes until an inspection nears. But at that time, they will demand that we show them the actual level of training along with the paper reports."

Actually, much of the company schedules had not been fulfilled. Cleanup work occupied the lion's share of the time and firing was postponed several times for objective reasons. Then, a whirlwind of tasks that had not been mastered at the time began immediately before the exercises, as usual. We need to give the battalion commander's subordinates their due: Major A. Kuzmin, Captain V. Lyakhov, Senior Warrant Officer I. Petrov, Senior NCO M. Blyashchin, Privates D. Todor and V. Urdinets, and others, who not only worked like shock workers in the field but also fought quite well.

But then the battalion returned from the training center and other regimental subunits went there. Details and guard duty already awaited the "trained personnel" and in the break, as we see, there is time to carry out the vitally needed plans but there is just no time to spend on training. How can you not believe a battalion commander who says that the problem of personnel in our army being kept away from training is "immortal".

It seems that we have to agree with that opinion under current conditions. It is impossible to imagine that order and service in units was maintained not at the expense of personnel. Another question is how to exclude this arrhythmia in troop combat training. I will not be original here but I am only repeating what has been on the lips of many military personnel for a long time. As soon as the Ukrainian Armed Forces entered the period of qualitative transformation and the improvement of command and control organs, the time had arrived to think about the creation of support subunits which would take on the primary load of tasks which cause combat units and subunits to be torn away from their primary mission. I remember that these problems were being actively discussed at one time but things did not

proceed beyond that. Will a Ukrainian soldier really be more accustomed to a shovel than to an assault rifle now?

Senior Lieutenant Dmitriy Tulyakov

Five Minus Three Is Poor Arithmetic

"Despite the great departure for the training center, the remaining personnel are engaged according to plan," Acting Assistant Motorized Rifle Regimental Commander for Personnel Major Andrey Dolinnyy brought me up to speed. "This is the situation at our unit: motorized riflemen are performing details in turn, according to the division commander's order, 60 men are peeling potatoes. Furthermore, training sessions for young drivers are occurring in the regiment. Right now, the acting chief of the training sessions is involved with replacement personnel at the motor pool..."

I caught Assistant Battalion Commander for Artillery Captain Aleksandr Leshenko (he is that same acting...) in his office. Another officer was working with the drivers at the motor pool. Judging by everything, Aleksandr Anatolyevich was quite concerned about what the soldiers would be involved with next.

The situation actually was conducive to unpleasant thoughts. There actually was no end to the training sessions. Soon there were the many kilometer marches that crown the exercises, and there wasn't a drop of fuel in the units. The exercises that had begun at an inopportune moment had "consumed" their limits. Or do we conduct training sessions at the wrong time?

As Carpathian Military District Combat Training Directorate Senior Officer Colonel Aleksandr Stepovoy explained to me later, the exercises had been planned for a bit later for the division than they had actually occurred. Besides other misunderstandings that were associated with the transfer, problems also appeared in other issues that were no less important for regimental combat readiness. Even taking into account replacement personnel, there will be a large shortage of specialists among the drivers at the unit.

But even those drivers that they have are underutilized and have been "cycled" in theory. Besides, the hitch in planning that resulted in two serious exercises at the same time resulted in a chain of other problems that hardly contributed to training effectiveness.

So, Training Sessions Chief Major Sergey Pukhno urgently departed for the firing range. They are also experiencing a shortage of other officers and warrant officers, therefore they had to obtain temporary duty personnel from other regiments and use non-staff personnel at the training sessions for some specialists.

Well, when serious training with the drivers did not occur, the time came to "involve" personnel. For quite legitimate reasons (the appropriate orders of division officials exist) only two of five platoons that make up the training sessions remained at the unit. One platoon was

peeling potatoes, another was loading vegetables, and still another—was supporting the exercises...

According to the regimental commander's decision, driver training sessions will be extended until successful completion. But it's still a pity that there is so much idle time. And all because the staffs have not approved the time periods and have not found people and the justification to at least separate the two major exercises. Indeed, is this a familiar picture from recent times when, as the saying goes, the right hand doesn't know what the left is doing?

Regimental Motor Vehicle Service Chief Major Aleksandr Kochetkov has his own opinion with regard to the training sessions. Under conditions of a shortage of material resources, it is much more effective, thinks Aleksandr Ivanovich, to conduct training sessions on a military district scale at a base, for example, at the training center. The advantage here is that dependence on local specific features is excluded (it is just the opposite at the regiment) and, which is no less important, the separation of the officers from personnel (especially at the platoon and company levels) will be excluded with the creation of a permanent administration.

In general, there is a dual impression from what has been seen: It's as if people at work and the effect of their involvement is far from what is desired. And a seditious thought arises: wouldn't it have been better to shift to the solution of the more worthwhile tasks as soon as the situation had developed?

We certainly had the opportunity to talk with Motorized Rifle Battalion Commander Lieutenant Colonel Sergey Oleksiyuk on that day and I asked that question. In fact, the soldiers are involved with what they can be involved with, when the regiment left its winter quarters—with sentries and duty officers a day later. Well, in the breaks, if you believe the schedule, there are enough intense exercises not only on the parade ground but also on the tactical field.

Incidentally, the topics have been planned in such a way so as to not repeat them when the regiment's primary subunits return, although some issues, especially special training, had to lag behind for objective reasons. The reason is simple: there are no platoon commanders at the majority of battalion special subunits. Regimental staff officers of the appropriate services usually conduct them but it's understandable that they are not at their desks during exercises. Therefore, the subunits have been reinforced by motorized rifle companies and they work out common topics with them. Well and the issues that directly affect the missions of those subunits have been postponed for later. Only when will they occur?

Everything is just like that. But doesn't it turn out that the sufficiently intense training rhythm lays an additional workload on the motorized riflemen who already don't know any peace? That same battalion commander complained that we need to allocate more time to

preparation for details, including relaxation. I recalled an episode that I had seen a day earlier at a sentry building where not one of the sentries could clearly answer the elementary questions posed by the officer from the troop services directorate. And everyone, including the chief of the guard detail, cited how tired they were due to the endless list of details.

And the schedule for the day following guard duty and on the eve of the motorized riflemen's commencement of guard duty contained tactical training and drill. I understand that the training was hardly first rate...

And it turns out that the combat training process has been organized in a difficult situation for units with people who bear a double workload in order to comply with the plan. But who knows if that "reinforced concrete" approach is beneficial?

When we left the regiment, training was occurring on the parade ground. Whether it was for show or not, the soldier's marching steps were striking with enviable zeal.
Lieutenant Colonel Oleg Vacheyav

Instead of an Afterword

The fact is not even that various pictures were observed on the eve and in the period of the commission's work. No one doubts the advisability of cleanup work for Major Mikhalev's subordinates (incidentally, his battalion was named the best in the division, based on the results of the last training period) and no one is thinking of doing away with details or guard duty. It seems to us that the question is how to more rationally approach this quite difficult, although also temporary, period in the life of any military organism. But even that is not the main thing. Hitches in planning and in the organization of duty are also observed under normal conditions. But everything proceeds from an indifferent attitude, no matter how strange that sounds, toward our own needs and the habits of resolving the painful problems using hackneyed methods that therefore do not result in any benefit.

But there is already progress. At that same division, for example, a basic subunit for training specialists has been created under the division training center. It's possible that this will help to resolve the age-old problem with the hiatus of personnel to carry out tasks that are not directly involved with their mission.

Reform of the Ukrainian Armed Forces is entering a decisive stage. But even one example taken separately from a Carpathian Military District division indicates that there are issues which we can resolve already right now through our own efforts, without waiting for directives or orders.

Christian Fellowship Works for 'Moral Responsibility' in Use of Military Force

93UM0070C Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA
in Russian 1 Oct 92 p 1

[Interview with Socio-Psychological Service Directorate Deputy Section Chief Lieutenant Colonel Aleksandr Vasilyevich Snegirev and Section Senior Officer for Religious Issues Lieutenant Colonel Nikolay Nikolayevich Chevylch by Major Gennadiy Klyuchikov, under the rubric: "Timely Interview": "God Bless Ukraine"]

[Text] A new social organization of servicemen who believe in Christ—THE CHRISTIAN FELLOWSHIP OF UKRAINIAN OFFICERS [KhTOU] is being created in Ukraine in order to bear witness to God in the Armed Forces of our Homeland.

God bless Ukraine, God is making a reality of Ukraine's age-old dream of statehood. It has already lived for more than 1,000 years in the family of Christian peoples. KhTOU will continue Ukraine's Christian traditions, the Defenders of the Faith and the Homeland. KhTOU has inscribed the motto "On the right hand of God" on its shield. It appeals to active duty, reserve, and retired officers to be Christian soldiers in the name of piety, peace, and harmony.

KhTOU is a peaceful social organization which aspires to activate the spiritual development of Ukrainian troops and to propagate genuine knowledge about Christian good deeds among all soldiers who desire to become acquainted with Biblical truths. We consider concern about high moral character and loyalty to the oath given before the State Flag and God to be God's business.

KhTOU will publish spiritual and educational literature, carry out spiritual research, will teach those who need a new profession, find jobs for those who have been released into the reserve or who have retired, render material assistance to the needy, intercede on behalf of people who are in prison, be concerned about servicemen's families and support ways of rendering humanitarian assistance and cultivate love for the Homeland.

The Christian Fellowship of Ukrainian Officers is striving, along with soldiers of the armies of the Christian peoples of the world who are believers, to bear witness to God for the sake of peace in the entire world. KhTOU recognizes our common belief in God with them and our devotion to Jesus Christ who embraces all of us and appeals for us all to be united.

The KhTOU's founding congress "On the Right Hand of God" will be held in the near future. Everyone who shares KhTOU's ideas and who wants to acquaint himself with God as a personal matter is invited to the founding conference.

For information by telephone: 543-91-65; 550-06-58; 224-23-78; and, 224-70-69.

Our correspondent turned to Socio-Psychological Service Directorate Deputy Section Chief Lieutenant Colonel Aleksandr Vasilyevich Snegirev and Section Senior Officer for Religious Issues Lieutenant Colonel Nikolay Nikolayevich Chevylch, the initiators of the founding of KhTOU, to expand information on the new public servicemen's organization.

[Klyuchikov] Do you think that our servicemen are already ready to understand and accept the ideas of Christianity after many years of atheistic propaganda?

[Snegirev/Chevylch] You have posed the question incorrectly. Faith is the state of a man's Soul. It always exists in him, regardless of the dominant ideology. It is another matter that the Soul is sleeping in many of us.

The issue on faith is always timely. And the earlier a man comes to God, the better for he himself because that is the path to love and freedom and that is the path to himself...

Being deeply convinced that the army must be with God, we believe that we will thus manage to remove the large layer of problems associated with the illegal employment of the armed forces as an instrument of force. The issue of a soldier's moral responsibility for the consequences of the use of a weapon by him will only be resolved in that case because the principles of good and evil are not simply words for a man who believes in God. But, on the other hand, only people who are free of spirit are capable of independently resolving their own ethical problems which each person has.

[Klyuchikov] Isn't the founding of the Christian Fellowship of Ukrainian Officers the first step on the path of the total christening of the army? For us, won't it change political classes to priests' sermons?

[Snegirev/Chevylch] Even a system of positive values is transformed into its own antipode if it is forcibly instilled. No one intends to forcibly turn servicemen to the faith. This is exclusively a question of the realization of man's consciousness. We are tasking ourselves with awakening the soul. If a man talks about God but his Soul is sleeping, then he is talking about the Devil.

We are not attempting to drive faith in God into servicemen like they attempted to drive the idea of Communism into us at one time. In this case, the method of winning over the masses is not only not promising but also harmful. KhTOU's primary task is to help people who have made their own first steps on the path to God and to support them morally and even materially. To make the path to God free and accessible for everyone who is still afraid or ashamed of their aspiration for faith.

Today it is very difficult to set out on the path of truth and freedom alone. The ideological dogmas of false conceptions of good and evil are too strong in us. The radical change of symbols, faith and ideals—all of that entails perceptible moral trauma. Many people do not

desire to assume the next obligations while experiencing fear of new violence or a new cult.

And our task is to help people to sort out these paths and to make them feel firm ground under their feet.

While helping man, we will not demand anything in exchange. This contradicts the Gospel. We will not require KhTOU members to observe certain rites. The aspiration for peace and philanthropy will unite us. The main thing is to find a path not only to God but to good and humanity. And this search does not have to mandatorily proceed under a religious form. All servicemen who need spiritual support in this difficult time can join our society.

We will be concerned so that political ambitions do not torment people's Souls, so that they do not succumb to the experience of power and political struggle and so that at times the energy of people is not purposely absorbed. Those problems that society must combat, that is not the pressure of some part of your dear ones but the struggle for their prosperity and for the development of society in the interests of each of its members. We want each dear one to be not an object of political repression but of philanthropic spiritual impact.

KhTOU is not exaggerating its role and is not assuming an exclusive right to the source of spirituality. In that case, we would not encroach upon the competence of God the Creator. While creating man in his own image, he imbued in each of us positive moral potential. We will be called to that beginning, while cultivating that fertile soil that is man's Soul.

But in the process, we will not abuse or sin against the ethic of freedom of conscience. We are prepared for cooperation with any serviceman for whom love for people and respect for the priceless gift of life—are above everything. Let that man even be an atheist.

[Klyuchikov] Are there similar public organizations in the armies of the world's developed countries?

[Snegirev/Chevilch] Yes, these organizations exist in many states. There are 46 national societies of Christian servicemen who continuously bear witness to Jesus Christ and they are united in the Association of Societies of Christian Servicemen (ASCS). These groups have various names but faith in God and our dependence on the Holy Spirit who guides us and gives us strength and in the Bible as the reliable guide to life is common for them.

ASCS strives so that God can erect evidence of himself in the armed forces of the entire world. To do this, ASCS appeals to both individual Christian servicemen and to national societies in the entire world to live bravely and openly.

Service Close to Home Increases Discipline Problems

93UM0070B Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA
in Russian 1 Oct 92 p 4

[Article by NARODNA ARMIYA Correspondent Lieutenant Colonel Vladimir Novikov: "Does a Soldier Need to Serve Near His Home?"]

[Text] Today many previously inaccessible military unit KPP [entry control points] remind us somewhat of various trading "posts". But if they are selling their belongings at "flea markets", mamas and papas are "bargaining" for their own sons at the entry control points.

"One woman," Lieutenant Colonel A. Kaplya told me, "proposed that we allow her son to live at home after he ended up serving in our military construction regiment. Why, she said, complicate the problem with bed sheets and breakfast..."

"It is turning out to be a complex legal case," a neighboring combat engineer unit commander entered into the conversation. "Some parents are asking us to let their soldier-sons harvest potatoes from the fields. It happens that they demand that their sons be transferred to serve in their native city."

During our visit to Dneprodzerzhinsk Garrison, we also learned that there are quite a few deserters at the units.

"If you don't allow a soldier to go on leave," Captain V. Loktnonov explained, "you can expect trouble. Either he'll jump "over the fence" or he will not return to the unit at all."

That reminded me of a recent incident with a soldier from a unit that is deployed near Kiev. While on his way home on leave (his home was nearby), he got drunk, sat on someone else's motorcycle and with a girl. And here is the result: he killed himself in a crash and made a mess of his female friend. Of course, they also found scapegoats in the person of the company and a warrant officer. But really not only the commanders are to blame for that but also our times that permit soldiers to commit deeds with impunity that verge on military crimes.

By way of illustration, at that same military unit, more than 50 servicemen were absent without leave [AWOL] from the unit. That is also understandable—they had relatives and friends nearby. And what is hidden behind that?

Unfortunately, we managed to learn that this did not result in any good for AWOL servicemen. There are also those soldiers who still haven't returned to their units. Or, on the contrary, you're amazed when the Dneprodzerzhinsk Committee of Soldiers' Mothers chairperson brings a deserter back to a unit.

"Several hundred young soldiers have already returned to work," Nina Ivanovna Lisogor, who heads that committee, told me. "It is difficult for a soldier to serve at home when his friends are going out with girls."

And these reasons, along with others, and also simply impunity, have permitted Sergeant D. Chudnovets, Junior Sergeant T. Shkak, and Private G. Prosolov to return to the unit in a drunken state, "having thanked" the taxi driver with tear gas.

The parents had to humor the taxi driver with money to hush up that incident.

We thought: has the army of independent Ukraine really begun to fall apart from the moment of its creation? It turns out no. Here is a letter (copy) certified by Unit Chief of Staff Major L. Murashev.

"Greetings from Kiev! Greetings, Valeriy. Your fellow countryman Sanya is writing to you. Service is going well for me here. I bargained with a warrant officer for you. He says, go ahead and desert. So, this is what you'll do: Get hold of some civilian clothing and run away. But just bring your uniform because there aren't any here. They have given me this uniform that chafes and officer's boots (!). Everyday I ride the self-propelled vehicle throughout Kiev. Put on your "civvies" and everything will be all right for you...

"So, let's go, Valeriy, 'let's get going'. They will send us to serve in Kharkov but I will wait for you. Go to military unit 01646 immediately, to the temporary duty company. You can go home first and then come here. Nothing will happen to you here if you go AWOL."

And these are not isolated examples when officials have not paid proper attention to AWOL personnel during the very embryo of army reform. And the soldiers who have been lucky enough to avoid having to serve at the "end of the world", instead of greeting this Supreme Soviet decision with gratitude, ignore it and more frequently go AWOL, seeking a more comfortable place—almost at their own home. Junior Sergeant D. Burdeynny and Private D. Sushchak especially "lead" among the combat engineers. They, like many others, say anything that comes to mind in a joking manner. It is not enough that they are serving near their homes and that there are no infringements on leave to go to the city, they are constantly leaving the unit.

"It is they and certain others," explained Subunit Commander Major B. Ryzhkov, "who prevent everyone from doing their job. Although there is something with which to compare them. By way of illustration, there is Sergeant Nikolay Sidyy. He will not rush to go AWOL although he also serves not far from home. But there are few such people."

This also reminded me of compulsory service in the Belarusian Military District. At that time we, drivers, served for 2.5 years because they did not release the spring draftees but sent them to the kolkhozes to help

harvest wheat. And the soldiers already returned as "pradedushki" [great grandfathers (from dedovshchina)]. And it was nothing because the majority understood the importance of the task of harvesting wheat. And there was a period of out-and-out stagnation at that time—the beginning of the 1970's. But there was no massive problem with people who went AWOL. And they served in foreign lands and their mothers never came to visit and no one spoiled anyone with leaves.

They say that everything is flowing and changing. Only the names and ammunition are left from the former Soviet Army. Now we are all specifically serving one Ukraine and we are making our state democratic and rule-of-law. But here is the problem: either the laws are humane or we have become something else if we cannot curb the AWOL serviceman.

And the question arises: Does a soldier have to serve right near his home?

Problems of Passing, Implementing Laws on Military

93UM0070A Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA
in Russian 3 Oct 92 p 1

[Article by Major Gennadiy Klyuchikov, under the rubric: "Permit Me To Disagree": "An Apartment for My Mother-in-Law"]

[Text] It is common knowledge that Ukraine occupies stable leadership on the issues of developing and adopting military legislation. But they are all laws of indirect effect, and additional resolutions, instructions, etc., are needed in order for them to begin to take effect, that is, everything that we are accustomed to calling the operating mechanisms of laws.

Unfortunately, everything that has been stated completely concerns the Law "On Social and Legal Protection of Servicemen and Their Family Members" that was adopted on 20 December 1991. A Cabinet of Ministers special resolution was needed so that the provisions declared by law become guidance for action for state institutions. Specialists of the appropriate Ukrainian Ministry of Defense directorates were enlisted to work on the draft resolution.

That is how work progressed on that portion of the draft Cabinet of Ministers resolution that concerned providing housing to servicemen and their family members. The Committee for Social Protection of Servicemen's Issues under the Cabinet of Ministers Deputy Chairman Major-General B. Lavrinenko headed the working group. The primary portion of the draft was developed by Ukrainian Ministry of Defense Capital Construction and Billeting Directorate specialists. In the process, the proposals and comments of garrison housing commission and Kiev Garrison Committee of Officers Without Apartments members were taken into account to a significant degree.

At the beginning of the summer, this portion of the draft was prepared and submitted for approval to the Cabinet of Ministers. And a period of exhaustive coordination, clarifications, and corrections began. Nearly four months was spent doing this. And then, when light had appeared at the end of the tunnel, the Committee for Social Protection of Servicemen's Issues under the Cabinet of Ministers was compelled to recall the draft that they had developed. Why?

The fact is that the very essence of the innovations that were made to the draft were emasculated during the course of the numerous finishing touches by the bureaucrats. Due to the addition of, it would seem, harmless changes, "it is possible" that "in certain cases" "it is permitted" that certain provisions acquire a meaning that is directly opposite what the working group inserted in it.

Let's leaf through the draft of the recalled Cabinet of Ministers resolution and let's analyze some of its most serious shortcomings.

First of all, it is not quite clear based upon which laws the draft resolution was developed. If only the Law "On Social and Legal Protection of Servicemen and Their Family Members" was taken into account and the Constitution that is currently in force, Ukrainian Housing Law and Cabinet of Ministers Resolution No 470, dated 11 December 1984, "On Approval of the Rules for Consideration of Citizens Who Need Improved Housing Conditions and Offering them Housing in the Ukrainian SSR" were not considered in the calculations, legal absurdities are totally inevitable. They exist and it is easy to find them.

In the "Writing Orders" section, there is an attempt to legally strengthen the provision that KECh writes the orders. Meanwhile, paragraph 2 of the Housing Law and Cabinet of Ministers Resolution No 470 state that documents of strict accountability, which orders are, are filled out in the prescribed manner at Soviet of People's Deputies ispolkoms [executive committees]. Moreover, based on an order of the President's Representative to the City of Kiev I. Saliy, in our city, orders are issued to servicemen only by Zaliznichnyy Rayon State Administration.

Even for restricted military facilities, Article 58 of the Housing Law requires the submission of orders of the prescribed type by Soviet of People's Deputies ispolkoms.

Thus, in the event that the Cabinet of Ministers draft resolution is adopted, we would be returned to the 1984 level in a legal context.

A provision was added to the "Housing Exchange and Reservation" section based on which the reservation of an apartment is processed through the KECh. But according to the law in Kiev, reservation of housing has already long been conducted by city authorities. Thus, they once again want to return us to the 1984 level. Why

is that bad? Even right now there are many ambiguities and foggy places in the issues of reserving housing. If you eliminate monitoring by independent city authorities, the number of abuses will increase many times over.

In the "Housing Accounting" section, among the various sources of housing, this source of housing is absent—"housing of a serviceman that he has obtained through the right of personal property".

What are the fine points here? By way of illustration, a serviceman has an apartment in Kiev that he obtained from his parents. But if he is transferred to serve in Kiev, he is placed on a list for an apartment since the previous one hasn't been taken into account in any way.

This variation will also appear as a result of the shift to the market economy: a serviceman acquires housing using his own money. But even this does not negate his right to obtain yet another apartment from the state.

Is everything really just here? It will hardly seem so to those who haven't had their own roof over their heads for years.

In our view, the draft Cabinet of Ministers resolution even contains several undisguised loopholes for the drain on housing and its distribution which skirts the general list. I will cite several examples.

The 5th paragraph of the "General Provisions" section states: "When a serviceman is transferred to a new duty location under conditions when adult family members or their equivalents have been left to reside at the previous duty location, they are allocated housing of a size that is no greater than the housing standards based upon the garrison commander's decision and with the approval of the military unit apartment organs from these units available housing".

Permit me to ask, whom do they have in mind when they use the term "their equivalents"? Grandmother, mother-in-law, or first cousin? Naturally, they will not permit a mere mortal to leave an apartment to "relatives". But this is a marvelous loophole for high-ranking officers...

Paragraph 15 of that same section states that the transfer of Ministry of Defense housing to other military formations and to other ministries and departments is authorized with the permission of the leaders of these military formations.

The question instinctively arises: what is this, for which military formations with the right to transfer our apartments, of which we have never had an excess? Isn't that the next loophole in order to give housing to "needy" people?

Paragraph 5 of the "Housing Section" section states that housing in Ministry of Defense apartment buildings and also housing in Soviet of People's Deputies ispolkom, ministry and department apartments outside the garrison is attached to those military units in which the servicemen are serving.

The sense of this provision is totally contradicted by articles 4 and 5 of the Ukrainian Housing Law which state that the departmental housing fund has been subject to transfer to the state since 1982 and to the jurisdiction of local ispolkoms. It turns out that, first of all, an attempt is once again being made to return us to the 1984 level and, second, a consistent aspiration is being observed to eliminate the undesirable monitoring of the civilian administration.

This is just a partial analysis of the draft document which could become the legal basis for forming state policy in the sphere of accounting and for distributing housing for servicemen. We think that this conclusion will not be too drastic: this draft is no better in many parameters and is even worse in many parameters than the previous housing law. Then, why was so much effort expended by that same Committee of Servicemen Without Apartments?

We would suggest this solution to the situation that has developed: publish the draft Cabinet of Ministers resolution that concerns providing housing to servicemen and their family members in the press for general discussion. This would permit us, on the one hand, to accumulate the most rational proposals and, on the other hand, would place the work on the draft under the control of society.

Social-Psychological Service Works to Halt 'Dedovshchina'

93UM0071B Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA
in Russian 9 Oct 92 p 4

[Article by NARODNA ARMIYA Correspondent Lieutenant Colonel Viktor Ovsyanikov: "The View From the Trenches on the Sociopsychological Service"]

[Text] Just like we can't give a precise definition of just what work with people is, we also cannot describe the circle of duties of a sociopsychological service officer. Outwardly, his work is ordinary. And it seems that it is not characterized by any real results on the tasks and standards, property and servicing of equipment or even by the quality of food for personnel, but all of that is a portion of his work. Let it be ordinary but still weighty. Success in the matter as a whole depends on in what mood a soldier has gone out onto the firing range, sat behind the levers of a tank or the steering wheel of a motor vehicle.

Therefore, no one will also say directly in what way the work of a sociopsychological service officer has been expressed at a unit or subunit. But everyone is unanimously certain that its contribution is enormous in the successes of the collective and first of all in that situation and mood that reigns in it.

The opinions of the soldiers of a battalion that were expressed in a conversation with Correspondent Lieutenant Colonel Viktor Ovsyanikov attest to that.

Private Aleksandr Kirsanov:

I honestly admit that I entered the army with a certain caution and alarm. I had heard so much bad about it. Here are both "dedovshchina" and poor living conditions, and constant useless labor. Yes, just what didn't I hear! The picture which I have seen for myself is drastically different from what I had heard before.

First of all, "dedovshchina" is simply impossible due to the constant attention to even its slightest manifestation by the sociopsychological service officers. This is not only monitoring, explanatory work, or some sort of preventive measures. First of all, an atmosphere of anti-dedovshchina plays a large role.

And even if someone suddenly begins, as they say, to demand rights in the barracks when the officers are absent, according to individual cues that are noted by comrades, he immediately senses that the opinion of the military collective is not in his favor.

Private Sergey Vasilyev:

I honestly admit that I was astonished that someone is interested in my opinion. And prior to coming into the army, I was prepared for the fact that a private is a serviceman with the least rights. His job is to precisely carry out orders and not display any initiative. Yes and the attitude of the commanders, beginning at the military commissariat assembly point, has confirmed that.

How surprised I was when they began to ask me not only about how I felt and about my mood but also many questions of a personal nature, everyday life and even combat training!

The officers of the sociopsychological service, headed by Lieutenant Colonel Vladimir Valeryevich Abezbauer in our regiment, were interested in all of that.

Of course, that doesn't at all signify that all of our suggestions are immediately being carried out. For example, we have been assigned to the mess hall facility and we only perform details at the mess hall. We would like some variety. We would like to perform guard duty. But that procedure has been determined at a higher level and we have to get used to it.

And yet it is understandable that officers of the sociopsychological service see first of all a person in each soldier.

Private Aleksey Lipskiy:

I totally agree—the comments and suggestions you have made will not always be implemented. There are just as many opinions as there are people. Yes and a soldier's desires have not always been directed at benefiting the service. One wants to sleep instead of going on detail and another wants to stop by at home. The main thing is that they are ready to listen to you. Interaction with your fellow servicemen is one thing. But the counsel and support of a senior are needed, as, for example, before, of your father and mother, or of a teacher or mentor. It is

not that way with the commander—he is the boss. Today he will talk with you and tomorrow he will issue an order and will not tolerate objections.

But a sociopsychological service officer will always have a heart-to-heart talk with you, will give you advice, and will suggest a solution. Right now many people are saying that priests are needed in the army. I think that their role will be very small at first. There are no believers among my fellow servicemen. Many want to talk about mundane, as they say, about worldly matters. And he will begin talking about God.

Therefore, in my view, it is still better to talk with a sociopsychological service officer, even to simply tell him about your mood.

Private Andrey Martynenko:

I want to say a few words about humanitarian training and about the study of the country's history. I won't say that we are displaying great interest toward these studies, just like we didn't toward history lessons before when we were in school. It is simply that many people have not yet formed a civilian position. Yes and the previous concept that "our Homeland is the USSR" still has a strong impact on the consciousness. Therefore, we also perceive the classes in the humanitarian training system as a necessary evil, no matter how well and lucidly they explain the material to us.

But the benefit from these classes is enormous, as I know from discussions with seniors and from lads who have already completed their tours in the army. For some, the foundations that are laid in the humanitarian training system will become that basis to which knowledge will be added and deepened. Maybe these classes will prompt someone's interest in our country's history and they will continue not only to study the subject but will become involved in further research work, there are still quite a few blank spots.

For the majority who do not enter higher educational institutions, the knowledge obtained in the army will be that required minimum which each of its citizens must know about the history of his own country. Those people who are studying in the schools right now will have gone through everything in the lessons. This is possible for us in the humanitarian training system. So, much depends on the program developed by the sociopsychological service.

Of course, it will be difficult for a soldier to give an assessment to the work of the sociopsychological service. But he is noticing the new things that are occurring in the creation of the young army and its structures. Right now just the foundations of the sociopsychological service are being laid. But the first results prove that it is on the right path.

Desertion Rates Prompt Service in Local Units

*93UM0071A Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA
in Russian 9 Oct 92 p 1*

[Article by Lieutenant Colonel Viktor Ovsyanikov: "A Person Who Works at Home or What Compulsory Service Near Home Is Fraught With"]

[Text]

How Some People Understand Defense of the Homeland

The Procuracy Has Enough of Its Own Problems

"Dedovshchina" [Hazing of Conscripts] The Other Way Around

Is It Worthwhile to Catch "Elusive John"

Before You Catch Him, You Need to Think of How to Build

Previously this issue, as they say, did not stand because trains carried conscripts throughout the then entire enormous country, from Ukraine to the Far East, from the Far East to Ukraine, from the Baltic states—to Central Asia and from Asia—to the Baltic States. Military commissariats had a firm order to not only not leave conscripts in their native city but also not in their oblast.

Then the sense of this was difficult to perceive, and only now are you beginning to understand that you learn everything better by another's experience.

Senior Warrant Officer Nikolay Yeremenko was returning home, as usual, after he had monitored retreat at the company. The street lights were burning at some places, but the lights were out in many windows in homes. Someone in a dark alley asked the senior warrant officer for a cigarette, which was followed by a blow, and several men began to beat him with their fists. The medical report stated that there was moderate bodily injury, and the militia wrote this case off as an outburst of hooliganism and closed the case. There are quite a few such incidents in the city every week. And only the duty officer for the city department by chance noted that for some reason they have begun to beat our military personnel.

What is this: a growing disrespect for the army, random incidents, or personal motives? As we have determined, the day before, the company senior NCO [noncommissioned officer] had a serious conversation with Private Stelonenko, after which punishment followed. But since the soldier was serving not far from home, he talked with his civilian friends. And they, in turn, beat up the senior NCO.

"And in general we have begun to serve more uneasily," say officers and warrant officers. While dads in their cars turn out to be at the entry control point by chance, offer to drop them off at home or to drink a bottle, mamas are

on guard duty and are threatening to write a complaint to the Committee of Soldiers' Mothers.

The local association of people from the same area, that dictates its own laws and procedures already not just to soldiers but also to commanders, is growing in the barracks. Officers who have already been harassed by everyday life problems and the unsettled state of their personal lives, react unambiguously to any remarks directed to them by the commander: the junior officers write out a request for release and the senior officers write complaints to the Ukrainian Officers' Union.

Cases of the theft of weapons have occurred when one person is on post and other people from the same area creep into the depot at the same time. And the theft of gasoline, the abundance of personnel going AWOL, and the growing use of alcohol...

Excuse me, they object to me, there is no such law or instruction that permits them to serve only at home. How did it end up this way? The problem of deserters is already quite serious in the troops. Commanders and military soviets are raising it. Large amounts of state resources are being spent on searches for deserters. In just one army for one month, 115 vehicles were involved in investigations, more than 12 tonnes of gasoline were consumed, and 341 officers and warrant officers and 1,573 soldiers and sergeants were diverted from their official duties.

And all of this is ending in practically nothing. Only 14 men have been convicted of the more than 80 criminal cases which have been filed against deserters. And they have been people who have refused to serve at all. And there have been those who, having gone home, have appeared at the military directorate organs and have requested that they be left to serve a bit closer to home. These soldiers have not been subjected to any punishment whatsoever. Moreover, there are cases when the units from which they went AWOL have refused to allow them to return.

And what about the procuracy? It has enough of its own problems. In the already former Soviet Army, they had already wanted to close it altogether or to transfer it to a civilian department. Yes and right now it still isn't clear how the fate of the military jurists will develop. I understand that it is difficult to work in this situation. To all this, add a great deal of confusion in the laws. Union laws are allegedly still in force but allegedly they aren't and there still aren't any Ukrainian laws.

About three years ago, I frequently dropped by the military district procurator's office in search of interesting cases. Detailed reports from the local area lay in plump cardboard folders marked with the garrisons' names. Now these cardboard folders have become rather thin or are totally empty. Do you think that there are fewer violations? Statistics attest to the opposite.

But it is not enough that there aren't any laws. They will write, adopt, and place them into force sooner or later. It

is worse that the moral foundations have been undermined. For example, desertion [dezertirstvo] is not considered to be shameful. Even this very concept has been replaced by a more neutral term—begletsy [deserters]. According to a poll conducted by an army sociopsychological service, one third of servicemen were already morally prepared to leave the unit prior to being drafted. Where did that come from?

Not so long ago, the army also began to collapse among the collapsing imperial structures. And glasnost from an objective need to say the truth was transformed into the opportunity to say what you want. And "dedovshchina" [hazing of conscripts] and other vices were taken to the absolute. It was as if nothing sacred or good was left. Emerging public organizations and movements appealed to soldiers to desert from the army in one voice. Not the best deserted (as, by the way, they are deserting right now). The then union leadership announced an amnesty.

Now they desert, for example, from Odessa to Kharkov or from Poltava to Vinnitsa, to be closer to home. And isn't it strange these desertions are successful in many cases, failing which, they simply aren't punished. And the principle of jurisprudence that is fashionable today states that what isn't prohibited by law is permitted. Therefore, it only remains to say, for example, that the number of outrages with regard to the local population has increased. That is once again associated with the influx of deserters into their native areas.

So, while breaking the traditions of the old army, we have undermined the foundations upon which any army is supported in general: discipline, readiness for service, and pride in being a part of the cohort of the defenders of the Homeland. Having stressed in the process the fact that we actually need to rid ourselves of: covering up violations, keeping silent about the actual state of affairs, punishment of commanders for the acts of subordinates, etc...

Serviceman's Protection Chief Seeks Unity, Citizen Support

93UM0161A Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA
in Russian 23 Oct 92 p 1

[Article by Maj-Gen Vilen Martirosyan, chairman of the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers' Committee for Questions of Social Protection of Servicemen: "Consolidation Is Our Motto"]

[Text] "You are our last hope," is how hundreds of letters begin and is what the dozens of visitors from every corner of Ukraine visiting the Ukrainian Council of Ministers' Committee for Questions of Social Protection of Servicemen say.

However, far from everyone can come to Kiev, and not everyone knows what problems the committee deals with and how effective this work is. At the same time, interest in questions of social protection is increasing in direct proportion to the drop in the population's standard of

living. Distribution of housing, retraining, and job placement for those being discharged into the reserve, pensions, and the return home of servicemen who are Ukrainian citizens—these topics disturb literally all our readers today.

Not so long ago, conducting an election campaign for plenipotentiaries of the Cabinet of Ministers' Committee for Questions of Social Protection of Servicemen, I had the opportunity to visit practically all oblasts of Ukraine and meet with all categories of citizens—from high-ranking leaders to ordinary workers and pensioners. Studying their numerous appeals and requests, I got a fairly good picture of the present situation that has taken shape in our state.

The situation in Ukraine today is as tense and contradictory as it can be. In conditions of intensification of the political instability and economic crisis, the population's standard of living is rapidly declining. Children's homes and dormitories, large families, and our elderly have ended up literally in a disastrous situation.

I, a general, did not know where to hide my eyes from the shame when war veterans, who did not spare their lives to save us, are now forced literally to beg for help to keep from starving to death. The impoverishment of the people has reached the point that now a person cannot either be born or die peacefully.

And all this is taking place against the background of insufficiently effective work by the deputy corps and contradictions between the legislative and executive powers.

There are quite a few oblasts where the state administration, councils of people's deputies, and bodies of the SBU [Ukrainian Security Service] and the Ministry of Internal Affairs work in close coordination.

But there are also those where some leaders continue to wage a protracted political struggle. With whom and for what? It seems that they themselves do not know the answer to these questions. But already today it is quite obvious who will end up on the losing side in this struggle—the common working people standing in endless lines for essentials and despaired of solving the most urgent everyday problems.

However, the worst thing is that in pursuing their corporate goals, certain parties and public organizations are beginning to use the national map more and more aggressively, striving to sow the seeds of dissension among various ethnic groups of the population.

They have a saying in the Orient: The adder will not crawl out if you don't beat the bushes with a stick. Forgetting that some newly-appeared leaders laying claim to the role of popular heroes without hesitation wave the club of national hostility, without thinking about whom the viper of blind rage will sting.

Being a deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, I had the opportunity to visit many "hot spots" and see for

myself the terrible consequences of such a policy. "Georgia is for Georgians," Gamsakhurdiya convinced me, and a month later I saw the dead and wounded in senseless altercations and the once-beautiful street named after Shot Rustaveli all in ruins.

I brought out from Nagorno-Karabakh the bodies of dead relatives and shuddered as I looked into the devastated eyes of refugees from the Dniester region. Well, you tell me, what difference is it to a mother what language her son's murderer speaks?

The pockets of interethnic conflicts are approaching closer and closer to the borders of Ukraine. There are already about 57,000 refugees on our territory. It would seem possible to derive a bitter lesson from the mistakes of others without going to extremes in our multinational state. However, the forces willing to unleash a fratricidal conflict are becoming more and more noticeable in our country. The amorphous position of people's deputies, the unabating disputes of political leaders, and the stupid attempts to divide everyone into us and them are to the liking of these thugs.

Elderly people often ask me: Here you, who did so much to destroy the USSR and its army, what specifically did you create for the people of Ukraine? Consider these words. We all must answer this question to our children and descendants. And they will curse us if we leave behind nothing but empty phrases, leaflets, and a destroyed economy.

I do not want to be a prophet, but unless we begin thinking all together about what is in store for us tomorrow, we might not have a tomorrow.

Yes, we had and still have certain contradictions among various political trends. But are they so antagonistic that on the brink of disaster we cannot find in ourselves the strength to reach out a hand to help one another? Are our positions so far apart that we cannot overcome our own ambitions for the sake of the welfare of the people, servants of whom we have grown accustomed to calling ourselves?

It was namely these reasons that motivated the Committee for Questions of Social Protection of Servicemen under the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine to come forth with an initiative at the conference of public opinion of Rovno Oblast to create a nationwide Union of Constructive Forces. It would enable all public movements, political parties, and organizations to consolidate their forces to stabilize the situation in the country and resolve the economic and social problems of the people.

We fully support the position of the President of Ukraine and call upon everyone who stands on this same platform to rally their ranks to solve the complex maze of economic problems.

The question may arise: Why call upon servicemen, who do not have the right to engage in political activities, to consolidate parties? We took that step because we know

all too well with what a social upheaval threatens us. Servicemen will be the first to be sent into the fire of a fratricidal war, and their families will be the first to receive its blow. Yes, even in peacetime this category of population is one of the least protected in social terms. Therefore, officers are vitally interested in a strong and reliable government. They decisively support the President's efforts aimed at stabilizing the situation.

We have the right to figure that such a powerful organization as the Union of Constructive Forces might become will provide effective assistance to servicemen in solving their social problems. In turn, we will also provide assistance to the people of Ukraine. Remember, it is rare that you will find a family in which a man is not preparing to serve in the army, is serving, or has already served. And these families are vitally interested in our assistance.

Isn't this really a splendid example of the unity of the army and the people?

Already today quite a bit is being done to create a legal and material base for accomplishing the tasks of social protection of servicemen and their family members. Our committee has sent an open letter to the President in which it not only analyzed the situation, but also proposed specific measures. The President charged us with drawing up a draft State Program of Social Protection of Servicemen. Part of this work has already been accomplished: preparation of a draft decree of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine for providing housing facilities for servicemen and their families; adaptation, retraining, and job placement programs for those being discharged into the reserve; and a program for relocating to the homeland servicemen who are citizens of Ukraine and serving outside its boundaries. A number of proposals are being prepared for expanding veterans benefits.

The Servicemen's Social Protection Fund is being formed for material support of this program.

It is quite obvious that it is necessary to have a sufficient number of reliable allies to implement any idea. We are now doing everything we can to unite into one powerful force the Union of Officers of Ukraine, the "Sozidatel" Union of Social Protection of Servicemen, the independent Association of Officers of Ukraine, the All-Ukrainian Committee of Soldiers' Mothers, the Union of Officers of the Ukrainian Diaspora, the Ukrainian Union of Veterans of Afghanistan and Union of Veterans of War, the Armed Forces, and Labor, and other public organizations of servicemen.

The numerous skeptics frequently ask: What guarantees are there that the Program of Social Protection of Servicemen will not be simply a good-looking gesture by the Government and the President to divert attention and release the steam of dissatisfaction? The guarantees are in ourselves. Even God helps him who helps himself. It is naive to sit idle and hope that some state structure will hasten to help us.

People in shoulder boards have enough intellectual potential and life experience to take an active stand in resolving the very complicated maze of problems facing our society. We only need to combine these efforts and direct them at achieving the common goal. We are counting very much on your advice and suggestions.

BELARUS

Budget, Personnel Problems of Belarus Armed Forces

93UM0073A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 15 Oct 92 p 7

[Article by ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA Correspondent Aleksey Yeroshenko, Minsk: "The Iron Fist Is Unclenching for a Handshake: Belarus is Creating a National Defense Shield"]

[Text] Military formations play an appreciable role in the life of society in Belarus, as in all of the other CIS states. Maybe, an even more appreciable role than in the other independent states: here every fortieth resident is under arms. There are many problems in this environment that require immediate solutions.

Professional military personnel, despite the law that has been adopted on pension support of servicemen who have been reduced, are not certain that they will be able to ensure the well-being of their families even in the near future. Two-thirds of those officers polled by sociologists are inclined toward active protest even with the slightest deterioration. And there is a new wave of reductions ahead. It is assumed that more than 60 military units will be reformed by the end of this year alone. That means that 22,000 cadre command personnel will go, as they say here, carry hay to the dogs. Approximately the same number will join them in the next stages of reform. But that is not all. Forty thousand Belarusians who are serving in Commonwealth country garrisons are about to rush home. Nearly 8,000 of them have already bombarded the Republic military department with requests, offering their services to the national army that is coming into being. However, it will be able to take few under its banner because it is proposed to have no more than 95,000 men in its complement. And the national defense shield is being formed unhurriedly while looking back at the emaciated state budget. Expenditures for material-technical support and social protection of released servicemen alone threaten to nullify it.

But in their bumpy history the Belarusians have repeatedly contrived to extract albeit the grains of good from the most absolute evil. All the more so that this time it lies on the surface at nearly every garrison. During its triumphal existence, the Belarusian Military District under orders stuffed numerous depots with all sorts of army things, without mentioning first-class military weaponry. While Russia fought with Ukraine over the Black Sea Fleet, polite Belarus rapidly gathered the military district's military equipment in its hands. The

republic government created an inspectorate under the Ministry of Defense to monitor the preservation of the former military district's military equipment and delegated emergency powers to it. The movement of vehicles and the airlift of equipment or foodstuffs are only possible now based on Republic Ministry of Defense orders under the inspectorate's watchful eye.

Indeed, these steps were taken in haste and there was no precise legislative foundation. Therefore, military personnel think that the emergency inspectorate's monitoring functions with the juridical vagueness of its forms frequently impart independence with a slant toward arbitrariness. The decision on the mandatory customs inspection of military-transport aircraft that take off from Belarus' airfields, even if they are performing training flights, attests to that. Aircraft commanders say that the matter is not that they are being beaten on the back with a knout but what is painful is that the former Belarus Military District's air forces are actually paralyzed.

As if in consolation for those whose hands yearn for the aircraft yoke, the republic Council of Ministers has adopted a resolution on granting the Ministry of Defense rights to carry out scheduled commercial flights on domestic and international airlines using army aircraft and helicopters. This injection did not affect the health of bilateral relations. And then, inspired, Belarus announced: transport aircraft deployed on its territory will remain under its jurisdiction forever. It seemed that Moscow frowned for show but remained silent. The resubordination of air transport aircraft, including strategic transport aircraft, took place in a unilateral manner. The Vitebsk Regiment, equipped with the latest IL-76's with first class trained crews, was the first to taxi out to the takeoff point in the new kind of role. According to expert calculations, each of these aircraft will provide up to 1.5 million rubles profit for each scheduled flight. Of course, it is strange to see military aircraft carrying money-earning cargoes, there are no similar occurrences in world practice. Later, the emerging Belarusian Air Force will be able to lay the foundation of its own military production base using its peacefully earned resources and conserve the qualifications of the crews.

If the "winged guard", simply speaking, has caught us by surprise, the former military district's ground contingent has shifted all of its combat might over to trade. The recently created commercial directorate that is composed of marketing, sales, and collection of secondary resources departments has become nearly the most powerful structure in the Ministry of Defense. Stockpiling of ferrous, non-ferrous, and precious metals, textile and other by-products, and broken glass—is now also a combat mission. Buildings that are suitable for production activities are being leased or sold, building materials, auxiliary vehicles, motor vehicles, refueling trucks, refueling stations, kitchens, laundries, auto repair shops,

motor-driven pumps, and washing and cleaning equipment are being sold for a profit... And even boots, foot wrappings and mittens.

It is more complicated with armored vehicles. Agricultural enterprises have been looking at some models for a long time but, since they need to be reequipped, plants are being rapidly created to reequip the armored combat steeds into harmless draft power.

But the domestic market is hardly capable of grinding these gigantic arsenals again. And therefore a provision on export operations with a "special" group of goods—arms, including equipment, assemblies, and components for weapons of mass destruction, dual-use goods with the possibility of their use for military purposes—was born in the Belarus State Committee for External Economic Relations. However, in the intensified commercial price fixing, the republic intends to strictly adhere to the appropriate international conventions. Zones of conflicts and criminal regimes from the point of view of the world community will not get hold of arms from Belarus. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, security organs, and the Ministry of Defense will monitor these deals. Although mankind certainly knows that everybody's business is nobody's business. It is entirely possible that operations with the "special" group of goods will already occur in the coming months because if the mighty iron fist is not unclenched today and they do not sell it finger by finger, tomorrow it will turn out to be a pile of obsolete metal and difficult to lend itself to be scrapped.

So, consider the resources to create the national defense shield in Belarus to be available. Some of it will go for social payments to released officers and warrant officers and also for the maintenance of defense enterprises. But then again, certain countries of the near and remote foreign areas have, consciously or unconsciously, not been indifferent, by way of illustration, Russia has allocated R5.5 billion to its peace-loving neighbor to finance the military sectors of industry while counting on taking advantage of the unique models of Belarusian military industry. And the government of the FRG [Federal Republic of Germany], while striving to more rapidly part ways with the remnants of the Western Group of Forces, have already sent 8.5 million marks to Belarus to open retraining centers for servicemen returning home and to maintain their social tone.

Decree on Housing for Retired, Discharged Servicemen

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in Belarusian 4 Nov 92 pp 1, 3*

[“Belarusian Council of Ministers Decree on Measures for Providing Housing for Retired or Discharged Servicemen,” signed by V. Kebich, chairman of the Belarusian Council of Ministers, and M. Kayko, administrator of the Belarusian Administration of Affairs, in Minsk on 26 October, 1992]

[Text] The Council of Ministers of the Republic of Belarus decrees:

1. To charge the local soviet executive administration to provide housing in 1992-1993 for retired and discharged officers, warrant officers ["praporshchik," "michman"], and extended-term servicemen who are on the list of persons wishing to improve their housing as of July 1, 1992. Housing construction for this category of citizens is financed from the republican budget. In the future, these categories of citizens will get housing in accordance with the legislation of the Republic of Belarus which specifies the status of servicemen.

2. To ask the Supreme Council of the Republic of Belarus:

—To adopt a decree on permission for the local soviet executive administration to deduct in exceptional cases in 1993-1994 up to 8 percent of housing (including residential cooperatives) despite its departmental property in order to provide housing for retired or discharged servicemen;

—To authorize free assignation of occupied housing (including housing quota and total quota) to retired or discharged servicemen with irreproachable service records of not less than 20 years.

3. To stipulate that the construction of individual houses and apartments in the residential cooperatives by servicemen (including retired and discharged servicemen) except servicemen who are called up for compulsory military service is in part financed from the republican budget. Building of the houses (apartments) is carried out according to the specifications foreseen by the Decree of the Belarusian Council of Ministers from 27 March, 1992 No 165 "On Urgent Measures for Development of Individual Building and Residential-Building Cooperatives in the Stage of Shifting to Market Economy" (Laws of the Republic of Belarus, 1992, N 9, Article 150).

Financial help from the republican budget for these purposes amounts to 50 percent of costs for the standard level of housing construction (the cost of one square meter equaling the cost of one square meter of state housing construction, while the norm of housing per person is 18 square meters).

The local soviet executive administration grants state subsidies to servicemen in accordance with the order issued by the Ministry of Finances.

4. To charge Minsk Oblast Executive Council and Minsk City Executive Council with providing retired and discharged servicemen with private lots for the construction of 1,000 individual houses by 15 November.

5. To accept a proposal of the Defense Ministry to regard housing in closed cantonments as official housing.

Servicemen who were voluntarily discharged for the infringement of discipline or criminal activity must be

withdrawn from official apartments together with their families without being offered any other housing.

6. To extend the application of the Decree to officer staffs, warrant officers, and extended-term servicemen of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, KGB, and Chief Administration of Border Troops at the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Belarus.

[Signed] Chairman of the Belarusian Council of Ministers

V. Kebich

Administrator of the Belarusian Administration of Affairs

M. Kayko

26 October, 1992

Minsk

BALTIC STATES

Council of Baltic States Discusses Withdrawal

93UM0082A St. Petersburg S. PETERBURGSKIYE
VEDOMOSTI in Russian 18 Sep 92 p 3

[Article by A. Rabkovskiy: "Baltic Summit: Positions Stiffen"]

[Text] Tallinn-St. Petersburg—Problems of the withdrawal of Russian forces from the territory of the three Baltic countries occupied a central place during the latest session of the Council of Baltic States held Wednesday in Tallinn.

It is common knowledge that the ministers of defense of Russia and Lithuania agreed upon and signed a new timetable for the Russian Army's withdrawal from this republic in Moscow on 8 September. According to these documents, the last Russian soldier will leave Lithuania no later than 31 August of next year.

At a concluding press conference in Tallinn, chairmen of the supreme councils of Baltic countries A. Ruutel, V. Landsbergis and A. Gorbunovs gave on the whole a positive assessment of progress which had shown up in talks with Moscow. But in commenting on the content of the adopted appeal to the CSCE, all three leaders of the Council of Baltic States emphasized that this is only the beginning of implementation of paragraph 15 of the CSCE Declaration of 10 July 1992.

It is obvious that Russian diplomacy now will have to encounter a stiffer position of Latvia and Estonia in difficult talks on military questions. Arnold Ruutel, for example, designated the following time periods: all Russian military subunits leave Tallinn and all units equipped with offensive arms leave Estonia before the end of the year. In the first half of 1993 questions are resolved with those units which have especially sophisticated technical equipment at their disposal. The final withdrawal of all Russian forces is before 10 July of next year.

Anatoliy Gorbunovs in turn expressed hopes that Russia will not link problems of citizenship of the Russian-language population in Latvia with the presence of its forces there.

At the same time, the following nuance draws attention: in exerting a certain diplomatic pressure on Russia through the CSCE, leaders of the Council of Baltic States are beginning to talk seriously about some kind of human rights violations in the Russian Federation. What do they have in mind here? As is clear from comments of that same Gorbunovs, it is a question, for example, of Letts who live closely together in Siberia and other places, but neither the chairman of the Latvian Supreme Council nor his Lithuanian and Estonian colleagues were able to cite specific examples of actually serious violations of the rights of such national minorities.

It can be surmised, of course, that they have in mind the organization of national schools, creation of religious communes, and publication of their own newspapers for Russians of Baltic origin. There unquestionably are problems here, above all for local Russian authorities, only are they already so aggravated that they require appeals to the CSCE?

The final documents of the Tallinn summit indicate that special diplomatic flexibility and principle will be required of Russia at talks with Baltic countries.

Latvian Official Discrimination Against Russian Servicemen

93UM0094A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 20 Oct 92 p 7

[Article by ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA Riga correspondent Yuriy Stroganov: "Former Soldiers Denied Citizenship: Latvian Authorities Lean to Right"]

[Text] It appears that Latvian central and local authorities are taking a definite turn "to the right." Regarding the Russian Army stationed on republic soil, this also holds true in the area of citizenship. These two issues are closely intertwined.

Latvian citizenship is to be restricted to those persons who were born and those who lived in the bourgeois republic that existed until 1940 and to their direct descendants. This situation cannot be changed until the last Russian Army soldier leaves Latvia, in the opinion of the major parliamentary bloc comprising the Konstitutsiya and People's Front factions.

However, even after the departure of the "last soldier," it is entirely possible that the republic will demand that former servicemen also execute a permanent departure

from Latvian soil. There was a good reason why Latvian Supreme Soviet Chairman A. Gorbunov, in a speech before the U.N. General Assembly, repeated the statement: "In no country other than Latvia is there such a large number of conscripted servicemen and those discharged into the reserve per private citizen... The uncontrolled migration and colonial policy in effect in Latvia has produced a dangerous change in the demographic situation." He then concluded that the foregoing precludes the application of accepted models.

However, was the person who spoke the above words not one of those who implemented the policy of the CPSU—the same migration and colonial policy?

And what about now? Recently taken with the blessing of the Latvian government was a number of anti-Russian actions: the Army printing plant in Riga was seized without cause, and the motor vehicle of Rear Admiral Shestakov, member of the Russian delegation, detained. In addition, the self-governing Kurza suburb is demanding that a residential building belonging to the Russian Army be vacated, since it is allegedly illegally occupied by our military. The Saldus rayon council is boycotting the unit stationed in the area by refusing to provide the servicemen with food supplies.

In this connection, the Latvian side is convinced that it is acting in full compliance with republic laws. Under way is an effort to "squeeze out" the Russian Army. And Latvia is not concerned with the fact that the recall to Russia of units requires time and enormous outlays. Instead of logic there are passions and irritation.

"Our internal policy necessitates clarification: Just who is it that must leave Latvia?" asked A. Gorbunov at the U.N. "First and foremost, the Army of the former USSR, and all those who cannot accept the idea of an independent Latvia."

But do not the Russian flags flying over the military units indicate that the Army, in acknowledging Russia's jurisdiction, does automatically acknowledge the independence of every sovereign state as well?

This being the case, why is it that local nationalistic radicals refuse to understand the condition befalling the hundreds of thousands of persons who have suddenly found themselves located in a foreign country, suffering confusion and an absence of hope for the future?

I dare say that non-native residents of Latvia are also not happy about the model of citizenship legislation under consideration, whereby the major naturalization criteria to be applied are the requirements of 10 years of residence in the republic and conversational fluency in the Latvian language.

CAUCASIAN STATES

Krasnoselsk Regional Military Chief on Defense, Conscription*93US0152A Paris HARATCH in Armenian 13 Oct 92 p 2*

[Article by Arpi Totoyan: "Who Must Think About the Soldiers?"]

[Excerpts] A question which cannot be described as anything but absurd in any other corner of the world, looms before us in all seriousness. It sits atop two columns of an official paper like HAYASTANI HANRAPETUTYUN as the headline of an interview on a pressing subject. The only justification for this situation is that Armenia is taking the first steps in its experience of independence and that the circumstances have not yet allowed it to focus on the issue of forming an army while the enemy, ignoring the Armenian timetable, rains fire on not only Karabakh but Armenia's border regions. [passage omitted]

It is possible to understand and explain the war Azerbaijan has unleashed against Karabakh. After all who would agree to give away one's possession to someone else, even if one has taken that possession by the most unjust, unfair and unacceptable means? But what about the bombs, shells and rockets falling on Armenia's soil? How can they be explained except as a show of force and a naked threat of more severe steps? It has already become evident that documents such as the CIS security treaty have no practical value. If Azerbaijan recovers Shushi following its successes in Karabakh villages, if it seizes Stepanakert and even if occupies all of Armenia, none of the signatories of that accord will raise a finger to uphold that treaty of mutual defense.

Then what should be done in this situation? What can Armenia do? Smbat Ayvazyan, the military chief of the Krasnoselsk region, tries to answer questions about this issue in the 29 September issue of HAYASTANI HANRAPETUTYUN.

He says: "Currently the territory can be considered to be well defended. If the adversary tries to cross the border again and engage in military operations, we are in a position to mount a serious counterstrike and maintain the impregnability of the region's borders." A few days after this interview there were news that scores of artillery shells fell on Krasnoselsk and that there were many casualties. Let us lay aside those news and continue to read the interview with S. Ayvazyan. In response to a question on conscription, he says: "The military commissariats are carrying out the work in that regard. Such work is also under way in Krasnoselsk, but I would not say that the work is proceeding at the necessary pace. In any event there is hope that this important measure will yield positive results in the near future." He says that the conscription applies to 20- to 45-year-old able-bodied males "who must participate in the conscription." [passage omitted]

Ayvazyan also talks about "the most important factor" which he describes as "psychological preparation." He

says: "We have always fought against enemies who were superior to us in numbers and armaments." He probably has Sardarapat [1921 battle in which Armenians defeated Turks] in mind when he talks about our history of unequal battles. However, he does not mention the name thus avoiding the painful question of what significance Sardarapat constitutes in the totality of that history. He also does not mention the fact that the part of the population subject to conscription has immersed the top-priority war situation in a sea of uncertainty characterized by hopes and "musts." As if hoping to find justification for that he expects "psychological preparation" from the people. He is tougher on the people than on the able-bodied males when he says: "Until the people feel and accept the reality of a genuine war and realizes that it is one of the 'active participants' in that war in the sense of territorial 'belonging,' we cannot have any serious military successes."

The prerequisite he outlines for achieving peace is well justified: "We will achieve peace only if we fight the fighting enemy, not if we 'engage' in war." However, even that prerequisite remains a mere mention when he adds new "musts" to his remarks: "A military situation must be declared in the republic." [passage omitted]

In the last part of the interview Ayvazyan moves away from military issues and talks about preparations for the coming winter, because the region is one of the country's coldest areas. He says that the most urgent need is for warm clothing in appropriate quantities. It would be understandable to appeal to the people on something like this, but it is hard to explain when he says: "The nation that looks after its soldiers well is defended well by them." In an independent country and in the presence of a government is it possible to assign to the people the task of "looking after its soldiers"? The interviewer, Lili Martoyan, herself responds: "You cannot maintain an army with voluntary contributions from the people alone. The government must think about feeding and clothing its soldiers because the state that looks after its soldiers well is defended well by them."

The interview with the military chief of Krasnoselsk does not introduce anything new to the war situation and the progress the Armenian government is making with regard to the limping conscription effort. Perhaps, by focusing on the astonishing and offensive aspects of this issue, it helps us understand better the territorial, human and other losses that have occurred.

Azerbaijan Asserts Armenia Purchased Mirage Fighters*93UM0118A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 22 Oct 92 p 3*

[Article by Aydyn Mekhtiyev: "How To Replenish Arsenals? The Ministry of Defense Continues To Assert that Armenia Purchased Mirages"]

[Text] According to a report from the Ministry of Defense of Azerbaijan, fierce fighting took place in the past days between Azerbaijani and Armenian troops for

control of the Lachin corridor. The strategically important elevations of Khochaz, Tigik, and Paradzhan changed hands several times, and the republic's defense department denied the assertions by Armenian sources about defeats of the Azerbaijani Army in this sector. As the deputy chief of the Ministry of Defense Information and Analysis Center, Azad Isa-zade, told a NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA correspondent, at dawn on 20 October, a ground-attack aircraft of the Armenian Air Force penetrated Azerbaijani airspace and dropped two aerial bombs on Zangelanskiy Rayon. There were no casualties, but some buildings were destroyed. Azad Isa-zade also confirmed data that have appeared in some mass media that through the mediation of the Armenia diaspora, Armenia's defense department had purchased Mirage bomber aircraft in France. According to Azerbaijani military intelligence data, the Armenian side originally intended to purchase 16 aircraft of this type, but as of the present time an agreement has been reached on acquiring six Mirage aircraft. In the words of Azad Isa-zade, representatives of the Armenian diaspora in the United States have used their own funds to acquire eight Phantom-F16 heavy bombers for the Republic of Armenia. It is planned to transfer them to Armenia during the withdrawal of U.S. military units from the Philippines. Presently there are four SU-27 aircraft from arsenals of troops of the Joint Armed Forces of the CIS located on the territory of Armenia. Twenty-one Strela-10 systems have been brought into Armenia from military bases of the Russian Army located in Georgia. Some 1,600 military specialists have been trained for the Armenian National Army in military units of the Russian Army stationed in Georgia. Among them are tank crew members, sappers, and assault troops. At the present moment, their transfer to Armenia has begun. Some 272 mercenaries from countries of the Middle East, who recently arrived in Armenia, are also preparing for transfer to Nagorno-Karabakh through the Lachin corridor. Azad Isa-zade also confirmed information about the transfer of a group of commandos fluent in Azeri to Azerbaijan from the territory of Armenia. Their main mission is to prepare terrorist acts.

Thus, the Karabakh war may enter a new phase in the near future: the bloody and exhausting ground battles may be supplemented by aerial duels between Azerbaijani and Armenian ground attack aircraft. The command authorities of the National Army of Azerbaijan are developing a reliable air defense system to protect the border areas against attacks from the air.

Apparently, the prospects of a further escalation of the conflict is the main reason that the governments of Georgia, Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan never made the decision to dispatch military observers to the region, as was required by the Sochi agreement and the Moscow protocol. And the Russian observers arriving in the area of combat operations are unable to influence the course of events.

Meanwhile, in a letter addressed to the UN secretary-general, Armenia's permanent representative to the UN,

Aleksandr Arzumanyan, called for sending a group of UN observers to Nagorno-Karabakh and also for appointing a special UN representative in the region. The government of Armenia came forth with an initiative for an urgent convening of a session of the UN Security Council to examine the UN's role in Nagorno-Karabakh.

Commenting on this report, the head of the Administration of International Organizations of the Azerbaijani Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Araz Azimov, stated to a NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA correspondent: "The Azerbaijani side believes that the peacemaking efforts of regional organizations (in particular, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe [CSCE]) to resolve the Karabakh question are being accomplished in accordance with the UN Charter and supported by the Security Council. So, it seems premature to convene an emergency session of the Security Council at a time when the negotiations in Rome within the frame work of the CSCE have not yet led to progress."

The position of the Azerbaijani Ministry of Foreign Affairs consists of the need to establish strict international control of the Lachin corridor in order to block the passage of military cargo through it from Armenia into Karabakh.

"Presently, the group of CSCE military observers in Vienna under the leadership of Colonel Kheyki Khapapanen are developing a mechanism for CSCE observers to monitor a cease-fire in Karabakh," a Ministry of Foreign Affairs senior official reported.

In the words of Araz Azimov, the recent visit to Baku by the head of the U.S. delegation in Rome, Jack Maresk, brought to light the community of positions of the CSCE and the Azerbaijani side in views toward solving the Karabakh crisis.

CENTRAL ASIAN STATES

Defense Deputy Promises Security for Turkmenistan

93UM0074A Ashgabat TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA
in Russian 28 Sep 92 p 2

[Article by TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA Correspondent G. Shchepotkina: "We Have a Reliable Defense: That is the Opinion of Armed Forces Chief of Staff—Turkmenistan First Deputy Minister of Defense Annamurad Soltanov"]

[Text] Today my fellow countrymen have no cause to fear for the integrity of our state, for political stability, or for the lives of their dear ones. It would be untrue to assert that the Turkmenistan National Army has already been formed. Of course not. Right now it is the time to form that enormous mechanism which has yet to become powerful, stable, and fine-tuned and to begin to operate like a watch. We are reorganizing certain structures of the former Soviet Army and we are creating new ones. We are searching for and polishing up our own work methods. We are developing the appropriate documents.

But the army has not ceased to be an army even for an instant. The enormous amount of work associated with the creation of the National Armed Forces has begun and is continuing along with the performance of military duty.

Right now the recently created Turkmenistan Ministry of Defense faces two main tasks: material-technical support of the army and manning it with qualified officer cadres and also with well-trained, disciplined soldiers.

Sovereign Turkmenistan has received practically all of the military facilities that are located on its territory in the inheritance from the former common army. I said "nearly" because some Air Force and air defense units have been shifted to the command of the Russian Federation. I think that this is quite sufficient in order to maintain a high level of combat readiness in the army today.

But everything is wearing out and it requires repair or replacement with time. So far we don't have our own material-technical support facility for the army: years are needed to create it. We are looking at these things realistically. That time period was stipulated in the Agreement signed two months ago by the governments of Turkmenistan and the Russian Federation. Over the course of five years, both sides will carry out, on a shared basis, financial support of all military formations deployed on the territory of our state. And during the time of the transition period, we propose creating the appropriate sector in the national economy which will totally assume responsibility for all these chores.

Of course, that step will also not isolate Turkmenistan's national army in the future. Our government's policy of good-neighbor relations with all states does not exclude contacts at the army level, too. Right now a military treaty has only been concluded with Russia. I know how the Russian officers waited for it. There were many groundless worries and alarms for their careers and for the fate of their relatives. The treaty dotted all of the "i's". Russian officers who are serving in Turkmenistan's National Armed Forces have received a new status that corresponds to the political realities and I think that all questions have been removed as of today. But, if some non-standard situations or problems arise anyway, we will resolve them as rapidly as possible either locally or at our headquarters.

Let's recall that not only officers from the Russian Federation serve in the military formations on Turkmenistan territory. We have quite a few citizens of other young independent states. I authoritatively state that they have no cause for worry: those same conditions that apply to Russian officers also apply to them. We have on our agenda right now—the development of so many multilateral agreements with the other former allied republics. I think that general bilateral agreement will be found in all cases. All officers can serve in peace. The main thing that is required of them is conscientious

performance of their military duty. And if an officer wants to change citizenship and remain in Turkmenistan, let there be no doubt: Here he and the members of his family will find their second homeland. And there is a job for each person here and there is enough work for everyone.

I think the fact that there are no political organs in our army is correct. Politics are not within the army's competence. Under any political system, the army is obliged to carry out its primordial functions—to stand on guard of the peace of citizens so that everyone without exception has the opportunity to peacefully live and work.

So, there should not be a politicized army. But that does not mean that the army should not be involved with education. Right now assistant commanders for personnel and psychologists are involved with these functions. Their task is humanitarian training of servicemen based on universal human values.

Although now educational work has acquired a somewhat different hue. That is associated with the revival of the kind traditions of the Turkmen people and with the merging of the large and small Homeland in our consciousness. Reviving feelings of patriotism and internationalism and instilling love for the Homeland and a brotherly attitude toward all fellow citizens is the priority duty of army educational structures.

The second military draft under new conditions is already being conducted: a large portion of the new recruits are staying behind to serve in the homeland, in Turkmenistan. This is a logical step but, like everything new, it has resulted in quite a bit of troubles along with the joy. Of course, both the parents are less worried since their son is not going far away and the lad is not depressed because of the previously inevitable separation from his native lands.

Right now systematic educational work with personnel is being worked out. Representatives of the President—khyakimy—often visit them on site and explain our state's foreign and domestic policies to them. Aksakaly—respected people teach the soldiers the fundamentals of human behavior and the wise precepts of their ancestors. Workers of science, cultural and the arts acquaint them with eternal human values. Veterans of war and labor don't permit them to forget the laws of military fraternity and joint work for the benefit of their Homeland. And you know right now soldiers have begun to more profoundly comprehend what a Homeland is, whose interests they are defending, and how precious the land of their fathers and grandfathers is for them. In the background of this thinking, what difference does it make if you are a native of some area, from which velayat [oblast]? If they drill for oil in one, cultivate cotton in another, or raise sheep in yet another—we need each other.

I think that these feelings will develop among young people in families, at schools, in workers collectives—

everywhere where formation is occurring and where the character of a young man and future defender of the Homeland is tempered.

And one other factor lit up the next to last spring draft, although I am also not inclined to dramatize the situation. Nevertheless, certain Voenkomat [military commissariat] workers made errors and new recruits were once again left to serve nearly right at home, at that same etrap [rayon] and shakher [city] where they were drafted. I think it is not worthwhile to create such "cordial" conditions for soldiers. A soldier must know all of the fine points (already not talking about the rigors) of army service. And what kind of soldier's tempering can we talk about when you run home to mama every day on leave? In my view, you need to perform compulsory service a bit farther from the native hearth when possible. Then lads become men more quickly, they grow up, and, what is noteworthy, they much more readily answer for their own deeds. That is, they become independent which distinguishes, first of all, a real man, a defender of his home, and the support of the family.

And we have sufficient conscripts in the qualitative sense in order to completely man all of the Armed Forces units and subunits on Turkmenistan territory, including the border troops.

Recently I was at a holiday at a military subunit. They invited me to a concert which the soldiers arranged through their own efforts. There were enough for both participants and an audience. To listen to melodies and

favorite songs that were familiar since childhood and to laugh along with everyone at the amusing scenes from life during my off-duty time—is satisfaction for a soldier. Many of them are opening a new side to their comrades and discovering a gift for music or dance. We need to establish ties with amateur artists from neighboring units and with civilian enterprises, to perform in front of each other, and to organize joint concerts.

I would like very much for my countrymen and for parents, having read this morning appeal, to send their sons with a light heart to conscription centers today, and for new recruits to be more profoundly aware of their mission—to defend the sovereignty of Turkmenistan, to protect the peace of mind of their mothers, sisters and loved ones, and of all citizens of Turkmenistan.

New Publication Set Up by Defense Minister

*LD2311230592 Alma-Ata Kazakh Radio Network
in Kazakh 0500 GMT 21 Nov 92*

[Text] The republic's Defense Ministry has its own publication. It has founded and registered the newspaper KAZAKHSTAN SARBAZA [KAZAKHSTAN SOLDIER]. The first issue will be published in mid-December. This will be the third military publication in the republic alongside the border troops organ THE MOTHERLAND GUARDSMEN and the internal troops KALKHAN [SHIELD]. Apparently it will be a publication common to all arms similar to RED STAR.

ARMS TRADE

Goals of 'Oboroneksport'

93UM0126A Moscow *TEHKNIKA I VOORUZHENIYE*
in Russian No 7-8, 92 p C3

[Article under the rubric "Oboroneksport": "The Russian State Foreign Economic Association for the Export of Military Products and Services, the Oboroneksport VO"]

[Text] At the end of January 1992 the Main Engineer Directorate of the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations of the Russian Federation, the traditional exporter of Soviet weapons and military equipment, was converted into the Russian State Foreign Economic Association for the Export of Military Goods and Services, the Oboroneksport Military Association (General Export for Defense, or GED).

The association is the legal heir of the Main Engineer Directorate of the Ministry of Foreign Relations and was registered with the Moscow Registration Office on 5 February 1992.

The association's charter will soon be published in an issue of the magazine VNESHNYAYA TORGOVLYA.

The foreign trade association's main purposes are the following:

- to provide military goods and services through commercial and other operations in the foreign market;
- to provide technical assistance with the mastery, maintenance, employment, modernization and repair of weapons and military equipment;
- to export weapons and military equipment through companies of foreign countries under license from the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations;
- to provide intermediary consultation and other services relating to foreign economic activities;
- to export (import) civilian products for the benefit of enterprises, associations and organizations of the Russian Federation's industrial complex.

More detailed information can be obtained from the following address:

113324, Moscow,
Ovchinnikovskaya nab.,
18/1
Telephone: 231-00-49
Telex: 411-428
Telefax: 233-02-72 or 233-18-13

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Claimed U.S. F-16 Sale to Armenia

93UM0113A Moscow *NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA*
in Russian 27 Oct 92 p 3

[Article by Armen Khanbabayan: "The United States Is Not Selling Aircraft for Karabakh"]

[Text] *Armenian guerrilla detachments control part of Shaumyanovsk Rayon.*

David Sifkin, press secretary at the U.S. Embassy in Yerevan called "groundless" and "fantastic" the claim by the Azerbaijani Ministry of Defense that the Armenian diaspora in America has acquired eight "Phantom-16" bombers, which supposedly are soon to be transferred to the Karabakh front from American bases in the Philippines. Mr. Sifkin emphasized that the United States is not selling weapons to any side in the conflict and does not plan to abandon this principle. Earlier, similar reports about the purchase of French Mirage fighters by Armenia were denied by the French Embassy in Moscow. The Armenian Ministry of Defense reported that the cost of one "Phantom" or "Mirage" is about \$150 million, and the republic cannot afford such acquisitions. The Azerbaijani side continues to have air superiority. On 20 October, Azerbaijani aircraft violated Armenian airspace and subjected populated areas of Gorisskiy Rayon to fierce bombing using bombs containing spherical projectiles. The Armenian Parliament adopted a statement regarding this in which it considered the raid as the beginning of a wide-scale war against Armenia, which, the statement emphasizes, "is forced to be drawn into another round of escalation of military actions." However, the raid on Armenian territory was accompanied by statements about bombings by the Armenian Air Force that allegedly took place on that same day in the Azerbaijani border regional center of Zangelan. The increase in military actions is accompanied in Baku not only by combat preparations but also information preparations. The Self-Defense Headquarters of the Nagorno-Karabakh [NKR] reported that the recent claim about the landing of an Armenian assault force in the vicinity of Sarsanskiy Dam in Mardakertskiy Rayon does not correspond to the truth: the Azerbaijani military needed this cover in order to land their own assault force near the populated area of Kolatag. The operation was thwarted by NKR self-defense forces. At the same time, the Armenian Ministry of Defense stated that Armenian military specialists are not being trained on the territory of Georgia. About 800 soldiers, inducted back during the existence of the USSR, are serving their today.

Sources in Baku report exaggerated data on the strength of Armenian forces and their victories, but make no mention of the fact that the situation in Saumyanovskiy Rayon of NKR is controlled today by Armenian guerrilla detachments which have already liberated certain villages taken earlier by the Azerbaijani Army. All deadlines for victory specified by the Baku leadership have long passed, and the Azerbaijani Army so far has not

only not entered Stepanakert but is suffering noticeable defeats in the vicinity of the Lachin corridor.

In an atmosphere of mutual suspicion and an information war, all talk about peace is diversionary in nature; therefore, it is hard to count on success of negotiations and peacemaking efforts.

ATGM's, SAM's Offered on Ukrainian-Siberian Exchange

93UM0113B Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 27 Oct 92 p 4

[Unattributed article: "Weapons on the Exchange"]

[Text] As we have learned, a large batch of weapons was announced for sale for foreign currency last week on the Universal Ukrainian-Siberian Exchange. Kalashnikov assault rifles and machineguns are being offered at \$227-275 each, ATGM's and Igla surface-to-air missiles for \$16,000 each, Il-76 assault-transport aircraft for \$30 million each, Su-24S bombers, MiG-29 fighters, MTV Mi-8 helicopters and T-72 tanks for \$3-4 million each, and also the S-300 anti-aircraft missile system for detecting and destroying Stealth aircraft for \$60 million. The firm offering the goods has desired to remain anonymous.

Making the deal requires a license to trade in arms, authorization to export to the receiving country, documents indicating the place of discharge, and a written guarantee from a first-category bank. All weapons cannot be sold in the CIS. The location of the weapons is Russia.

Experts assume that offering the batch of weapons may be a sounding out of the situation, since broker's offices or middleman firms do not have the right to trade in this commodity and also because payment must be made not in the CIS but in more distant foreign countries. Using Ukraine as a market for Russian weapons guarantees the seller a 5 percent profit. The likelihood of the weapons ending up in areas of regional conflicts through third-party countries is not ruled out.

DEFENSE INDUSTRY

Ryzhov Outlines Views on Conversion

93UM0093A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 20 Oct 92 pp 1, 2

[Article in the column "In Committees and Commissions": "Conversion: Walking a Vicious Circle"; first paragraph is ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA introduction]

[Text] Committees of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet on science and education, industry, and power, acting jointly with the Ministry of Science, Higher Schools, and Technical Policy, held an expanded conference dealing with the problem of conversion and science. Participating in the activities were people's deputies, representatives of the President and government of the

Russian Federation, leaders of a number of military enterprises and military-industrial complex institutions, representatives of the Russian Academy of Sciences and Ministry of Defense, and scientists from the Strategic Research Institute. ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA is presenting the following so that its readers will become acquainted with the views held by Yuriy Ryzhov, a Russian Federation people's deputy who participated in the conference.

Conversion of military production in Russia differs substantially in several ways from the processes taking place in countries of Western Europe and America. In the case of Russia, this problem involves 80 percent of industry. If we include modernization of industry and replacement of technologies and equipment, the percentage is even higher. This being the case, we cannot borrow from world experience, due to the absence of similarities associated with overcoming a crisis of this magnitude by a country the size of Russia. And we have no experience of our own on which we can draw.

In the absence of a clear and well-thought-out plan for building the Armed Forces and for the production of modern weapons, and in the absence of a state military doctrine, there can be no conversion of military production. At the very least, we need an answer to the question of which plants, enterprises, and research institutes of the military-industrial complex cannot undergo conversion but are to be utilized along the lines of their usual alignment: the development and production of modern weapons. If this is to be the case, they should in the future be recipients of state tasking, orders, and money. The military doctrine must also address the problem of enterprises which can be converted but can also undergo realignment for military purposes if the need arises. What we are speaking of here are dual-purpose technologies.

Everything stated above points up the need for investing substantial funds, which if not accomplished relegates conversion to a position of mere discussions. Conversion of even a moderate-size enterprise requires an outlay of two to three billion rubles. Large plants requiring upgrading of technologies and equipment will demand outlays exceeding this amount by an order of magnitude. The state does not now, nor will it for some time to come, possess this amount of money. A policy founded on carrying out conversion by the state is destined to fail. Therefore, for conversion to become a reality, it is necessary to attract private capital - domestic and foreign. It can be attracted in only one way: by linking conversion with privatization of some kind so as to afford the possibility of bringing a return on investments in the form of profits.

In existence are quite a number of attractive factors rendering privatization in the military-industrial complex realistic: the availability of laborers and engineers of high qualifications expert in high technologies, and the military-industrial complex's possession of a powerful system of research institutions employing more than a

million scientists offering a large reserve of intellectual capabilities. Many enterprises are in possession of incomplete construction sites and land. This is of great importance, since the possibility is afforded of gradual introduction and mastery of segments of new production facilities without destroying old ones. This provides an opportunity for maneuvering, for creating an infrastructure of improved production facilities. The unfolding situation compels us to take a decisive step toward privatizing military-industrial complex enterprises. The point here is that some of the latter are riding along on the basis of old reserves, which are being consumed rapidly. If this process is permitted to result in exhaustion of these resources, privatization would no longer be possible.

It is no secret that private capital is much more effective than state investments, since there is someone watching each ruble of private money. The system of plunder of state funds is long-established and untouchable in our country, thus rendering state policy essentially unreliable. In contrast, private capital, with its interest in profits and production efficiency, has an automatic affinity for production modernization, for the application of new ideas, technologies, and people capable of managing production under new conditions.

The second source of financing for conversion involves the opportunity of selling weapons back to their producers or to their representatives, on the condition that the lion's share of income from sales of the weapons be applied to conversion of military products or to the creation of new weapons systems. It should be understood that this kind of sale would be carried out in compliance with the state's general policy.

In tying conversion to privatization and the establishment of entrepreneurship, we necessarily must come to grips with the role of science in these processes and the responsibility the state carries for the destruction and ruin of science in Russia. The threat of the disintegration of science as a living body, the threat of loss of quality of scientific research, have become a reality assuming an alarming rate of advance. The measures being taken by the government are not adequate to the power of the science degradation process we are witnessing, and they cannot stop the process of scientific disintegration. Actually required for science to function are budgetary allocations larger by 20 to 30 times than that presently made available by the government.

What is envisioned is an integrated process in which conversion is tied to the offering of stock in military enterprises, to entrepreneurship and an active role of science and scientists, who are undergoing difficult times. Science can be saved and afforded the opportunity of exercising effective participation in the transformation of production by applying nontrivial measures. The government cannot provide sufficient money, but it does possess a certain valuable commodity, growing with time, something that is decidedly not transient. This valuable commodity is land. Land will render science

rich. In addition, land will render scientific institutions attractive for privatization along with military production. In 1882 the U.S. government took that nontrivial route to grant universities land. This act was of great importance for American science, for it lifted science out of penury.

In addition, a considerable portion of money for the financing of industry and for conversion must be passed through the hands of science proper. The best example of this is the CERN (European Organization for Nuclear Research). Member countries contribute considerable sums to the CERN. The latter uses the money to conduct research on high-energy physics. An insignificant amount is spent for paying salaries of researchers and specialists. The lion's share is used to fill orders for industry of contributing members, with the particular sum proportional to the amount contributed by a country. However, CERN orders are not ordinary orders. They serve as part of a difficult and complex experiment necessitating the fabrication of apparatus and equipment based on the latest technologies. It is this that gives rise to the creation of amazing and modern technological solutions and attainments, with the origination of new enterprises based on the application of new ideas and high technologies which are then snapped up and mastered by industry. This particular principle was employed to a certain extent in our country in the space program, thermonuclear work, etc. This rendered a noticeable influence on the implementation of new attainments. It is necessary to adopt this principle as an essential element of state scientific policy and of the tie between science and industry.

Hence practical proposals which if implemented would breathe life into the idea of transformation and reform.

There is a need to create a specialized information and consulting system capable of rendering assistance in the resolution of financial and technological problems that would crop up when any kind of organization takes the conversion route. This kind of system can be organized in the form of federal and regional centers at the respective organs of authority, with financing via the budget and income generated by contracts with enterprises.

Required is a legal basis that would make it possible to carry out the necessary transformations without hindrance, with input of funding from the state, enterprises, commercial structures, private individuals, and foreign investors.

It is important to emplace an approach to the problem of the weapons trade, with a clear statement of the rights and obligations of governments, regional administrations, producers, and middlemen.

Also necessary is the transfer of land and property to universities, major research organizations and educational institutions, and the development of machinery for financing science so that the latter can execute automatic and continuous participation in the processes of production transformation.

It may be said that the decrepid condition presently surrounding the country's scientific and creative potential constitutes a serious obstacle to overcoming the crisis. It is from science that we can expect assistance in effecting radical economic, political, and cultural reforms in the country. However, science will not be capable of rendering this assistance to its people as long as it remains in this helpless situation. We are walking a vicious circle, and we have been doing this long and stubbornly. The time has come to learn how to resolve the problem of overcoming the vicious circles that have become part and parcel of our life.

Russian Aviation Trade Organization Described

93UM0123A Moscow *TEKHNIKA I VOORUZHENIYE*
in Russian No 7-8, 92 pp 8-9

[Article by V. Milevskiy, deputy general director of the Russian Aviation Trade Center: "The Russian Aviation Trade Center, RATD"]

[Text] The Russian Aviation Trade Center was established by decision of the directors of a number of leading aviation enterprises as an open, joint-stock company. The A/O [joint-stock company] RATD was founded by designers from the Mikoyan, Sukhoy and Yakovlev design offices, eight aircraft plants, the Aviatrans production association, the Aviaspetsnabsbyt company, Aviabank, the Scientific Research Institute of Economics and the Brokinvest brokerage. The latter handles the issue of shares for the company. A number of other organizations have now expressed a desire to become stockholders in the Trade Center, and the directors' council of the A/O RATD has therefore decided to increase the charter capital from 14 to 25 million rubles. RATD shares, which have a face value of 50,000 rubles in the open market, are being offered at 350,000 rubles a share. The founders believe that the high price relative to the face value has to take into account the significant drop in the ruble's rate since the price was deregulated on 1 January 1992.

Unlike most commercial enterprises which act as middlemen in trading operations, the experts believe that RATD, as a joint-stock company set up by the producing enterprises and operating in their interest, is the optimal commercial structure and a natural and essential component of the developing market economy. The founders feel that the trade center's prime objective is to create conditions conducive to the sale of their products in the foreign and domestic markets. This task is made considerably more difficult by the fact that military production is being thoroughly reformed, since the MiG-29, MiG-31, Su-24 and Su-27 and modifications of these aircraft constitute their main production item. Only the Saratov aircraft plant produces a civilian plane, the Yak-42.

Over the past several years practically all of the plants belonging to RATD have mastered the production of a broad range of consumer goods. Launches and other boats, gliders, furniture, dishes, household appliances,

tourist gear, various household goods, toys—these are a far-from-complete list of the civilian products already being offered to the public by RATD. Obviously, however, it would not be prudent to convert the modern aircraft plants totally to the production of consumer goods. The main focus of their conversion must be on mastering the production of a new generation of civilian aircraft such as the Il-114, S-80, Yak-112, Yak-46, S-51 and S-21. It will take years and a lot of money to create these, however. It is simply unrealistic to count on funds from the state budget in the years immediately ahead, and the large special design offices and plants, deprived of state orders, will be forced to sell off themselves, or rather shares in themselves, to private enterprises. This entails possible massive lay-offs and the respecialization of aviation production.

The only way out for most joint-stock plants in this situation are stable exports of combat aircraft, with a gradual reduction of their annual production volumes and planned conversion to the production of civilian aviation production. Even with the current rigid tax system, the economic effectiveness of military exports is so great that they allow not only for retaining the production capabilities of the plants and simplifying the resolution of social problems, but all for building up large capital reserves in the accounts of the enterprises themselves. This is illustrated by the fact that a plant earns a net profit of around 1 billion rubles from the sale of a single MiG-29 fighter after all taxes and other costs have been figured in. The existence of large capital reserves will enable the aviation plants to pay for experimental design projects to develop promising civilian aircraft and to finance projects of special aircraft design offices under economic agreements.

The trade center must participate in the coordination of this work, since it receives commercial information on prospects for the development of the market for aviation equipment and proposals from the special design offices for developing new models. The trade center arranges for the expert appraisal of these proposals at branch institutes with its own funds. The evaluations are reviewed in the directors' council, where it is also decided whether this or that project is to be financed. This can perform the function of market-oriented regulation of aircraft production, without which the designers and the producers, accustomed to centralized planning, are simply incapable of determining the most promising areas for their development.

It is proposed that an investment fund be set up at the trade center to perform research and development of interest to the share-holding enterprises. The fund would be used to finance promising projects up to the draft stage of the designing process and to finance their expert appraisal.

In addition to performing for the share-holding enterprises the basic services involved in the design, development, production, sales and maintenance of the aviation equipment, the RATD management plans to provide

additional services for them, including supplying them with imported goods and equipment, situating agents of the enterprises in Moscow, providing them with transportation and arranging conferences and negotiations, exhibits and air shows. RATD is therefore more than just a commercial joint-stock company for profit. In the future it is to become truly a home for its shareholders.

The company staff regularly conduct talks with agents for potential buyers, most of which are foreign companies. There are requests for more than just the aircraft produced by the founding plants. There is a great demand also for the Mi-8MT and Mi-17 helicopters and for Il-76TD transport planes. The airlines of some of the CIS states want help with the acquisition of Tu-154, Il-86 and Il-62 passenger planes. These are produced at plants which are not shareholders in the company, but some of them have expressed a desire to acquire shares, particularly since shares will be sold to aircraft plants at face value and not at market prices.

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Shutdown of Weapons-grade Reactor Near Krasnoyarsk

93UM0061B Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN
in Russian 6 Oct 92 pp 1, 3

[Article by Z. Milman, SELSKAYA ZHIZN correspondent, Krasnoyarskiy Kray: "The Thorns and Roses of the Atom"]

[Text] The discharge of radioactive water into the Yenisey has stopped: the last direct-flow nuclear reactor has been shut down at the mining and chemical combine near Krasnoyarsk—the largest producer of weapon-grade plutonium in Russia.

Aircraft fly around this area enclosed by a double wall of barbed wire. Passenger ships usually go past it at night. My colleagues and I are "getting" to here by the usual land route. The rigid gates of the check point, several hundred meters of excellent highway...and here it springs up—a town pressed against a clear, quiet lake and drowning in taiga and park undergrowth. Not noted on maps, called "Number Nine" for decades, populous, theatrical, not disciplined for today's times and surprisingly, and incredibly well-groomed. Just the fact that they design and build domestic communications satellites here is able to shroud the city with a dense cover of secrecy. However, the original reason for its super-secrecy is in a different production facility. For more than 30 years, right up until last Tuesday, "Number Nine" produced civilization's most horrible product—plutonium 239. It is the filling for nuclear bombs and missiles.

Its "maternity hospital" does not catch the eye. A regular semicircular tunnel in a tree-covered mountain. But its concrete mouth is only an entrance into a gigantic complex. Dozens of neon-bathed streets, intersections, multi-stage adits, hundreds of offices, halls, laboratories,

incredibly huge shops of three of the most modern plants, and, of course, dining halls, saunas, a specialized firefighting unit... Eight million cubic meters of rock had to be gnawed away in order to fit all this into the mass of stone—more than from the maze of the Moscow subway. Those who willingly or forcibly built this combine, which, they say, Beriia himself came to accept, did truly colossal work, unlike anything in the country or in the world. This large, cumbersome object was supposed to hang around not for 100 or 200 years, but for centuries.

But glasnost came even to the most closed zone. And the sensations—one after another more alarming—began to leak into the press. A radioactive trail stretches for hundreds of versts, it turns out, along the Yenisey, fish that are caught "glow" after a week, and it is in the plans of the nuclear people to expand the storage facility for depleted fuel coming in from the country's nuclear power plants.

The residents of neighboring villages have become agitated: "What is this graveyard of nuclear waste being built over the river? What is this 'Number Nine' in general?" The 'Greens' have risen. Writers Viktor Astafyev and Roman Solntsev have made alarming statements.

Specialists at the mining and chemical combine tried to persuade the people: the purification system in the operating production facility is super-reliable, since it was originally directed toward state secrets, nobody's sensors were supposed to locate the suspicious discharge. As proof, they took samples of milk from cows grazing near the Yenisey and around the islands. The percentage of cesium 137 in the samples, the longest-lasting and therefore the most dangerous radioactive component, was 370 times below the strict world tolerances. They even allowed one of the meticulous newspaper people to try some of the water directly from under the reactor. He "took" 150 grams! And couldn't care less! He didn't "glow" any more than after drinking the purest mineral water.

But people were not satisfied—the Chernobyl disaster had become too strong of a shock. It is not known how much longer this aggravated confrontation between the combine and the public would have lasted if not for the changes in policy. Early last summer, they had to stop the process of uranium fission in the first direct-flow reactor, which had been in operation since August 1958. At 11:30 on 29 September, Mikhail Lezin, chief of the second reactor, signed before our eyes Instruction No 119: based on the resolution of the board of the Committee for Supervision of Nuclear and Radiation Safety under the President of Russia and the order of the Ministry of Nuclear Energy, it was shut down after being in operation for 31 years. It was shut down "without resuming operation to produce plutonium." At that same moment, the command was given and a red button on the panel was pressed, and the curved line of the electronic chart dropped to zero.

In and of itself, this event is symbolic and joyous: at this specific facility, the arms race really is coming to a halt, and Siberia's greatest river will no longer receive 400 million cubic meters of not the most needed water, to put it mildly, each year. They also understand this at the combine. As its general director, Valeriy Lebedev, said: "The civilian conscience ordered us to understand." However, they also must realize what this means for these people—professionals of the highest class—the loss of a job to which they have devoted half of their life. There were both confusion and melancholy in their eyes when the crimson roses were placed on the wet roof of the reactor, roses that were grown here.

These changes that are largely tragic for them are easy for the giants of the military-industrial complex. There will still be enough jobs on the nuclear machines that are dying down. They have to remove fuel from the thousands of passages, decontaminate the entire adjacent zone, and, finally, without dismantling them, "seal" the reactors here in the rock with concrete coffins. What then?

"We will try to see that those who are forced out of work remain at the combine," V. Lebedev shared the plans. "To the layman it would seem that now all the production facility should invariably come under the knife. But why? The modern technologies and unique underground "residence permit" enable us to switch to the production of ultra-pure materials, say, semiconductors for the electronics industry. If we can find interested clients, we could take on the demonstration, installation, and operation of low-yield nuclear reactors. In remote rural areas and in the Far North, with the shortage of electrical power and diesel fuel, the thing is irreplaceable and absolutely safe. But I think our skilled craftsmen from the machinery and repair shops will cope very well with conversion tasks: for example, we are beginning to make spare parts for poultry plants, rustproof tanks for industrial pasteurization or cooling of milk...

After the event, we dropped in on Boris Petrov, an engineer in the combine's environmental protection department, in the "recreation and reading room." On the occasion of the "celebration," there were chocolate candies and age-old decanters with strong, hot tea on the tables—indispensable and cleansing the body of radiation. Some of the workers are reading a newspaper item aloud: "...the leading nuclear workers of Russia have gathered today at Krasnoyarsk to discuss the ecological possibility of building a plant here for regenerating expended nuclear fuel..."

"Why, of course!" someone's skeptical comment is heard. "So, the countrywomen gave us the go-ahead!"

"And they may not right away," agrees Boris Valentinovich. "Now this is beyond their powers: in 1984 prices such a production facility would cost two billion. But in the future we will not be able to get by without it. That means that the Supreme Soviet must pass a law on nuclear energy, and a special state program must be

developed and, of course, approved by the citizens. Today we are ready for a constructive dialogue and open to all opponents. You see, we are also fed up with being hostages to 'our own' secrets."

Conversion at Moscow Aviation Production Association

93UM0061A Moscow TRUD in Russian 9 Oct 92 p 2

[Article by Fedor Vulf, engineer: "There Is Only a MiG Between the Past and Future in Military Equipment Trade"]

[Text] When the Blue Angels, an elite squadron of the U.S. Air Force, recognized the perfection of Russian combat aircraft and pilots at a recent celebration at Tushino, the report of this pleasantly tickled our intimidated pride.

When television casually showed how some of the aircraft from the CIS remained immobile exhibits at the Farnborough Air Show, since the pilots were not given entry visas, other spectators gloatingly hemmed: the importance is not great, you would think they took money from a baby. But, you see, the lack of pilots prevented us from demonstrating the merits of our equipment for potential buyers.

Yes, now our children, to the joy of inveterate pacifists, do not play as pilots. They have other games—as merchants, racketeers, stock brokers. The only sad thing is that the adult uncles, who once played as "Pokryshkin" and "Kozhedub" and are now engaged in commerce, do not see this as a very serious matter...

For many years, when energy and raw materials were predominant in the structure of domestic exports, military equipment also was a substantial support for the USSR's foreign currency budget. True, the military equipment was usually delivered on credit and to countries so poor that it is a difficult matter to collect debts amounting to tens of billions of dollars from them. The situation has changed; however, our traditional sale markets have remained. So, there is a demand for our high-quality weapons and, as before, we are producing many of them. The only question is, how to sell them? Moreover, you cannot change the specialties of millions of workers and engineers employed in the defense complex (although it also provides consumer goods) all at once. It is also difficult to adapt the plants, designed to produce unique equipment, for the production of water faucets and coffee grinders. Considerable investments are also needed.

Paradoxical as it may be, trade in military equipment is a real basis for financing conversion.

"For us it is a question of survival," believes Viktor Tatarnikov, STO chairman of the Moscow Aviation Production Association [MAPO]. "Our MiGs are quoted highly on the world market. They are plain, economical,

simple to fly and maintain, and reliable, but the main thing is that they have remarkable flying and combat qualities."

This is not bragging. For example, the series-produced MiGs that were delivered to the former GDR Army and were "inherited" by the Bundeswehr did not have a single breakdown during guarantee operation, not a single one! Generals of the Luftwaffe talk about this with respect. Well-to-do amateur pilots are also interested in our aircraft. Reports have already appeared in the foreign press about businessmen wishing to make business flights not on passenger airliners but on private, high-speed MiGs. For example, Dean Martin from Burlington, Vermont, is already doing precisely that.

However, the situation in the market is far from being without clouds. Western companies have been firmly settled in there for a long time. They know how to offer their goods and do not plan to give up their positions to Russian competitors. The efforts of our novice commerce voyagers are sometimes not very effective because western firms have allocated far more assets for market formation than our former government, which was guided basically by political sympathies. Therefore, the experience and strategy of winning contracts are on the side of aircraft producers from the United States, England, and France.

Unfortunately, dilettantism and the desire of our homebred businessmen to get rich quickly lead to a destabilization of the market and give rise to an unnecessary crowd around export operations. The confusion in our power structures also contributes to this. It hinders sound and efficient work to move abroad products that are in demand and are able to provide considerable foreign currency revenues for the Russian treasury. We will emphasize: this is not about raw materials. That same MAPO has buyers who have their eyes on MiGs. But who is supposed to sell them?

Our aviation enterprises were not involved in forming a market before. They have gained such opportunities and rights only quite recently. It clearly is no simple matter to master a new sphere of activities. In addition, a military aircraft is not a washing machine: the sale of combat equipment, as is customary throughout the world, should be done under the control of the state with observance of state interests. The structures of the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations play a positive role in this process. Their staff members understand how much contracts for combat equipment mean to the industry. But a situation sometimes arises which, as much as you would like, you would not call normal.

"Our government," V. Tatarnikov is surprised, "authorized not only the MAPO but also an affiliate belonging to the association—the Lukhovitskiy Machine Plant [LMZ]—to deal in MiGs, thus provoking an unnecessary and even harmful 'internal' competition, figuratively speaking, between the fingers of the same hand. Yes, this plant is involved in the production of MiGs; they fly the

aircraft there. They perform test flights and check flights, which is impossible in conditions of the densely populated Moscow. Then, strictly speaking, the LMZ was created."

It should be noted here that under the existing practice, the profit earned by the enterprise does not depend on who specifically sold the combat aircraft. Whose middleman will receive a percentage of the sale—this is also a constant problem. Of course, no one thinks that the director of the Lukhovitskiy Machine Plant, S. Tektonidi, decided to engage in marketing MiGs independently for the sake of this percentage. No, he absolutely was motivated by the desire to achieve a better result. However, the absurdity of the situation will become quite obvious if we were to disclose certain details of the intrigue that arose.

So, there is some country wishing to acquire a batch of MiG-29 aircraft for its air force. The MAPO, with participation of the "Oboroneksport" All-Union Association, conducts negotiations with this country's government, discussing the technical and financial details of the contract.

"Unexpectedly," says F. Timofeyev, a deputy department chief at the MAPO and a participant in these negotiations, "a little-known foreign firm interferes in the deal, having in its hands documents (signed by S. Tektonidi) for the monopoly right to conduct negotiations on the sale of MiGs."

It turns out that the director of the Lukhovitskiy Machine Plant had promised the Russian Government to sell the same MiGs to that same country, but at a price of \$3 million more per aircraft.

Seemingly, there was a profit. But was it realistic? You see, the Americans, taking into account the fact that our fighter had entered the market, reduced the price for their F-16, similar in characteristics, from \$35 to \$21 million! One must assume that they know how to count millions not only in Moscow and Lukhovitsy. Our potential buyers also know how to count millions. In this situation, the MiG-29 is no longer competitive, and our leaders at home, instead of settling the conflict that arose between the MAPO and LMZ, try to believe that the improbable will become a reality and that the contract will be won by itself.

For the time being, the contract is up in the air. Who will dare to predict how the "Tektonidi changes" that emerged in the negotiating process thanks to the director of the LMZ and his sponsors will affect the fate of the contract? If the deal falls through, the country will lose as much as it is now trying hard to get, humbling itself, from its foreign creditors. Not to mention the fact that the MAPO (and not only it) will have an increasingly difficult time providing work for thousands and thousands of people with truly golden brains and hands—aircraft builders with unique skills who would hardly

want to make ends meet by making cots and smoke-houses: skilled craftsmen have their pride. The high-ranking officials who, without doubting for a moment, signed the documents granting S. Tektonidi preferential rights to sell the famous MiGs should have remembered this.

The fog of excessive secrecy over domestic military aviation equipment has begun to lift, thank God. Strange as it may seem, for the first time in many long years we have been given the opportunity to it on its merits—without rhetorical self-boasting and propaganda. The objective performance and technical characteristics of our aircraft and the subjective assessments of pilots and designers "from the other side" agree on one thing: this equipment is at the world level, and a number of models are unequaled. We must efficiently manage this wealth. And it is important here that the commercial temptation (there is no sense in ignoring it) not conflict with the interests of the country and its citizens. "At a minimum," believes A. Kokoshin, Russia's deputy minister of defense, "we must preserve our positions in those place where they are strong and then reorient ourselves on those technologies which will determine the industrial might, nationwide prestige, and influence of society and the state as a whole."

If everyone in government understood this, the absurdity with the MiG trade would hardly have been possible...

Tula Advertisement: 30-mm 2A72, 2A42 BMP Cannon

93UM0059A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in English
16 Oct 92 p 4

[Text]

30-mm Automatic Gun 2A72

It is intended for suppression or defeating manpower which is of danger to tanks at ranges up to 1500 m, affecting lightly armoured targets at ranges up to 2000 m and also for fight against helicopters at ranges up to 4000 m.

Specifications

Calibre, mm	30
Number of rifling grooves	16
Rifling pitch, mm	715.5
Muzzle velocity, m/s	960 ⁺³⁰ ₋₁₀
Rate of fire, rounds/min	Min. 330
Guaranteed service life, rounds	6000
Weight, kg:	
of gun	84
of barrel	36
Recoil force, kN	60

Length of gun, mm	3006
DC power supply voltage of electric trigger and contactor, V	27 ⁺² ₋₅
Feed	Two-belt
Reloading	Manual
Charge ignition method	By impact
Firing control	Remote from electric trigger
Torque at manual reloading screw, N x m	20-30
Number of base assemblies	9
Number of parts	349

30-mm Automatic Gun 2A42 for APC

It is intended for use against lightly armoured targets at ranges up to 1500 m, antitank guided missile launchers, soft-skinned targets and manpower at ranges up to 4000 m and also against air targets, flying at low altitudes up to 2000 m at subsonic speeds and a slant range of up to 2500 m.

Specifications

Calibre, mm	30
Number of rifling grooves	16
Rifling pitch, mm	715.5
Muzzle velocity, m/s	960 ⁺³⁰ ₋₁₀
Rate of fire, rounds/min:	
fast	Min 550
slow	200 to 300
Guaranteed service life, rounds	6000
Weight, kg:	
of gun	115
of barrel	38.5
Recoil force, kN	40 to 50
Length of gun, mm	3027
DC power supply voltage of electric trigger and contactor, V	27 ⁺² ₋₅
Feed	Two-belt
Reloading	Pyrotechnic and manual
Number of squibs	3
Charge ignition method	By impact
Firing control	Remote from electric trigger and mechanical
Manual charging force, N:	
in loading	Max. 400
in reloading with extraction of misfired cartridge	Max. 600
Number of base assemblies	8
Number of parts	578

Roskomstat Publishes Military Conversion Data for Nov*LD2511170692 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 1700 GMT 24 Nov 92*

[From the "Vesti" newscast]

[Text] Today Russia's Roskomstat [Russian Committee for Statistics] published data on the conversion of military production for November of the current year. Conversion is taking place at over 600 enterprises in the defense complex. Two years ago, the defense production share at these enterprises was 51 percent. By the end of 1992, it will amount to 26 percent. Admittedly, the halving of military output that we can see has not so far, unfortunately, been counterbalanced by any growth in civilian production. That growth amounts to just 9 percent. This is in regard to production. As for employees, the statistics are as follows: Of some 900,000 people shaken out of defense work, 536,000 will work in civilian production in the same sector; for 300,000 people there are no prospects of finding work at the moment.

**MILITARY CONFLICT, FOREIGN
MILITARY AFFAIRS****Volkogonov on Decision to Put Missiles in Cuba***93UM0131A Moscow TRUD in Russian 27 Oct 92 p 3*

[Interview with Dmitriy Antonovich Volkogonov, advisor to the Russian president on defense and security, by V. Badurkin; date and place not given: "Operation 'Anadyr': Thirty Years Ago the World Was on the Brink of Nuclear War"]

[Text] Military commanders were invited to a meeting of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee on 24 May 1962. Establishment of a group of Soviet forces in Cuba was the issue under discussion. Khrushchev, Kozlov, Brezhnev, Kosygin and Mikoyan spoke. A decision was made unanimously. All that remained was to "coordinate" this issue with Fidel Castro. Next day, in the presence of Malinovskiy, Gromyko and Andropov, Khrushchev personally instructed the "emissaries"—Rashidov, Marshal Biryuzov and two generals. Coordination was quickly achieved, and by as early as 10 June the Presidium unanimously proclaimed the beginning of Operation Anadyr.

[Volkogonov] The operation was carried out brilliantly from a military point of view. People and combat equipment were brought together secretly from the entire country and transport vessels were prepared in extremely short time. Forty-four thousand persons, two missile divisions, two surface-to-air missile divisions, four separate motorized rifle regiments, a helicopter and a missile regiment, and a number of special subdivisions were activated in the operation. In addition participation of two squadrons—submarines and ships—was planned.

All of this armada was meticulously camouflaged as a civilian expedition. The people (there were even agricultural specialists among them) wore civilian clothing, and the decks of the ships were loaded with tractors and combines. Ships carrying a cargo of skis and jackets left Baltic ports—they were off to "develop the Chukchi Peninsula." And it was only when they were on the ocean that the captains of the vessels opened their special envelopes and learned of their subsequent course—to Cuba.

[Badurkin] Dmitriy Antonovich, what in your opinion guided Khrushchev in his decision to put Soviet missiles in Cuba?

[Volkogonov] This was most likely an attempt to establish nuclear parity. Our country was surrounded by NATO bases, and we were clearly behind in those days in the number of warheads and delivery vehicles. By installing launchers at America's "underbelly," Khrushchev obviously hoped to "rectify" the correlation of forces.

However, Nikita Sergeyevich clearly overestimated his possibilities and underestimated the reaction of the Americans to this adventure. When Cuba was discovered to be "bristling" with Soviet missiles, the Americans, who hitherto had never experienced real danger, were in shock. And their reaction corresponded.

[Badurkin] Did our missiles really present a serious threat to them?

[Volkogonov] Of course. Forty launchers, 60 nuclear warheads from 700 kilotonnes to a megaton each, and missiles with a range of 5,000 kilometers—a huge force.

Upon discovering the missiles in Cuba on 14 October, the Americans immediately sought retaliatory measures. Pentagon leaders proposed destroying them with a massed air raid. Had this happened, war would have been very probable. Because in accordance with Moscow's decision the missiles were intended "to defend Cuba." Moreover General Pliyev (who acted under the cover name of "Pavlov" in the operation) was granted permission to use tactical missiles at his discretion in the event of a landing by an American assault force.

[Badurkin] Nonetheless, the U.S. Strategic Air Command did issue orders for all of its formations to assume full combat readiness.

[Volkogonov] A similar decision was also made on our side. There is a document—an encoded telegram from Pliyev to the "director", Defense Minister Malinovskiy—in which he reported to Moscow his intention to use "all available air defense resources" against the American airplanes. In this case the decision was approved by Khrushchev himself. This document, sent at the peak of the Caribbean crisis, is an indication that mankind was on the brink of nuclear catastrophe. Thank God, the politicians had enough wisdom not to take the last and fatal step.

[Badurkin] Halting at the "Rubicon," Khrushchev and Kennedy began the political "haggling." Who won?

[Volkogonov] Perhaps no one. At least not the Soviet Union. In exchange for taking the nuclear weapons back, Moscow wanted public assurances and guarantees that the USA would not attack Cuba. Moreover Khrushchev demanded an announcement from Kennedy on withdrawal of American missiles from Turkey. Upon receiving agreement on the first demand and an extremely evasive reply to the second, Khrushchev relaxed, and even interpreted this as a victory for him.

But in fact, things did not turn out so well for our military. I can only imagine how they felt during the humiliating inspections the Americans carried out aboard each vessel departing Cuba.

[Badurkin] The opinion exists that the military were the ones who cooked up the whole affair, while Khrushchev simply yielded to their pressure. Is this version confirmed by Central Committee documents?

[Volkogonov] The idea of "dropping a hedgehog down the pants of the Americans" belonged to Khrushchev. Malinovskiy and Zakharov (the chief of General Staff) were only the executors. The minister even tried to "cool down" his leader by turning the discussion to the possible reaction from the Americans, but Khrushchev shrugged him off. Moreover in the most critical moment of 25-27 October, when the Central Committee Presidium was meeting practically nonstop, it was Malinovskiy who suggested accepting the American demands.

[Badurkin] You said that Operation Anadyr was adventurous from the Soviet Union's side. But even adventurous plans do not arise without cause.

[Volkogonov] I'm not at all arguing that Khrushchev was a "hawk" and Kennedy was a "dove." I think that both sides were to blame for the Caribbean crisis. The Americans acted provocatively, like masters of the entire world. The Soviet leadership showed restraint when they placed their missiles in Turkey, Japan and South Korea, and presented no ultimatums. But of course, this could not go on forever.

And even during the operation the Americans did not act all that cautiously. In the morning of 27 October the KGB director reported to Khrushchev that the Americans had in fact established a marine blockade of Cuba and that their airplanes were violating Cuba's borders at every opportunity. For example on the day that two of our missiles brought down an American U-2 from an altitude of 21 kilometers, Cuba's airspace was violated by eight airplanes.

Such that the blame and responsibility for the crisis lie on both sides. Still, I would like to emphasize once again that the politicians did have sufficient restraint and sense to keep back from the brink. This to me is the main lesson of those anxious days of October 1962.

Stealth Aircraft

93UM0125A Moscow *TEKHNICA I VOORUZHENIYE*
in Russian No 7-8, 92 pp 38-39

[Article by Candidate of Military Sciences Major A. Vladimirov: "Low-Signature Aircraft"]

[Text] The first series-production aircraft with a low radar signature entered the inventory in the 1950's. Their low signature was provided through the utilization of the "flying-wing" aerodynamic design (the British Vulcan bomber), by applying radar absorbing paint (the American U-2 reconnaissance aircraft), the use of special strakes on the fuselage that impart a streamlined contour to it, small vertical stabilizers that are inclined inward, and wing leading-edge and fuselage leading-edge wing extensions that are manufactured from radar absorbing honeycomb filler materials (the American SR-71 reconnaissance aircraft).

According to foreign experts, the experience that has been accumulated in the development and operation of first-generation low-signature aircraft have confirmed the promise of applying "stealth" technology in aviation. In 1978, work was begun in the United States to design a combat aircraft which would have a radar cross section (RCS) that would be lower than the RCS of an ordinary aircraft of similar size by a factor of 1-2. It received the designation F-117. The last of the 59 aircraft ordered entered the U.S. Air Force inventory in the summer of 1990.

This aircraft's low level of compromising indicators in the radar range of electromagnetic waves is primarily provided through the specific configuration of the airframe. Manufactured based on a design that is quite close to a "flying wing", it is formed by a majority of two-dimensional panels and does not have any flat contours. Foreign experts assert that the F-117's so-called multi-faceted surface, that was used in practice for the first time, significantly impedes its detection using radar. A large portion of the panels and vertical stabilizers have a slope of approximately 30-45° relative to the vertical which ensures the reflection of radar signals upward or downward and practically excludes the formation of a stream of electromagnetic energy that is directed toward the illuminating radar site.

Radar absorbing materials are used to reduce the total level of the reflected signals. Panels that are manufactured from these materials are attached to the fuselage skin and tail assembly which are manufactured from aluminum alloys; a special coating is applied to both wing edges. The signals which it is impossible to suppress are concentrated into several narrow sectors. Their orientation in the horizontal plane corresponds to the direction of the wing's straight edges, the rear section of the fuselage and tail assembly—the strongest reflectors. Accordingly, other surfaces that make up the airframe are also oriented in these directions. In the remaining zones, the RCS is commensurate with background noise. In order to impede detection of the aircraft from the

forward hemisphere, none of the sectors of intense reflection has been directed directly ahead, which promotes a highly swept wing. The all-moving V-shaped tail section has a diamond-shaped cross section and the angle between the vertical stabilizers totals less than 90°, thus they cannot fulfill the role of a corner reflector.

The designers paid special attention to techniques to reduce the signature of the engines. They say that the wing will carry out the functions of a screen that transforms the radar illumination of the engines from certain angles of approach when the engines are mounted at the wing-fuselage joint. Grates, manufactured from composite materials that reflect electromagnetic radiation as a flat surface, have been installed on the air intakes. The large area of the air intake (1.41 X 0.82 meters) permits diverting a portion of the air that enters into them to be used to cool the engine compartment and exhaust gases.

Two-dimensional slit-shaped nozzles have 12 internal bulkheads which, along with the exhaust device that is diverted upward by the lower panel, screens the engines, thus impeding detection of the aircraft in the IR [Infrared] and radar ranges. Furthermore, the wide nozzles provide effective cooling of the stream of exhaust gases through its rapid mixture with atmospheric air. Plates with a thermal-protective coating have been installed along the trailing edge of the fuselage.

Small structural elements have also been manufactured while considering the requirements to minimize the RCS. All antennas are either internally retractable or are removable. Pitot-static tubes have been manufactured from composite materials and have a polyhedral shape. The sawtooth edges of the edges of the flaps, weapons bay, engines, landing gear wheel wells, cockpit canopy and IR sensor fairings promote the reduction of the number of peaks of reflected electromagnetic radiation. The covering of the cockpit's flat panes of glass which contains gold has a low reflective characteristic. The IR systems are covered with special non-radio-transparent screens. According to foreign press reports, all of this has permitted them to obtain an RCS from the forward and rear hemispheres of approximately 0.01m² (the RCS of an ordinary fighter aircraft is 3-5m²). So, the maximum detection range of an F-117 by a ground based radar is 25 kilometers which is not always adequate for PVO [air defense] systems to react in a timely manner.

The F-117 does not have an onboard radar. An inertial navigation system similar to the one installed on the B-52 bomber is utilized for navigation. Target search, detection, and tracking is carried out using passive systems: IR forward and downward scanning systems and a laser target designation system. Required stability and handling for the aircraft is attained through the use of an electronic control (fly-by-wire) system.

The third generation low-signature aircraft—the B-2 strategic bomber that was developed in the 1980's—is an example of the further development of "Stealth" technology. The foreign press notes that the designers have

managed to obtain an RCS that is approximately the same as the F-117's with the substantially greater geometric dimensions of the B-2.

The B-2 was manufactured based on a "flying wing" design. Its airframe was shaped with complex curvature surfaces that improve aerodynamic characteristics without reducing the low-signature indicators. It has a W-shaped form and straight wing leading edges that are coated with a radar absorbing material. This allowed them to use the concentration of reflected electromagnetic energy into narrow sectors, a concept that was described above but, since all wing edges, control elements, and also the sawtooth edges of the air intakes, nozzles, and the hatches of the various compartments are oriented along two parallel directions, the number of sectors has been reduced to four. To reduce the level of compromising indicators, a special system of air signals was employed for the first time on the B-2: eight static pressure sensors that do not protrude beyond the contour of the aircraft skin are utilized instead of the traditional pitot-static tube rods in the nose section of the aircraft. Requirements have been increased for the quality of the machining of the surface of the aircraft skin: the height of surface inequalities should not exceed 0.025 millimeters.

The B-2 bomber was manufactured from aluminum and titanium alloys and from several types of thermoplastic composite materials that are designed for heating to temperatures of nearly 200°C. The control surface in the central portion of the trailing edge of the wing is used for balance. The large total area of the control surfaces, which exceeds 65 m² (nearly 15%), the availability of the electronic (fly-by-wire) control system and the fast-response drives that deflect the ailerons at a velocity of up to 100° per second provide the aircraft's good handling and stability, according to test-pilot assessments. It has been noted that the B-2 has good flight handling characteristics thanks to the high rigidity of the aircraft design.

The power plant consists of four non-afterburning F-118-GE-100 TRDD [turbojet bypass engines] with a maximum thrust of 8,600 kilograms of force. The engines are located inside the aircraft fuselage and the intake and exhaust devices are on the upper surface of the wing which serves as a reliable screen that dampens thermal radiation. The channels of the air intakes are coated with radar absorbing material. They have an S-shaped configuration that prevents illumination of the engine compressor blades. Chambers have been installed on the engine exhausts that are designed to mix the hot gases of the jet stream with cold air.

A compartment containing electronic equipment is located behind the crew cockpit. A closed circulation air conditioning system is used to cool the equipment. The presence of conformal antenna arrays mounted on the lower surface of the wing's leading edge is a specific feature of the AN/APQ-118 onboard radar system that ensures a low probability of illumination. The synthetic

aperture radar operates in the 12.4-18 GHz frequency range. The principle of control of the spectrum, output, and the form of waves has been used in it. It has been reported that it provides surveillance of the ground to a width of up to 240 kilometers at the aircraft's cruising altitude. Fiber-optic communications lines are used in the electronic equipment suite.

The foreign press has reported that expenditures for the acquisition of 132 B-2 aircraft will exceed \$70 billion and that the purchase price of one aircraft is \$530 million (the planned reduction of the number of aircraft purchased to 75 will result in the price of the aircraft being increased to \$870 million). Construction of a special hangar for each aircraft will cost \$4.8 million and reequipping an entire airfield will cost \$400 million.

Development of the A-12 Avenger all-weather, low-signature, carrier-based, ground-attack aircraft began in the United States in 1988. This two-seat, subsonic aircraft was manufactured based on a triangular "flying wing" design. The primary techniques for reducing its signature are on the whole similar to what has been described above: the selection of an optimal airframe configuration combined with the concentration of the peaks of reflected electromagnetic energy in several narrow sectors and the reduction of the size of the peaks themselves through the use of radar absorbing materials.

The A-12's comparatively large internal size that permits the placement of a significant payload is a specific design feature. The cockpit, the weapons bay, engines and some of the fuel tanks are located in the central portion of the airframe which is more than two meters in height. The dimensions of the weapons bay is sufficient to install in it any type of conventional or nuclear weapons that are used by contemporary carrier-based ground-attack aircraft. Two separate compartments have been designated for air-to-air missiles. The possibility of hanging weapons on external conformal hardpoints has been provided for.

The aircraft's power plant consists of two non-afterburning F412-GE-400 engines (modified F404 TRDD [turbojet bypass engines]), that were installed on the F-18. They are distinguished from the base model by a 40% increase in thrust (6,700 kilograms of force) and by a low thermal radiation level. Trapezoidal air intakes, located under the wing's leading edge, do not impede its contours and have curved channels. Two-dimensional nozzles are located below the wing's trailing edge.

The A-12 does not have a vertical tail. It has a folding wing. A synthetic aperture radar and a forward-looking

IR system provide search, tracking and destruction of seaborne (ground based) targets. According to the foreign press, the radar system permits determination of the dimensions and class of a ship at a range of 150 kilometers. The hexagonal panels of the radar antenna fairings have been mounted in the wing leading-edge and two IR sensor fairings have been installed under the airframe's nose section. The communications and electronic warfare systems conformal antennas have been covered by dielectric panels. The inertial system with laser ring gyroscopes provides high accuracy of air navigation.

According to information provided by the U.S. Navy, the A-12 must have a 60% greater combat radius and a 40% greater combat payload than the A-6E ground attack aircraft which it is designated to replace and also significantly exceed it in acceleration characteristics, combat survivability, reliability and operational technological effectiveness. However, these too high demands on the aircraft have resulted in a significant increase of its weight, also a delay in the work completion schedule, and a cost overrun of \$900 million. As a result, the A-12 ground attack aircraft development program was terminated in January 1991. But already six months later, leading U.S. aircraft building companies had begun work on designs of new aircraft with a similar mission. The Department of Defense's requirements for its low-signature have been reduced somewhat in contrast to the A-12 which they assume will be compensated for with an increase in speed to supersonic, use of highly-effective electronic warfare systems and long-range weapons that are employed outside enemy PVO range. Introduction of the new aircraft into the inventory could begin in 2005.

The foreign press notes that many elements of "stealth" technology are also being quite broadly employed in aircraft that are not in the low-signature category, specifically, on the American ATF aircraft. A drastic reduction in signature in comparison with the F-15 fighter aircraft was one of the goals of its development. However, the foreign press has noted that designers have not been able to solve the primary problem of combining a low level of compromising indicators with supersonic flight speeds. They think that this will require a special coating that will permit reducing the airframe skin's heat radiation that is caused by aerodynamic heating by many times without substantially increasing the aircraft's weight and, consequently, without worsening its flight data. Developers of the supersonic fighter aircraft Rafael (France), EFA (Great Britain, FRG [Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, and Spain], FS-XX (Japan), and others also face similar problems.

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SECURITY SERVICES

Russian Federation Law on Internal Troops

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[Law of the Russian Federation: "On Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation"]

[Text]

Section I. General Provisions

Article 1. Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation

The Internal Troops are part of the system of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation and are called upon to protect the interests of the individual person, society, and the state, and the constitutional rights and freedoms of citizens against criminal and other illegal encroachments.

Article 2. Tasks of the Internal Troops

The tasks of the Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation (hereinafter referred to as the Internal Troops) are:

- providing assistance to internal affairs agencies of the Russian Federation in maintaining public order and ensuring public safety and the legal conditions of an emergency situation;
- guarding important state installations and special cargo;
- guarding corrective labor institutions and escorting convicts and prisoners in custody;
- participating in the territorial defense of the Russian Federation.

The Internal Troops may be charged with other tasks only by law.

Article 3. Principles of Activities of the Internal Troops

The activities of the Internal Troops are accomplished based on the principles of rule of law, respect for human rights, one-man management, centralization of command and control, universal military service and voluntary manpower acquisition under contract, and extraterritorial performance of service by service members.

Article 4. Composition of the Internal Troops

The composition of the Internal Troops includes:

- operational formations and military units;
- formations and military units for guarding important state installations and special cargo;
- formations and military units for guarding corrective labor institutions and for escorting;
- special motorized military units;
- aviation and maritime military units;

- command and control bodies, institutions, and military units supporting the activities of the Internal Troops (training, construction, communications, and others);
- military-educational institutions.

Formations and military units make up the districts of the Internal Troops.

Article 5. Fixed Assets of the Internal Troops

Housing facilities and other structures of military installations of formations, military units, and subunits, military-educational institutions and establishments of the Internal Troops, training installations and the training facilities and equipment located on them, and also authorized engineer systems used by the Internal Troops for performing their tasks and duties are federal property of the Russian Federation and comprise the fixed assets of the Internal Troops. The Internal Troops enjoy the right of operational control with respect to the above and other property assigned to them.

The land for accommodating and for the permanent activities of formations, military units and subunits, and establishments and military-educational institutions of the Internal Troops is granted to them for indefinite (permanent) use or leased to them by the appropriate councils of people's deputies within the limits of their powers.

The Internal Troops use the land, minerals, airspace, and maritime space in accordance with legislation of the Russian Federation that is in force.

Article 6. Language of Official Communications and Office Work in the Internal Troops

Official communications and office work in the Internal Troops are accomplished in the Russian language.

Article 7. Legal Basis for the Activities of the Internal Troops

The following are the legal basis for the activities of the Internal Troops: the Constitution of the Russian Federation (Russia); this law and other legal acts of the republics belonging to the Russian Federation; legal acts of the krais, oblasts, the autonomous oblast, autonomous okrugs, and the cities of Moscow and Saint Petersburg; normative acts of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation; and acts of bodies of local self-government adopted within the limits of their powers.

Article 8. Activities of the Internal Troops and Rights of Citizens

The Internal Troops protect a person against criminal encroachments regardless of his citizenship, place of residence, social origin, property status or position, race or nationality, sex, age, education, language, attitude towards religion, convictions, or membership in public associations.

Service members of the Internal Troops are forbidden to resort to language that degrades the dignity of citizens.

Any restriction on citizen's rights and freedoms by the Internal Troops is permissible only as specified by law.

Section II. Powers of Bodies of State Power and Administration

Article 9. Powers of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation

The Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation:

- accomplishes legislative regulation of the organization and activities of the Internal Troops and establishes legislative guarantees of legal and social protection of service members and their family members;
- on the recommendation of the President of the Russian Federation, approves the composition and personnel strength of the Internal Troops;
- monitors the legality of using the Internal Troops to accomplish the tasks assigned to them by this law;
- legislatively determines the overall tasks of the Internal Troops in the security system of the Russian Federation.

Article 10. Powers of the President of the Russian Federation

The President of the Russian Federation:

- determines the composition and personnel strength of the Internal Troops and submits appropriate proposals for approval by the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation;
- on the recommendation of the minister of internal affairs of the Russian Federation, approves the structure and disposition of the Internal Troops;
- makes the decision on involving the Internal Troops to assist internal affairs agencies in maintaining the legal regime of an emergency situation;
- on the recommendation of the minister of internal affairs of the Russian Republic, appoints the commander of the Internal Troops, relieves him of his post, or accepts his resignation;
- confers the military ranks of general in the prescribed manner;
- approves the regulation on military councils in the Internal Troops;
- determines annually the number of citizens of the Russian Federation who are subject to induction into military service and assemblies in the Internal Troops, issues decrees on scheduled inductions into military service in the Internal Troops and on discharging into the reserve service members who have served the prescribed terms of military service;
- takes steps to ensure legal and social protection of service members of the Internal Troops and their family members.

Article 11. Powers of the Government of the Russian Federation

The Government of the Russian Federation:

- ensures the allocation of material and technical resources and appropriations for supporting the activities of the Internal Troops;

- approves the list of types of weapons and ammunition, combat and special equipment, and special gear in the inventory of the Internal Troops and rules for their use;
- ensures that the Internal Troops are supplied with armament, combat and special equipment, and special gear;
- establishes for the ministries and departments of the Russian Federation, governments of the republics belonging to the Russian Federation, bodies of executive power of krais, oblasts, the autonomous oblast, autonomous okrugs, and the cities of Moscow and Saint Petersburg, state and municipal enterprises, institutions, and organizations assignments for preparing and transferring to the Internal Troops transportation, communications, and other material-technical assets in the event mobilization is declared and in wartime, as well as other mobilization assignments;
- approves the list of routes for escorting convicts and prisoners in custody, installations, and special cargo subject to troop protection, as well as the vessels in the interests of which the troops perform their assigned duties; in accordance with the approved list (established tasks), submits proposals to the President of the Russian Federation for determining the composition and numerical strength of the Internal Troops;
- determines the grounds for considering military units and subunits as being located at remote garrisons and localities;
- makes decisions on creating, changing the specialization, and abolishing scientific research and experimental design institutions and military-educational institutions of the Internal Troops;
- accomplishes measures for the social protection and material welfare of service members of the Internal Troops and their family members, as well as individuals in the reserve (retired) and their family members;
- resolves other issues of supporting the activities of the Internal Troops, besides those which, according to the Constitution of the Russian Federation and this law, are under the jurisdiction of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation, the President of the Russian Federation, and bodies of state power and administration of republics belonging to the Russian Federation.

Article 12. Powers of Supreme Bodies of State Power and Administration of Republics Belonging to the Russian Federation, Bodies of State Power and Administration of Krays, Oblasts, the Autonomous Oblast, Autonomous Okrugs, and the cities of Moscow and Saint Petersburg, and Bodies of Local Self-Government

The supreme bodies of state power and administration of republics belonging to the Russian Federation, bodies of state power and administration of krays, oblasts, the autonomous oblast, autonomous okrugs, and the cities of Moscow and Saint Petersburg, and bodies of local self-government, within the limits of their powers:

- participate in the consideration of proposals of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation for forming military units and institutions of the Internal Troops;

- create for the Internal Troops suitable conditions for their activities and support realization of guarantees of legal and social protection of service members of the Internal Troops and their family members;
- render assistance to the command of the Internal Troops in manning the military units with inductees;
- in urgent cases, they enlist the aid of personnel of military units of the Internal Troops for the location of their permanent deployment to eliminate the consequences of accidents, disasters, fires, natural disasters, epidemics, and epizootic diseases, with immediate notification of the minister of internal affairs of the Russian Federation.

The disposition of formations, military units, institutions and military-educational institutions of the Internal Troops on the territories of republics belonging to the Russian Federation, krais, oblasts, the autonomous oblast, autonomous okrugs, and the cities of Moscow and Saint Petersburg is coordinated with the appropriate bodies of state power and administration of the Russian Federation.

In the event the bodies of state power and administration of republics belonging to the Russian Federation, bodies of state power and administration of krais, oblasts, the autonomous oblast, autonomous okrugs, or the cities of Moscow and Saint Petersburg appeal to the President of the Russian Federation to change the disposition of the Internal Troops stationed on their territories, all expenditures for relocating and settling the troops at the new location are covered by funds from the budget of the corresponding nation-state or administrative-territorial formation. These expenditures include costs for building and equipping military installations, housing for personnel, communications and training facilities, structures and buildings for social, cultural, consumer, and other purposes, the construction of which must be completed before the military units begin moving.

Article 13. Obligations of State Bodies and Their Officials for Assisting the Internal Troops

State bodies and their officials, within the limits of their powers, assist the Internal Troops in performing their assigned tasks.

The Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation calls up citizens for military service and assemblies in the Internal Troops, provides Military Transportation Aviation aircraft for transporting personnel and equipment of the Internal Troops while they are performing missions in emergency situation conditions, and provides assistance in training and improving the skills of officer personnel of the Internal Troops on a contract basis.

Ministries and departments of the Russian Federation provide on a priority basis and free of charge at their airfields landing, parking, refueling, and takeoff of aircraft performing special flight missions in support of missions assigned to the Internal Troops.

For transporting convicts and prisoners in custody, the Ministry of Transportation of the Russian Federation leases to the Internal Troops special railcars and vessels and allocates at railroad stations areas equipped for separating railcars and boarding (disembarking) special railcars individuals being escorted.

Officials of management bodies of all types of transport, military commandants, and representatives of bodies of military and special transportation of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation provide assistance in transporting service members of the Internal Troops when they are performing official duties and out of turn in emergency situations.

The Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Communications, Ministry of Transportation, Ministry of Security, and other ministries and departments of the Russian Federation provide free of charge communications lines and channels for command and control of formations, military units, and subunits of the Internal Troops in their performance of duties for ensuring the legal conditions of an emergency situation and in eliminating the consequences of emergency situations.

The mechanism of fulfilling these duties of state bodies and their officials is established by the Government of the Russian Federation.

Section III. Service in the Internal Troops

Article 14. Personnel of the Internal Troops

Personnel of the Internal Troops include service members, office employees, and workers.

Service members of the Internal Troops have military ranks as well as uniforms and insignia established for them by the Government of the Russian Federation. They must have the necessary professional, legal, and physical training, know how to skillfully use organic weapons, special gear, and equipment assigned to them.

Service and labor activities of office employees and workers of the Internal Troops are governed by labor legislation of the Russian Federation and other laws and legal acts of the Russian Federation and republics belonging to the Russian Federation.

Article 15. Military Service in the Internal Troops

Manpower acquisition for the Internal Troops is accomplished on a voluntary basis under contract and also based on a call-up of citizens of the Russian Federation for military service.

The conditions, procedure, and term of performing military service by service members of the Internal Troops, their status, rights and responsibilities, reassignment procedures, awarding of military rank, certification, discharge, and pensions are determined by legislation of the Russian Federation.

Citizens entering military service in the Internal Troops take the Military Oath of Allegiance of the Russian Federation.

Service members of the Internal Troops enjoy the rights and freedoms of citizens of the Russian Federation with restriction established by legislation of the Russian Federation resulting from the particular features of performing military service.

Selection of inductees for the Internal Troops is accomplished by territorial internal affairs agencies, formations, and military units of the Internal Troops. If necessary, federal bodies of state security of the Russian Federation may be used in this work.

Article 16. Training Personnel of the Internal Troops

The Internal Troops have military-educational institutions which train and improve the skills of personnel. In addition to a military occupational specialty, students at military-educational institutions of the Internal Troops receive a higher education for a civilian specialty. Officers of the Internal Troops receive the appropriate higher military education at the Military Academy of the Internal Troops and also at military academies of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.

Training of warrant officers, noncommissioned officers (petty officers), and lower-rank specialists is accomplished at warrant officer schools and training units (centers) of the Internal Troops.

Article 17. Performance of Military Service Duties by Service Members of the Internal Troops

When performing military service duties, service members of the Internal Troops are in the disposition of a military unit, subunit, institution, military-educational institution, or outside them, including when proceeding to and from the duty location.

The job-related duties of service members of the Internal Troops and the procedure for performing these duties are determined by this law, the Regulations of the Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation, approved by the President of the Russian Federation, general military regulations of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, and normative acts of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation.

Performance of duties entrusted to the Internal Troops are accomplished by means of alert duty of personnel of guard details and line-unit details.

The procedure and conditions for standing alert duty by service members of the Internal Troops, as well as the amount of pay for it are established by laws of the Russian Federation, decrees of the President of the Russian Federation, and decisions of the Government of the Russian Federation.

The duration of performance of duties by service members of the Internal Troops on alert duty is determined

by the actual time a service member is part of a guard detail or line-unit detail assigned to guard installations, maintain public order, or perform other duties specified by this law.

Section IV. Rights and Responsibilities of the Internal Troops

Article 18. Responsibilities of Special Motorized Military Units, Formations, and Operational Military Units

Special motorized military units, formations, and operational military units are charged with:

- participating jointly with internal affairs agencies in maintaining public order by performing patrol and sentry duty in cities and populated areas, as well as in ensuring public safety when conducting mass measures;
- assisting internal affairs agencies in taking urgent measures to rescue people and protect property left unsupervised, maintaining public order during accidents, disasters, fires, natural disasters, and other emergency situations, and also safeguarding legal conditions of an emergency situation;
- participating in stopping mass disturbances in populated areas and, if necessary, at corrective labor institutions;
- accomplishing measures of a reconnaissance nature in areas where the Internal Troops are performing duties specified by this article.

It is forbidden to use the Internal Troops to stop unauthorized rallies, meetings, street marches, and demonstrations of a nonviolent nature.

Article 19. Responsibilities of Formations and Military Units for Guarding Corrective Labor Institutions and for Escorting

Formations and military units for guarding corrective labor institutions are charged with:

- guarding the corrective labor institutions included in the list approved by the Government of the Russian Federation;
- escorting convicts from corrective labor institutions guarded by troops to and from production facilities and guarding these facilities during the time the convicts are working at them;
- escorting convicts and prisoners in custody from investigatory isolation wards to corrective labor institutions over prescribed planned routes and defendants to court sessions of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, supreme courts of the republics belonging to the Russian Federation, kray, oblast, Moscow or Saint Petersburg city courts, and other courts, according to a list approved by the Government of the Russian Federation, and guarding these during the court sessions;
- participating in the search for convicts and prisoners in custody who have escaped from under the guard of guard details of the Internal Troops;

- guarding warehouses and military bases of district administrations of material-technical and military supply of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation;
- participating in stopping mass disturbances at corrective labor installations.

Article 20. Responsibilities of Formations and Military Units for Guarding Important State Facilities and Special Cargo

Formations and military units for guarding important state facilities and special cargo are charged with:

- guarding important state facilities, structures on lines of communication, and special cargo included on a list approved by the Government of the Russian Federation;
- participating in eliminating the consequences of accidents, disasters, fires, natural disasters, and other emergencies at guarded facilities and structures;
- participating in the search for and detention of persons infiltrating into guarded territory.

Article 21. Responsibilities of Maritime Military Units

Maritime military units are charged with:

- providing security for important state facilities and structures on lines of communication located in the coastal area of seas and on rivers, lakes, and other waterways;
- participating in eliminating the consequences of accidents, disasters, fires, natural disasters, and other emergencies at guarded facilities and structures;
- participating in the search for and detention of persons infiltrating into guarded facilities and structures from the direction of the water area.

Article 22. Responsibilities of Aviation Military Units

Aviation military units are charged with:

- transporting personnel, armament, combat and special equipment, and other materiel;
- combat support of operations by the Internal Troops and subunits of internal affairs agencies in their performance of duties in conditions of a legal regime of an emergency situation and when eliminating the consequences of other emergencies.

In order to receive additional funds for improving maintenance of aircraft and daily support of service members, the commander of the Internal Troops is authorized to use the aviation element to transport cargo of other ministries and departments in the manner prescribed by the Government of the Russian Federation.

Article 23. Rights of Service Members of the Internal Troops When Performing Assigned Duties

When performing assigned duties, service members of the Internal Troops have the right:

- a) to require observance of public order by citizens and officials and to stop crimes, administrative offenses, and actions impeding the performance of their duties;

b) to check identification documents of citizens and officials if there are sufficient grounds to suspect them of committing a crime or administrative offense;

c) to detain and deliver to the militia persons who have committed an offense or have attempted to commit one, or to ascertain their identity;

d) to detain for up to three hours and hold in official facilities of the Internal Troops until transfer to the militia persons who have encroached upon guarded facilities, inspect their person, inspect their belongings, and confiscate their belongings and documents;

e) to inspect transport vehicles and craft (vessels) that have violated rules established at the facilities being guarded by the Internal Troops;

f) to enter unimpeded at anytime of the day or night the territory and premises of enterprises, institutions, and organizations, regardless of the form of ownership, except those having diplomatic immunity, and inspect them in order to stop offenses threatening public order and the safety of citizens, to search and detain persons infiltrating into guarded territory, and to search for criminals and prisoners in custody who have escaped;

g) by decision of the senior chief of operations, and in exceptional cases by decision of the commander of the military unit or subunit, to cordon off (block) terrain sectors, individual structures, or other facilities when searching for convicts and prisoners in custody who have escaped, pursuing persons who have infiltrated into guarded territory, stopping mass disturbances and group breaches of public order, and also when eliminating the consequences of natural disasters, accidents and disasters, epidemics and epizootic diseases, and other emergencies, inspecting transport vehicles and craft (vessels) when necessary;

h) to made a search of convicts and prisoners in custody when they are being escorted or detained during the course of a search;

i) to give incentives to citizens distinguishing themselves in assisting the Internal Troops in their performance of duties.

The Internal Troops are granted the following additional rights when performing their duties in conditions of an emergency situation:

a) to enter unimpeded housing and other facilities occupied by citizens, land belonging to them, and the territory and premises occupied by enterprises, institutions, and organizations, regardless of form of ownership, except for those having diplomatic immunity, and to inspect them when pursuing persons suspected of committing crimes or if there is sufficient data that a crime is being or has been committed there, or an accident has occurred there.

The command of the military unit notifies the procurator within 24 hours of all instances of entering housing without consent of citizens residing there;

b) to prohibit temporarily or restrict transport and pedestrian traffic and to conduct inspections on the streets and roads in order to protect the lives, health, and property of citizens;

c) to use transport vehicles of enterprises, institutions, organizations, regardless of their form of ownership, public associations, or citizens (other than vehicles belonging to diplomatic, consular, or other missions of foreign states, international organizations, or special-purpose transport vehicles) for passage to the site of emergencies, for delivering citizens needing immediate medical assistance to treatment facilities, for pursuit of persons who have committed crimes, and to deliver them to the militia;

d) not to permit citizens on individual sectors of the terrain or on installations and to oblige them to remain there or leave these sectors or installations in order to protect the health, lives, and property of citizens;

e) to use without hindrance for official purposes communications equipment belonging to enterprises, institutions, organizations, regardless of the form of ownership (except those having diplomatic immunity), and public associations;

f) to receive free of charge from enterprises, institutions, and organizations, regardless of the form of ownership, the information necessary to perform official duties, except in cases when the law specifies a different procedure for obtaining the corresponding information;

g) when necessary, to check citizens' documents and in exceptional cases, when there is information that they have a weapon, to inspect their person, and inspect their belongings, housing, and transport vehicles;

h) to detain citizens violating curfew until the curfew is over and to detain persons not having identification documents on their person until their identity can be established, but for no more than three days.

Section V. Use of Physical Force, Special Equipment, Weapons, and Combat Equipment by the Internal Troops

Article 24. Conditions and Limits of Use of Physical Force, Special Equipment, Weapons, and Combat Equipment

The Internal Troops have the right to use physical force and to store and use special equipment, authorized weapons, and organic combat equipment only in instances and in the manner specified by this law.

Service members of the Internal Troops must undergo special training, as well as a periodic examination of their fitness for actions in conditions associated with

using physical force, special equipment, weapons, and combat equipment and also for the ability to provide first aid to victims.

When using physical force, special equipment, weapons, or combat equipment, a service member of the Internal Troops must:

- warn about the intention to use them, allowing sufficient time to carry out his demands, except in those cases when a delay in using physical force, special equipment, weapons, or combat equipment creates an immediate danger to the lives or health of citizens, service members, or staff members of internal affairs agencies can result in grave consequences or when such a warning is inappropriate or impossible in the situation at hand;
- ensure first aid is given to individuals who have received bodily injuries;
- report on command about each specific case of using physical force, special equipment, weapons, or combat equipment.

The appropriate commanders and chiefs of the Internal Troops must immediately notify the procurator of all instances of wounding or death when using physical force, special equipment, weapons, or combat equipment.

Service members who use physical force, special equipment, weapons, or combat equipment exceeding authority are held accountable as established by law.

Article 25. Use of Physical Force

Service members of the Internal Troops have the right to use physical force, including combat fighting tactics, to stop crimes and administrative offenses, detain persons committing them, or overcome resistance to legal demands of service members of the Internal Troops, if other methods do not ensure performance of their assigned duties.

Article 26. Use of Special Equipment

Service members of the Internal Troops have the right personally or as a subunit to use special equipment in the following instances:

- a) to repel attacks on citizens, workers at corrective labor institutions, service members, or associates of internal affairs agencies;
- b) to stop unlawful resistance to a service member of the Internal Troops;
- c) to detain persons caught committing a crime against the life, health, or property of citizens and attempting to hide;
- d) to detain persons with respect to whom there are sufficient grounds to believe that they intend to offer armed resistance;
- e) to deliver detained individuals to the militia and to escort and guard detainees, persons under administrative arrest, and prisoners in custody when their behavior

gives reason to believe that they may escape or injure themselves or those around them, or resist a service member of the Internal Troops;

f) to repel attacks on military installations, troop trains and columns, and guarded facilities, structures, and cargo;

g) to free hostages and captured buildings, facilities, structures, transport vehicles, and terrain sectors;

h) to stop mass disturbances and actions disrupting the operation of transportation, communications, enterprises, institutions and organizations, as well as the work of corrective labor institutions;

i) in conditions of an emergency situation to stop transport vehicles whose drivers do not obey legal demands to stop and also when detaining convicts or prisoner in custody who have escaped on a transport vehicle;

j) to search for and detain convicts and prisoners in custody who have escaped.

Service members of the Internal Troops may use the following as special equipment:

- rubber sticks—in instances specified by paragraphs “a”, “b”, “f”, “g”, “h”, and “j” of the first part of this article;
- tear gas—in instances specified by paragraphs “a”, “b”, “d”, “f”, “g”, “h”, and “j” of the first part of this article;
- handcuffs—in instances specified by paragraphs “b”, “c”, “e”, and “j” of the first part of this article. If there are no handcuffs, a service member is authorized to use improvised means;
- distracting light and sound devices—in instances specified by paragraphs “a”, “d”, “f”, “g”, “h”, and “j” of the first part of this article;
- barrier demolition devices—in instances specified by paragraphs “d”, “g”, and “j” of the first part of this article;
- roadblock devices—in instances specified by paragraphs “i” and “j” of the first part of this article;
- water jets and armored vehicles—in instances specified by paragraphs “d”, “e”, “g”, “h”, and “j” of the first part of this article and only at the direction of the commander or deputy commander of the military unit with subsequent notification of the procurator within 24 hours of the use;
- guard dogs—in instances specified by paragraphs “a”, “b”, “c”, “d”, “e”, “f”, “g”, “h”, and “j” of the first part of this article.

All types of special equipment may also be used in instances specified by the first part of Article 27 of this law.

It is forbidden to use special equipment against women who show obvious signs of being pregnant, persons who are clearly disabled, and minors, except when they offer armed resistance or make an attack threatening people's lives and health.

In a state of necessary defense or absolute necessity, a service member of the Internal Troops is authorized to use any improvised means in the absence of special equipment or small arms.

Article 27. Use of Weapons

Service members of the Internal Troops have the right to use weapons personally or as a subunit in the following instances:

a) to protect citizens against an attack threatening their lives or health;

b) to repel an attack on service members, associates of internal affairs agencies, and workers of corrective labor institutions when their lives or health are endangered, and also to stop attempts to capture them with weapons;

c) to free hostages and captured guarded facilities, structures, cargo, and combat equipment;

d) to detain persons caught when committing a crime against the life, health, or property of citizens and trying to hide, and also offering armed resistance;

e) to stop the escape of persons detained on suspicion of committing a crime, persons taken into custody as a measure of stopping a crime, persons sentenced to imprisonment, and also to stop attempts to forcibly free the persons indicated in this paragraph;

f) to stop transport vehicles by damaging them, if the driver refuses to stop in conditions of an emergency situation despite the lawful demand of the militia or a service member;

g) to repel a group or armed attack on military installations, troops trains and columns, guarded facilities, structures, and cargo, housing of citizens, or facilities of state agencies, public associations, enterprises, institutions, and organizations, including using transport vehicles;

h) to suppress resistance by armed groups refusing to carry out the lawful demands to stop illegal actions and surrender their weapons and combat equipment;

i) to warn citizens about the intent to use weapons, to give an alarm signal, and to call for help.

Weapons are used without warning to repel an attack with the use of weapons, combat equipment, transport vehicles, aircraft, or maritime and river vessels, in an escape using weapons or with the aid of transport vehicles, aircraft, or maritime and river vessels, and also in an escape in conditions of limited visibility and in an escape from transport vehicles or maritime and river vessels while they are moving.

It is forbidden to use weapons against women, persons who are clearly disabled, and minors, when age is obvious, except when they offer armed resistance or make group attack threatening people's lives.

Article 28. Use of Combat Equipment

Organic combat equipment in the inventory of the Internal Troops is used in the following instances:

- a) to free hostages and captured guarded facilities, structures, cargo, and combat equipment;
- b) to detain individuals offering armed resistance;
- c) to halt transport vehicles in conditions of an emergency situation;
- d) to repel a group or armed attack on military installations, troop trains or columns, guarded facilities, structures, and cargo, housing of citizens, or facilities of state agencies, public associations, enterprises, institutions, and organizations, including using transport vehicles;
- e) to suppress resistance by armed groups refusing to carry out the lawful demands of service members of the Internal Troops to stop illegal actions and surrender their weapons and combat equipment.

Article 29. Guarantees of Personal Safety of a Service Member of the Internal Troops

A service member of the Internal Troops has the right to draw and ready his weapon if he believes that there may be grounds to use it in the situation, as specified by Article 27 of this law.

Attempts by a person being detained to approach a service member of the Internal Troops with a cold weapon or small arm drawn, which may be used to inflict bodily harm after reducing the distance indicated by the service member, and also attempts to touch the weapon of a service member authorize the latter to use weapons in accordance with paragraph "b" of the first part of Article 27 of this law.

In the interests of ensuring the safety of service members and their family members, it is not permitted to publish in the mass media information about the locations of deployment (redeployment) of military units, duty station location, or residence of service members of the Internal Troops involved in clashes with armed criminal groups. Information on the official activities of the Internal Troops may be provided only by authorization of the commander of the military unit or chief of the institution or military-educational institution of the Internal Troops.

Section VI. Leadership of the Internal Troops

Article 30. Powers of the Minister of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation

The minister of internal affairs of the Russian Federation exercises leadership of the Internal Troops and is responsible for the lawful accomplishment of the duties assigned to them.

The minister of internal affairs of the Russian Federation:

- issues normative acts on questions of organizing the activities of the Internal Troops in execution of laws of the Russian Federation, decrees of the President of the

Russian Federation, and decisions of the Government of the Russian Federation and also monitors their fulfillment;

- approves the structure and staffs of the Main Directorate of the Commander of the Internal Troops, districts, formations, military units, institutions and military-educational institutions of the Internal Troops, and also the composition of military councils;
- recommends the commander of the Internal Troops for appointment and officers for awarding of the highest officer ranks;
- on the recommendation of the commander of the Internal Troops, appoints officers to positions of division commander and above;
- confers primary officer ranks and also military ranks to officers up to and including colonel (captain 1st rank);
- discharges officers from military service in accordance with legislation in force;
- organizes the study and selection of replacements inducted into the Internal Troops based on decrees of the President of the Russian Federation through the commander of the Internal Troops, territorial agencies of internal affairs, and, if necessary, through bodies of state security of the Russian Federation;
- assists families of service members of the Internal Troops who have been killed (died) with finding jobs and with material and everyday support in accordance with legislation in force.

Article 31. Powers of the Commander of the Internal Troops

The commander of the Internal Troops is simultaneously deputy minister of internal affairs of the Russian Federation and exercises direct command and control of the Internal Troops.

The commander of the Internal Troops in peacetime and wartime is personally responsible for maintaining the combat and mobilization readiness of the Internal Troops and the successful accomplishment of the tasks assigned them.

The commander of the Internal Troops:

- is the direct superior of all personnel of the Internal Troops;
- in accordance with the orders of the minister of internal affairs of the Russian Federation, prepares and makes proposals for improving the activities and structure of the Internal Troops and for conducting organizational measures;
- organizes the drafting of plans for manning the Internal Troops with compulsory-service personnel upon call-up and discharges them from military service in accordance with decrees of the President of the Russian Federation and orders of the minister of internal affairs of the Russian Federation;
- issues orders, directives, instructions, and regulations, and approves plans and programs of combat and mobilization training of the Internal Troops, as well as plans for scientific research and experimental design

work; reissues and makes changes to staffs of military units, institutions, and military-educational institutions within the limits of the personnel strength established for the Internal Troops;

- decides questions of performance of military service by officers, warrant officers, extended-service personnel, and persons serving under contract in accordance with legislation in force;
- appoints officers to positions up to commander of a separate brigade, deputy chief of a directorate of the Main Directorate of the Commander of the Internal Troops, and deputy district commander of the Internal Troops;
- confers military ranks on officers and discharges officers up to and including the rank of lieutenant colonel (captain 3d rank) from military service;
- ensures development of the material base and creation of the necessary social and daily conditions for personnel;
- recommends service members, office employees, and workers for award of government decorations of the Russian Federation;
- by decision of the Government of the Russian Federation, accepts into service of the Internal Troops combat and other equipment and property;
- writes off property that is in unfit condition or lost material values and monetary assets of the troop (budget) record in the manner prescribed by the minister of internal affairs of the Russian Federation;
- within the scope of powers granted by the minister of internal affairs of the Russian Federation, in conditions of an emergency situation, coordinates the actions of the Internal Troops of the corresponding territorial internal affairs agencies being used to ensure the legal conditions of the emergency situation.

Article 32. Main Directorate of the Commander of the Internal Troops

The Main Directorate of the Commander of the Internal Troops is the structural subdivision of the central apparatus of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation.

The organization and sequence of activities of the Main Directorate of the Commander of the Internal Troops are established by a regulation approved by the minister of internal affairs of the Russian Federation.

Article 33. Districts of Internal Troops

Districts of Internal Troops are operational-territorial strategic formations of the Internal Troops.

The district commander of Internal Troops is the direct superior for all personnel of formations and military units that are part of the district. By order of the minister of internal affairs of the Russian Federation, formations and military units directly subordinate to the Main Directorate of the Commander of the Internal Troops, as well as military-educational institutions of the Internal

Troops located within the boundaries of the district may be transferred to the operational subordination of the district commander.

The organization and sequence of activities of district directorates of the Internal Troops are established by a regulation approved by the minister of internal affairs of the Russian Federation.

The district commander of Internal Troops organizes his work in close coordination with the ministers of internal affairs of the republics belonging to the Russian Federation, chiefs of directorates (main directorates) of internal affairs of krais, oblasts, the autonomous oblast, autonomous okrugs, and the cities of Moscow and Saint Petersburg, and when training troops and in the course of carrying out missions in the area of defense—in close coordination with the command authorities of military districts of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.

Article 34. Military Councils of the Internal Troops

Military councils are formed in the Main Directorate of the Commander of the Internal Troops and in districts of Internal Troops; their activities are accomplished in accordance with a regulation approved by the President of the Russian Federation.

The military council of the Main Directorate of the Commander of the Internal Troops, by position, includes the commander of the Internal Troops—chairman of the military council; the chief of staff of the Internal Troops, who simultaneously is first deputy commander of the Internal Troops; the first deputy commander of the Internal Troops; and also other officials in accordance with the order of the minister of internal affairs of the Russian Federation.

The military council of a district of the Internal Troops, by position, includes the district commander of the Internal Troops—chairman of the military council; the district chief of staff of the Internal Troops; deputy district commanders of the Internal Troops; and also other officials in accordance with the order of the minister of internal affairs of the Russian Federation.

Article 35. Powers of the Ministers of Internal Affairs of the Republics Belonging to the Russian Federation, Chiefs of Directorates (Main Directorates) of Internal Affairs of Krays, Oblasts, the Autonomous Oblast, Autonomous Okrugs, and the Cities of Moscow and Saint Petersburg

The ministers of internal affairs of the republics belonging to the Russian Federation, chiefs of directorates (main directorates) of internal affairs of the krais, oblasts, the autonomous oblast, autonomous okrugs, and the cities of Moscow and Saint Petersburg are the senior operational command personnel with respect to commanders of military units for guarding corrective labor institutions and special motorized units of the Internal Troops located on the corresponding territories (of a republic belonging to the Russian Federation, kray,

oblast, autonomous oblast, autonomous okrug, or the cities of Moscow and Saint Petersburg) and are empowered:

- to use the manpower and assets of special motorized military units to assist internal affairs agencies in maintaining public order within the limits of the corresponding territory and the manpower and assets of military units for guarding corrective labor institutions to stop mass disturbances among convicts in the manner specified by this law and the Regulation of the Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation;
- jointly with commanders of formations and military units, to determine the volume of official missions for military units and subunits for guarding corrective labor institutions and special motorized military units;
- to exercise control over the activities of military units for guarding corrective labor institutions and special motorized military units and the performance of duty by guard details and line-unit details;
- to participate in conducting joint exercises and training sessions of subunits of internal affairs agencies and military units of the Internal Troops;
- to hear reports from commanders of military units for guarding corrective labor institutions and special motorized military units on the results of official combat activities;
- to assist commanders in creating proper conditions for activities of military units and units of the Internal Troops, including those arriving to accomplish missions from other regions of the Russian Federation, and also in observing guarantees of legal and social protection of service members of the Internal Troops and their family members;
- to arrange for equipping facilities of corrective labor institutions being guarded by the Internal Troops with engineer equipment, construction and outfitting of guardrooms and military installations, as well as their repair.

Section VII. Calling Upon the Internal Troops To Perform Duties Assigned To Them

Article 36. Procedure for the Performance of Assigned Duties by Formations, Military Units, and Subunits of the Internal Troops

The procedure for performance of assigned duties by formations, military units, and subunits of the Internal Troops is determined by this law, the Regulation of the Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation, and normative acts of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation.

The duration of calling upon formations, military units, and subunits to perform duties in conditions of an emergency situation must not exceed three months. In so doing, for officers, warrant officers, extended-service personnel, and service members performing service under contract, the term of service is computed at the rate of one month for three in length of service giving the

right to a pension, and for compulsory-service personnel it is at the rate of one month for three in length of labor service for a granting a pension. Increased pay and allowances are also paid in the manner established by the Government of the Russian Federation.

Article 37. Calling Upon Formations, Military Units, and Subunits of the Internal Troops To Perform Duties Outside Their Disposition Areas

Calling upon formations and military units of the Internal Troops to perform duties outside their disposition areas is accomplished by the minister of internal affairs of the Russian Federation.

Senior operational command personnel are authorized to call upon subunits of special motorized military units for a period of up to one month to provide assistance to internal affairs agencies in maintaining public order within the limits of the corresponding territories (republic belonging to the Russian Federation, kray, oblast, autonomous oblast, autonomous okrug, and cities of Moscow and Saint Petersburg) with mandatory notification of the commander of the Internal Troops of the decision made.

Section VIII. Guarantees of Legal and Social Protection of Service Members of the Internal Troops

Article 38. Mandatory Nature of Observance of the Lawful Demands of Service Members of the Internal Troops

It is mandatory that the lawful demands of a service member of the Internal Troops be observed by citizens and officials of the Russian Federation.

Failure to observe the lawful demands of a service member of the Internal Troops and actions impeding their performance of assigned duties will entail liability established by legislation of the Russian Federation.

Article 39. Necessary Defense and Absolute Necessity With Respect to the Activities of a Service Member of the Internal Troops

Legislation of the Russian Federation on necessary defense and absolute necessity applies to the activities of a service member of the Internal Troops.

Article 40. Inadmissibility of Interference in the Actions of a Service Member of the Internal Troops

In the performance of duty and the duties assigned to him, a service member of the Internal Troops is guided only by the law, is the representative of authority, and is under the protection of the state.

No one has the right to interfere in the lawful actions of a service member of the Internal Troops, other than persons directly empowered to do so by this law. No one has the right to force a service member of the Internal Troops to perform duties not assigned to the Internal Troops by this law.

Article 41. Testimony of a Service Member of the Internal Troops

The testimony of a service member of the Internal Troops on a case on a crime or administrative offense for which he is a victim or witness is evaluated equally with other evidence obtained in the manner established by law.

Article 42. Right of a Service Member of the Internal Troops to Judicial Protection

Service members of the Internal Troops have the right to judicial protection of their rights and legitimate interests, including to appeal to a military court an order on discharge from military service.

Article 43. State Insurance and Compensation for Damage in the Event of Death or Injury of a Service Member of the Internal Troops

All service members of the Internal Troops are subject to compulsory state personal insurance at the expense of the republic budget of the Russian Federation.

In the event of the death of a service member of the Internal Troops in the line of duty or within one year after his discharge from service as a result of an injury, wound, or illness received or contracted during the performance of service, his family and dependents are paid a lump-sum benefit in the amount of 10-years pay and allowances of this service member from funds of the republic budget of the Russian Federation, with subsequent recovery of this amount from the guilty persons.

If a service member of the Internal Troops is injured, wounded, or contracts an illness in the line of duty which prevents him from continuing to serve, he is paid a lump-sum benefit in the amount of 5-years pay and allowances from funds of the republic budget of the Russian Federation, with subsequent recovery of this amount from the guilty persons.

Damage caused to property of a service member of the Internal Troops or to his family in connection with his performance of duty is reimbursed in full from funds of the republic budget of the Russian Federation, with subsequent recovery of this amount from the guilty persons.

Article 44. Providing Housing Space to Service Members of the Internal Troops

Officers, warrant officers, and extended-service personnel are provided housing in the form of a separate apartment or house according to established norms by local bodies of executive power, and also by the appropriate ministries, departments, enterprises, institutions, and organizations whose facilities are being guarded by the Internal Troops, in the manner established by legislative and other normative acts of the Russian Federation with regard to service members of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.

For construction of housing at individual garrisons and isolated military installations, the Internal Troops are allocated funds by the Government of the Russian Federation from the republic budget of the Russian Federation as well as centralized state material and technical resources and authorized to create the appropriate structural subunits is authorized with financing of administrative and technical personnel and military construction workers using appropriations from the republic budget of the Russian Federation.

Unprivatized housing occupied by officers, warrant officers, and extended-service personnel in buildings of the available municipal housing and the available housing of ministries, enterprises, institutions, and organizations is assigned to the Internal Troops. When these housing facilities are vacated, they are occupied by service members of the Internal Troops. In the event of redeployment of a military unit and the lack of other military units of the Internal Troops in this area, the housing occupied by the service members of this military unit shall be returned to the bodies of local self-government unless otherwise specified by legislation of the Russian Federation.

Service members of the Internal Troops (other than compulsory-service personnel) have the right to join housing construction (housing) cooperatives, acquire and build individual residential buildings for their duty location in the manner and on terms specified by legislation in force; those serving in the areas of the Far North and equivalent localities and in localities with severe climate conditions in which tour limits have been set, in individual garrisons and isolated military installations upon serving 15 calendar years or more regardless of place of service—in cities and populated areas selected by them. In doing so, service members with 10 or more continuous years of flawless military service and not provided housing space or needing an improvement in housing conditions, having joined housing construction (housing) cooperatives or constructing individual residential buildings, are provided free financial assistance at their duty station in the amount of 75 percent of the cost of the cooperative housing or bank credit received for construction of the individual residential building.

Officers in the rank of colonel, its equivalent, and above who are in military service or discharged from military service, commanders of separate military units, service members who are instructors at military-educational institutions, and scientific workers having academic degrees or titles have the right to additional living space or an additional room in the amount of at least 10 square meters.

Service members of the Internal Troops (other than compulsory-service personnel) residing with their family members are provided apartments that meet the requirements of housing legislation of the Russian Federation and sanitary standards within six months after their

arrival at the duty location. These persons must be granted temporary housing or dormitories until receipt of permanent housing.

A service member is paid monetary compensation for renting temporary housing in the amount stipulated in the housing rental agreement until living space is provided in the established time period.

Local bodies of executive authority may sell housing on favorable terms to service members of the Internal Troops (other than compulsory-service personnel) at 50 percent of its value.

For officers, warrant officers, and extended-service personnel of the Internal Troops who have 20 or more calendar years of service, persons discharged from military service for age, illness, reduction in forces, or limited health and having 20 or more calendar years of service, war veterans, soldier-internationalists, and also family members of service members killed or of service members who died as a result of service-related wounds, injuries, or illness, the housing space occupied by them in buildings of available municipal and departmental housing is transferred to their ownership free of charge.

The procedure for granting these individuals tax benefits associated with privatization of housing facilities is established by legislation of the Russian Federation.

Officers, warrant officers, and extended-service personnel discharged from military service into the reserve or retired, as well as their families, are provided housing at their chosen place of residence on a priority basis but within at least three months. If it is impossible to provide living space within the established time period, with consent of the reserve or retired service member, he is paid monetary compensation until receipt of living space in the amount stipulated by a housing rental agreement. If a service member of the Internal Troops exercises this right, the local bodies of executive power charged with this responsibility.

If a service member of the Internal Troops dies in the line of duty, the family of the deceased retains the right to receive living space on those grounds which existed when placed on the rolls for needing improvement in housing conditions, and the living space is granted to the family no later than one year from the date of death of the service member.

Article 45. Providing Service Members of the Internal Troops with a Telephone and Granting Their Children Places in Children's Preschool Institutions

Officers of the Internal Troops have the right to installation of telephones in their quarters out of turn.

Places in children's preschool institutions are granted to children of service members of the Internal Troops by local bodies of executive power, appropriate ministries, departments, state and municipal enterprises, organizations, and institutions within six months from the date of

submission of the request with payment on favorable terms established by the Government of the Russian Republic.

Article 46. Medical Care for Service Members of the Internal Troops and Their Family Members

The right of service members of the Internal Troops to medical care is realized by conducting medical, hygienic and treatment measures, constant monitoring of the health of service members, giving them medical assistance in the event of injury or illness, and providing them free medicines and various medical services in medical institutions of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation.

Service members of the Internal Troops are accepted for outpatient and inpatient treatment by institutions of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation and on a contract basis, using budget funds of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation, at treatment institutions of the Ministry of Public Health of the Russian Federation and other ministries and departments of the Russian Federation and republics belonging to the Russian Federation.

In the event service members of the Internal Troops need emergency medical assistance, such assistance is given to them free of charge at the nearest medical institution of the Ministry of Defense or any other health institutions of the Russian Federation.

Family members of officers, warrant officers, and extended-service personnel, are authorized medical service at treatment institutions of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation, as are service members discharged from military service into the reserve or retired and having at least 20 calendar years of service.

Sanitary supervision of the facilities of military installations of the Internal Troops is accomplished by sanitary-epidemiological institutions of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation and the State Committee for Sanitary-Epidemiological Supervision under the President of the Russian Federation.

Article 47. The Right of Service Members of the Internal Troops to Free Travel

Service members of the Internal Troops throughout the Russian Federation may use free of charge all types of public transportation of urban, suburban, and local routes (other than taxis), as well as en-route transportation in rural areas.

Service members of the Internal Troops performing duty on transportation lines of communication or in areas where an emergency situation has been instituted, in addition, have the right to free passage on trains and on river and maritime vessels within the areas serviced.

Service members of the Internal Troops and their family members (other than family members of compulsory-service personnel) are granted the right once a year to

free passage to and from their scheduled leave location at the expense of funds of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation.

Officers, warrant officers, and extended-service personnel of the Internal Troops using personal transportation for official purposes are paid monetary compensation in the manner and amounts established by the Government of the Russian Federation.

Article 48. Rights of Service Members of the Internal Troops when on an Official Trip

Service members of the Internal Troops sent on an official trip enjoy the right to acquire travel documents out of turn for all types of transport and to hotel accommodations according to travel orders.

Article 49. Social Welfare and Privileges of Service Members of the Internal Troops

Service members of the Internal Troops are exempt from income tax on pay and allowances, monetary awards, and other payments received in connection with performance of military duties.

Service members of the Internal Troops and their family members are provided personal goods and services by the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation and the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation through military trade organizations in the manner established for the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and also by other trade institutions using resources allocated by them according to requests by commanders of formations and military units and chiefs of institutions.

Officers, warrant officers, and extended-service personnel of the Internal Troops who are on military duty and also those discharged from military service for age, illness, reduction in force, or limited health and having 20 or more calendar years of service pay for the living space occupied by them and their family members residing with them in buildings of available state, municipal, and departmental housing and for municipal services, including telephone use, in the amount of 50 percent.

Service members of the Internal Troops having 15 or more calendar years of service, persons discharged from military service for age, illness, reduction in force, or limited health and having 15 or more calendar years of service, and family members of service members killed or of service members who died as a result of service-related wounds, injuries, contusions, or illness are provided free of charge tax-free land for the construction of individual residential buildings and garden plots at norms not below those established by legislation of the Russian Federation and issued loans for erecting the appropriate residential buildings in an amount established by legislation of the Russian Federation.

Upon discharge from military service, service members of the Internal Troops are paid a lump-sum benefit in the manner established by the Government of the Russian

Federation. Officers, warrant officers, and extended-service personnel having 20 or more calendar years of service, at their request, may be sold at the initial residual value motor vehicles and tractor equipment in service in the Internal Troops in the manner established by the Minister of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation.

Non-working wives of officers, warrant officers, and extended-service members of the Internal Troops at remote garrisons and in localities lacking employment opportunities are paid a monthly social benefit in the amount equal to the minimum wage established by law, with the time this benefit is received included in the length of labor service.

Other standards of social and legal guarantees established for service members of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and, when necessary, by decision of the Government of the Russian Federation, the standards of social and legal guarantees specified for the corresponding categories of associates of internal affairs agencies also apply in full to service members of the Internal Troops and their family members.

The governments of the republics belonging to the Russian Federation and local bodies of executive power may establish additional guarantees of social protection of service members of the Internal Troops not specified by this law.

Article 50. Responsibility for Failure To Observe the Guarantees of Legal and Social Protection of Service Members of the Internal Troops

In the event of failure to observe the guarantees of legal and social protection of service members of the Internal Troops specified by this law, the officials guilty of this bear responsibility as established by legislation of the Russian Federation.

Section IX. Financing and Logistic Support of the Internal Troops

Article 51. Financing of the Internal Troops

The Internal Troops are financed using funds of the republic budget of the Russian Federation as a separate item.

Article 52. Logistic and Military Support of the Internal Troops

The procedure and standards of logistic and military support of the Internal Troops, taking into account the functional purpose of the military units, are established by the Government of the Russian Federation at the recommendation of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation.

Combat equipment is repaired at repair enterprises of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, including at plants of the Navy of the Russian Federation on the basis of contracts (requests) of the Internal Troops.

The construction or granting of facilities for housing military units (subunits) of the Internal Troops is done in the manner and according to standards established for service members of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (taking into account particular features specified by the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation) at the expense of the ministries, departments, enterprises, institutions, and organizations in charge of the facilities being guarded by the Internal Troops; facilities for housing the Main Directorate of the Commander of the Internal Troops, headquarters of districts and formations of the Internal Troops, aviation and maritime units, operational military units, special motorized military units, institutions, and military-educational institutions, respectively, at the expense of funds of the republic budget of the Russian Federation and budget funds of local bodies of executive power with centralized provision of material resources.

Repair of and municipal services for military installations, buildings, and structures allotted for housing military units (subunits) are provided using appropriations from the republic budget of the Russian Federation for human and material resources allocated for these purposes by the ministries and departments in whose interests the personnel of the Internal Troops are performing official duties and also by bodies of local self-government.

Construction, major repair, and renovation of engineer and technical equipment and support of its operation is accomplished using funds of the ministries, departments, enterprises, and state institutions and organizations in charge of the facilities being guarded by the Internal Troops.

Repair of and municipal services for buildings of the Main Directorate of the Commander of the Internal Troops, headquarters of districts and formations of the Internal Troops, aviation and maritime military units, operational military units, special motorized military units, institutions, and military-educational institutions of the Internal Troops are provided, respectively, at the expense of the republic budget of the Russian Federation and budget funds of local bodies of executive power with centralized provision of material resources.

Service members of the Internal Troops on temporary duty away from their permanent duty station are provided housing, municipal services, communications lines and channels, motor transport and fuel and oil, and additional food at the expense of funds specially allocated from the republic budget of the Russian Federation.

Section X. Monitoring and Supervision of the Legality of Activities of the Internal Troops

Article 53. Departmental Monitoring of the Legality of Activities of the Internal Troops

The minister of internal affairs of the Russian Federation accomplishes departmental monitoring of the efficient use of men and equipment in the Internal Troops,

the conformity of organizational structures of military units to the volume and nature of tasks assigned them, and also the legality of their activities.

Article 54. Procurators' Supervision of the Legality of Activities of the Internal Troops

The Procurator General of the Russian Federation and the procurators subordinate to him accomplish supervision of the legality of activities of the Internal Troops.

[Signed] B. Yeltsin
President of the Russian Federation
Moscow, House of Soviets, Russia
24 September 1992
No 3534-1

Decree on Implementation of Law on Internal Troops

935D0029B Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 13 Oct 92 p 7

[Decree of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation: "On the Procedure for Implementation of the Law of the Russian Federation on Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation"]

[Text] The Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation decrees:

1. The implementation of the Law of the Russian Federation on Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation at the time of its promulgation.

2. The Committee of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation on Issues of Legality, Law and Order, and Fighting Crime shall submit within two months to the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation proposals on bringing legislative acts of the Russian Federation in line with this law.

3. The Government of the Russian Federation within three months shall:

—adopt the necessary legal acts on implementing the provisions of the Law of the Russian Federation on Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation;

—ensure review and repeal by the ministries and departments of the Russian Federation of normative and other acts that are contrary to this law.

[Signed] R.I. Khasbulatov
Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation
Moscow, House of Soviets, Russia
24 September 1992
No 3535-1

Decree on Reconsideration of Law on Internal Troops

935D0029C Moscow *ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA*
in Russian 13 Oct 92 p 7

[Decree of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation: "On Reconsideration of the Law of the Russian Federation on Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation"]

[Text] Having reconsidered the Law of the Russian Federation on Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation returned by

the President of the Russian Federation, the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation decrees:

The adoption of the Law of the Russian Federation on Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation with the remarks of the President of the Russian Federation taken into account and editing clarifications.


[Signed] R.I. Khasbulatov
Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation
Moscow, House of Soviets, Russia
24 September 1992
No 3536-1

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